Thread by @james_acton32

<THRAED>My main reaction to CMPR...

I think it's quite likely that China will restart fissile material production--but I am NOT convinced by the argument in CMPR that it has already decided to do so.

media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/20…

(1/n)

China is believed to have ceased production of missile material for weapons, but it has never declared a formal cut-off. Presumably, it wants the option to restart production. And, given other developments, no-one should be surprised if it exercises that option.

BUT... (2/n)

I'm somewhat skeptical that China's fast reactor program is--today, at least--intended to produce plutonium for weapons. It requires China to master two difficult technologies: operating fast reactors and reprocessing oxide fuel. (Fuel fabrication may not be simple either). (3/n)

The process is likely to be slow and carries some fairly significant technical risk. It doesn't seem all that attractive from a military perspective. (4/n)

I believed that if China wants to restart fissile material production--which, to be clear, it may--it'll build dedicated reactors (moderated by graphite or heavy water) and reprocessing plants for that purpose. It'd be fast and reliable, given Chinese experience. (5/n)

I want to be clear. Technically, fast-breeders could produce lots of plutonium well-suited for weapons. And, if the fast breeder program is successful, it could be coopted for military purposes. (6/n)

I am yet to be convinced, however, that the fast-breeder program is currently intended to produce plutonium for weapons--although this is what the IC would call a low confidence assessment: better than 50-50 but not by much. (7/7)