The shell game idea was originally developed--but never implemented--in the Cold War by the US, which planned to hide 200 ICBMs in 4,600 silos (seriously!) to complicate Soviet efforts to destroy them preemptively. (2/n)
.@DeptofDefense assesses that China's current "operational warhead stockpile" is in the low 200s and that China has enough fissile material on hand to double its warhead stockpile. (3/n)
This statement needs careful parsing (I've been guilty of sloppiness here before). The warhead stockpile that could double (or more) appears to be the larger *total* stockpile, not the smaller *operational* stockpile. (4/n)
So, I @DeptofDefense as implying that China could build very roughly 250 new warheads and conceivably 300 or even 350.
Now, superficially, that appears to be enough for 230 new silos.
BUT...
(5/n)
The new silos are likely for DF-41 ICBMs, which can carry multiple warheads. They've reportedly been tested with two warheads, but there's press leaks (of questionably provenance) saying they can carry more. (6/n)
China's force of nuclear-armed and dual-capable regional missiles may be expanding too (in particular, the DF-26 force). (9/n)
When you add up all this demand, it's very difficult for me to see how China can meet it from its existing fissile material stockpile...
...which provides evidence for the shell game hypothesis. In fact, the more silos there are, the more likely it becomes. (10/n)
Now, to be clear, China could be planning to produce more fissile material.
But, China surely needs plutonium for its warheads and plutonium production is fairly time consuming and visible, and there's no evidence it's started yet. (11/n)
In summary, I'd assess with ~70% confidence that the new DF-41s silos will be a shell game--at least initially. However, over time (measured in years), China may produce more fissile material and warheads and fill more silos. (12/12)
Addendum: I do think it's very possible that China will arm some DF-41s with one single-warhead glider each. I strongly doubt that'll alter the basic fissile material math. (13/13)
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Essentially, I suspect that China will seek to hide a relatively small number of real ICBMs in a much larger number of silos and dummy ICBMs--a form of "shell game" intended to complicate U.S. efforts to destroy China's nuclear forces. (2/n)
This scheme was originally developed in the Carter administration for the MX missile. The US planned to build 4,600 (not a typo!) shelters to hide 200 ICBMs. Ultimately, the Reagan administration changed plans, largely for reasons of domestic politics. (3/n)
China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)
The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.
But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.
See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)
2. Make all intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes (whether nuclear or conventionally armed) accountable. (3/n)
<THREAD>Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov responded to @USArmsControl in an interview with @ElenaChernenko. Beyond the predictable lack of interest in U.S. proposals, two points caught my eye.
First, the good news. If Biden wins, Ryabkov did not rule out agreeing to a New START extension in the time between Biden's inauguration (Jan 20) and the treaty's expiry (Feb 5).
Previously, Russian officials and experts had said that time would be too short. (2/n)
Second, in his interview, @USArmsControl explicitly threatened that, if New START is not extended, the U.S. will "unconvert" converted delivery systems so they can be used to deliver nuclear warheads. (3/n)