If it's true that the US and the UK are going to help Australia to acquire nuclear submarine technology, they are making a significant mistake.

It will create serious proliferation risk down the line. (1/n)

afr.com/politics/feder…
I'm NOT particularly concerned that Australia will acquire nuclear weapons. I AM concerned that other states will use this precedent to exploit a serious potential loophole in the global nonproliferation regime. (2/n)
Because non-nuclear weapon states are not prohibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, IAEA safeguards permit them to remove nuclear material from safeguards for "non-proscribed military activity." (3/n)

iaea.org/sites/default/…
This is a *huge* loophole that could easily be exploited to enable proliferation. Fortunately, it's never been tested. Non-nuclear weapon states have started programs to develop nuclear powered submarines, but for one reason or another, they have never come to fruition. (4/n)
Brazil is a classic example, which @tkassenova discussed in her excellent Carnegie volume. (5/n)

carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/12/bra…
If the US and UK help Australia acquire nuclear submarines, will they say no to, for example, South Korea, whose nonproliferation credentials are less than perfect (sorry) and which has stronger potential incentives to proliferate? (6/n)
And what about Brazil? Or Saudi Arabia? Or Iran? They could all invoke Australia as a precedent too. (7/n)
Right now--and this is the key point--Russia and China might well oppose any of those states invoking the exemption and levy some serious behind-the-scenes pressure to prevent it. (8/n)
But, if Australia exploits the exception, they'll become much less inclined to levy such pressure because it'll be perpetuating a very real double standard. (9/n)
I'm not an expert in submarine technology and won't try and analyze whether nuclear-powered attack submarines are the most cost-effective way for Australia to meet its (very real) defense needs. (10/n)
But, I find it very hard to believe that the benefits outweigh the risks, given the very real damage to the nonproliferation regime of Australia's acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. (11/11)

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More from @james_acton32

15 Sep
I've been saying all day that it's about the precedent not Australia. But, if Australia wants to be transparent, I have some questions:

1. Will the reactors be fueled by low enriched uranium or highly enriched uranium?

(1/n)
2. How will Australia acquire the material? Domestic enrichment? Purchase?

3. Who will supply the fuel? Or will it be fabricated domestically?

4. At what point will IAEA safeguards on the reactor fuel be terminated? And reinstated?

(2/n)
5. Does the Australian government accept that removing nuclear material from safeguards will set a bad precedent, even if it believes that the benefits to Australia of doing so outweigh the risks? If so, what it will do to mitigate this precedent?
Read 5 tweets
27 Jul
<THREAD>@nukestrat and @mattkorda have discovered ~110 new Chinese silos, bringing the total to 230.

In my opinion, this reinforces the shell game hypothesis--the idea that only some of the silos will have ICBMs in.

nytimes.com/2021/07/26/us/…
(1/n)
The shell game idea was originally developed--but never implemented--in the Cold War by the US, which planned to hide 200 ICBMs in 4,600 silos (seriously!) to complicate Soviet efforts to destroy them preemptively. (2/n)

washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/…
.@DeptofDefense assesses that China's current "operational warhead stockpile" is in the low 200s and that China has enough fissile material on hand to double its warhead stockpile. (3/n)

media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20…
Read 13 tweets
30 Jun
China is building more than 100 new ICBM silos--a major discovery by @ArmsControlWonk and @dex_eve and reported by @JobyWarrick.

My working hypothesis (as mentioned in article) is that China will deploy much fewer than 100 new missiles. (1/n)

washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
Essentially, I suspect that China will seek to hide a relatively small number of real ICBMs in a much larger number of silos and dummy ICBMs--a form of "shell game" intended to complicate U.S. efforts to destroy China's nuclear forces. (2/n)
This scheme was originally developed in the Carter administration for the MX missile. The US planned to build 4,600 (not a typo!) shelters to hide 200 ICBMs. Ultimately, the Reagan administration changed plans, largely for reasons of domestic politics. (3/n)
Read 13 tweets
16 Jun
Let's do math on the Taishan fuel leak!

Chinese authorities estimate that around five fuel rods have leaked, but basically says this is unremarkable. No biggie.

But, actually, this many rods leaking is very unusual. Let's work out how unusual. (1/n)

world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Fuel-…
China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)

aris.iaea.org/PDF/EPR.pdf
Now, the @W_Nuclear_News article linked above cites the @iaeaorg as saying that there are ~14 leaks per 1,000,000 rods. (3/n)
Read 8 tweets
17 Nov 20
<THREAD>Thoughts on the successful test of an SM-3 IIA interceptor against an ICBM.

BLUF: For technical & operational reasons, SM-IIAs aren't much use for homeland defense, especially against Russia or China.

Politically this test is a BIG deal. (1/n)

The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.

But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.

See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)

Read 17 tweets
16 Nov 20
<THREAD>The @DeptofDefense is ignoring the danger of inadvertent nuclear war.

Thanks to @RepRickLarsen, other @HASCDemocrats, and their staff, DoD has issued a report on inadvertent escalation.

It's very revealing... but not in a good way. (1/n)
My concern is that this report is really about maintaining effective deterrence, not preventing inadvertent escalation.

Of course, maintaining effective deterrent is important! But, even if deterrence is effective, a nuclear war could still break out.

I'll explain. (2/n)
The report rightly recognizes the need to “clearly communicate U.S. intentions” [p. 1].

Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests.

That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)
Read 11 tweets

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