I'm NOT particularly concerned that Australia will acquire nuclear weapons. I AM concerned that other states will use this precedent to exploit a serious potential loophole in the global nonproliferation regime. (2/n)
Because non-nuclear weapon states are not prohibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, IAEA safeguards permit them to remove nuclear material from safeguards for "non-proscribed military activity." (3/n)
This is a *huge* loophole that could easily be exploited to enable proliferation. Fortunately, it's never been tested. Non-nuclear weapon states have started programs to develop nuclear powered submarines, but for one reason or another, they have never come to fruition. (4/n)
Brazil is a classic example, which @tkassenova discussed in her excellent Carnegie volume. (5/n)
If the US and UK help Australia acquire nuclear submarines, will they say no to, for example, South Korea, whose nonproliferation credentials are less than perfect (sorry) and which has stronger potential incentives to proliferate? (6/n)
And what about Brazil? Or Saudi Arabia? Or Iran? They could all invoke Australia as a precedent too. (7/n)
Right now--and this is the key point--Russia and China might well oppose any of those states invoking the exemption and levy some serious behind-the-scenes pressure to prevent it. (8/n)
But, if Australia exploits the exception, they'll become much less inclined to levy such pressure because it'll be perpetuating a very real double standard. (9/n)
I'm not an expert in submarine technology and won't try and analyze whether nuclear-powered attack submarines are the most cost-effective way for Australia to meet its (very real) defense needs. (10/n)
But, I find it very hard to believe that the benefits outweigh the risks, given the very real damage to the nonproliferation regime of Australia's acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. (11/11)
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2. How will Australia acquire the material? Domestic enrichment? Purchase?
3. Who will supply the fuel? Or will it be fabricated domestically?
4. At what point will IAEA safeguards on the reactor fuel be terminated? And reinstated?
(2/n)
5. Does the Australian government accept that removing nuclear material from safeguards will set a bad precedent, even if it believes that the benefits to Australia of doing so outweigh the risks? If so, what it will do to mitigate this precedent?
The shell game idea was originally developed--but never implemented--in the Cold War by the US, which planned to hide 200 ICBMs in 4,600 silos (seriously!) to complicate Soviet efforts to destroy them preemptively. (2/n)
.@DeptofDefense assesses that China's current "operational warhead stockpile" is in the low 200s and that China has enough fissile material on hand to double its warhead stockpile. (3/n)
Essentially, I suspect that China will seek to hide a relatively small number of real ICBMs in a much larger number of silos and dummy ICBMs--a form of "shell game" intended to complicate U.S. efforts to destroy China's nuclear forces. (2/n)
This scheme was originally developed in the Carter administration for the MX missile. The US planned to build 4,600 (not a typo!) shelters to hide 200 ICBMs. Ultimately, the Reagan administration changed plans, largely for reasons of domestic politics. (3/n)
China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)
The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.
But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.
See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)