Tout le monde, et encore plus ceux qui s'intéressent aux relations diplomatiques entre Etats africains, allez lire cette archive absolument fascinante - on y voit des petites saynètes du off entre hommes d'Etat africains - Blaise, Sankara, Kadhafi et Rawlings qui discutent...
Autre épisode intrigant... Selon l'ancien président ghanéen, le soutien qu'il donnait à l'opposant togolais Sylvanus Olympio, et l'évocation par ce dernier d'une unité Ghana/Togo aurait agacé Mitterrand et pourrait expliquer la tentative d'assassinat contre Olympio...
Plus, la France aurait rassemblé des soldats d'Afrique francophone au Togo et tenté des provocations militaires pour déclencher une guerre avec le Ghana et renverser le régime Rawlings...
Full disclosure: je ne suis pas du tout spécialiste de ces pays, ni des relations frano-africaines... Mais il y a là des épisodes mystérieux. Est-ce que Paris est vraiment dans l'attaque contre Olympio?
Rawlings a-t-il surinterprété des manoeuvres militaires organisées par la France avec ses alliés ouest-africains au Togo? La France a-t-elle fait ces manoeuvres pour montrer à Rawlings qu'il fallait qu'il s'occupe de ses affaires. Ou Paris voulait vraiment renverser Rawlings?
A minima, c'est révélateur de la perception d'un homme d'Etat africain majeur de ces années-là... Peut-être qu'on finira par en savoir plus...
De ce point de vue-là, et puisque la question revient régulièrement, on peut citer le travail remarquable de @SmallArmsSurvey sur le Niger, cas intéressant, puisque le pays est au croisement des deux zones du djihad ouest-africain: le Sahel central et le Lac Tchad/Borno.
Dans l'étude ci-dessous, Small Arms Survey essaie de tracer la provenance des armes saisies par les forces nigériennes sur ces deux fronts. Pour le Lac Tchad, le gros des armes utilisées sont bien des prises de guerre. smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/…
Autre résultat très intéressant: les deux fronts du djihad ouest-africain sont deux bassins de circulation très peu connectés (à l'époque, en 2017 - on se demande bien sûr ce qu'il en est maintenant).
A thread on recent events in Sambisa. There are some reasons to think #ISWAP has largely prevailed for now in the struggle that broke out in August with malcontent #JASDJ groups who refused to rally. #BokoHaram
A 15-minute ISWAP video has been circulating for a few days, which discusses the issue of the JASDJ dissenters. The video comprises of four segments.
First, there is a short extract by Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi, the official spokesperson of the Islamic State, taken from a speech he made after Shekau’s death. The extract chosen welcomes the victory of ISWAP over the “khawarij”, the “extremists”.
About the reports on #BokoHaram associates defecting in Cameroon & Nigeria... a thread... First, it is a welcome development, and it is clear that it has a lot to do with the Lake Chad states setting up and advertising defection/reintegration programmes.
Jihadis would not come out if it were not for those programmes, which make clear to them that there is a safe way out. It seems previous defectors play a big role in facilitating additional exits, too - informing potential defectors & contacting the authorities on their behalf.
So much for critics of these programmes... Yes, these pgs come with flaws, but if they can get some people to stop fighting, they are useful.
I definitely agree, @judithverweijen. So let me try and reflect a bit about policy and knowledge re: global jihad and African franchises based on what I have learnt from the #BokoHaram field...
As the title of your paper makes clear, your preoccupation with the insistance on the global jihadi connection of the (former?) ADF has to do essentially with policy, not with knowledge.
I share that concern: reductio ad jihadum is very dangerous indeed, & states should not be given a free pass just because their enemy is jihadi or has jihadi connections. Jihadi draw their strength from the unfair and abusive nature of states and of the global system.
I must say that this one time, my sense is different from yours, @bulamabukarti. In the #ISWAP video, there is at least Tahiru Baga, the English-speaking old man, a Yusufiyya pioneer and hisbah leader.
Also, I can't help noticing that reported attacks on civilians by #JASDJ have dropped drastically in Cameroon - one plausible interpretation is JASDJ is falling in line with ISWAP policy. Bakura is the exception here (and there are still attacks against civilians in Chad).
Plus ISWAP has already claimed four attacks in areas that used to be JASDJ areas. And they attacked Damboa from both sides, from Alagarno and from Sambisa.
Meetings took place in Sambisa early on. 18 out of 20 Jasdj units reached quickly an agreement over doctrine. Only two groups had reservations - including the "Kangar" group - Bakura.
I have commented on the situation re:Bakura in an earlier discussion of Sahalaba's video.
There is indication Bakura and Iswap fought in early June. Not clear what the situation. The Sahalaba video called for the mediation the IS - and expressed loyalty to the Caliph...