Reading the alleged report by Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mamadu Turé on the 1 Feb incidents at the Palacio do Governo in #GuineaBissau, available at the website ditadura e consenso (a usually good source for documents). ditaduraeconsenso.blogspot.com/2022/02/tentat…
This is not an official source, however, so the authenticity of the report is not certain. Nor is it clear that the content of the report is accurate – as I mentioned before, accounts of many key events in Bissau are controversial, sometimes decades after the deed...
A number of opposition politicians and (pro-opposition?) civil society figures have made it very clear that they did not believe the official version of the story, some of them hinting that this was a ploy against the opposition PAIGC, which is to hold its Congress soon.
Also, it’s not clear whether the post includes all the pages of the report or not – perhaps it does, since it includes a first (with mention of the identity of the authoring authority and that of the recipient) and a last page (with signature and stamp). Three pages in all, only?
The report largely squares with the narrative of President Sissoco. It mentions the attackers captured some of the security detail in Palacio, and then shot at the building intensely (including two RPG rockets).
Security personnel identified some of the attackers, all of them members of the security forces. Papis Djeme, Domingos Iogna, Pam Braia, Tchami Yala, Mario Fanda, Matchi and Demna.
Strangely, one member of the Prime Minister’s security detail, Braima Sori Djalo, was among the attackers – he was killed, apparently the only casualty on the side of the attackers.
Three other participants were captured (Antonio Indami, Adão Rodrigues & Ligna Armando Nhaga) and are detained at the HQ of the Armed Forces. Weapons and vehicles were seized.
Judging from the patronyms, the group was an ethnic mix, with a Balanta dominance – not unlike the armed forces. Some of the names will be familiar to those who follow Bissau’s recent history.
Mario Fanda, from the Para-Comando unit, was arrested in 2015 because he took part to the robbery of a Senegalese cocaine trafficker. As for Tcham Iala, he was accused of involvement in a 2008 attack on the house of the then President Nino Vieira.
Along with Papis Djeme, Tcham Iala was a close associate of the then Navy Chief of Staff Bubo na Tchuto and was caught in the DEA sting operation of 2013. All three men served time in the United States.
They hail from that part of the military who have agreed to engage in the complex, messy & unproductive) game of military factionalism (often with extra flavours of party politics, ethnic politicking + cocaine topping) played by many major political & military actors for years.
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Tout le monde, et encore plus ceux qui s'intéressent aux relations diplomatiques entre Etats africains, allez lire cette archive absolument fascinante - on y voit des petites saynètes du off entre hommes d'Etat africains - Blaise, Sankara, Kadhafi et Rawlings qui discutent...
Autre épisode intrigant... Selon l'ancien président ghanéen, le soutien qu'il donnait à l'opposant togolais Sylvanus Olympio, et l'évocation par ce dernier d'une unité Ghana/Togo aurait agacé Mitterrand et pourrait expliquer la tentative d'assassinat contre Olympio...
Plus, la France aurait rassemblé des soldats d'Afrique francophone au Togo et tenté des provocations militaires pour déclencher une guerre avec le Ghana et renverser le régime Rawlings...
De ce point de vue-là, et puisque la question revient régulièrement, on peut citer le travail remarquable de @SmallArmsSurvey sur le Niger, cas intéressant, puisque le pays est au croisement des deux zones du djihad ouest-africain: le Sahel central et le Lac Tchad/Borno.
Dans l'étude ci-dessous, Small Arms Survey essaie de tracer la provenance des armes saisies par les forces nigériennes sur ces deux fronts. Pour le Lac Tchad, le gros des armes utilisées sont bien des prises de guerre. smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/…
Autre résultat très intéressant: les deux fronts du djihad ouest-africain sont deux bassins de circulation très peu connectés (à l'époque, en 2017 - on se demande bien sûr ce qu'il en est maintenant).
A thread on recent events in Sambisa. There are some reasons to think #ISWAP has largely prevailed for now in the struggle that broke out in August with malcontent #JASDJ groups who refused to rally. #BokoHaram
A 15-minute ISWAP video has been circulating for a few days, which discusses the issue of the JASDJ dissenters. The video comprises of four segments.
First, there is a short extract by Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi, the official spokesperson of the Islamic State, taken from a speech he made after Shekau’s death. The extract chosen welcomes the victory of ISWAP over the “khawarij”, the “extremists”.
About the reports on #BokoHaram associates defecting in Cameroon & Nigeria... a thread... First, it is a welcome development, and it is clear that it has a lot to do with the Lake Chad states setting up and advertising defection/reintegration programmes.
Jihadis would not come out if it were not for those programmes, which make clear to them that there is a safe way out. It seems previous defectors play a big role in facilitating additional exits, too - informing potential defectors & contacting the authorities on their behalf.
So much for critics of these programmes... Yes, these pgs come with flaws, but if they can get some people to stop fighting, they are useful.
I definitely agree, @judithverweijen. So let me try and reflect a bit about policy and knowledge re: global jihad and African franchises based on what I have learnt from the #BokoHaram field...
As the title of your paper makes clear, your preoccupation with the insistance on the global jihadi connection of the (former?) ADF has to do essentially with policy, not with knowledge.
I share that concern: reductio ad jihadum is very dangerous indeed, & states should not be given a free pass just because their enemy is jihadi or has jihadi connections. Jihadi draw their strength from the unfair and abusive nature of states and of the global system.
I must say that this one time, my sense is different from yours, @bulamabukarti. In the #ISWAP video, there is at least Tahiru Baga, the English-speaking old man, a Yusufiyya pioneer and hisbah leader.
Also, I can't help noticing that reported attacks on civilians by #JASDJ have dropped drastically in Cameroon - one plausible interpretation is JASDJ is falling in line with ISWAP policy. Bakura is the exception here (and there are still attacks against civilians in Chad).
Plus ISWAP has already claimed four attacks in areas that used to be JASDJ areas. And they attacked Damboa from both sides, from Alagarno and from Sambisa.