Learning something about Mohamed Yusuf, founder of the movement often known as #BokoHaram, known for his opposition to aspects of Western education ("Boko") which he deemed incompatible with Islam...
Yusuf was not always hostile to "Boko". His own children, including Habib Yusuf, who became the wali of #ISWAP in 2016, used to attend Al Kanemi College in Maiduguri, a private institution of repute, using English as teaching language (but also teaching Arabic).
But after Yusuf developed his criticism of "Boko", he removed his kids from Al Kanemi and sent them to a Quranic school in Maiduguri.
If I am correct, two of his wives were also following “modern” education in some institutions of Maiduguri, and he convinced them to drop it too.
After the 2009 uprising, during which Yusuf was executed by the police, supporters evacuated Yusuf’s children to Ndjamena, where they kept on studying the Quran. Following the establishment of jihadi camps in the Sambisa forest, Habib was brought there, launching his career…
I suspect this Boko education endowed Habib with the good English and Arabic that he is often noted for - a significant resource in his privileged relation with the Islamic State.
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Hearing of a recent case of "collateral damages" near Baga, in northern Borno. Herders were reportedly bombed by the Nigerian Air Force, killing several of them as well as many heads of cattle.
Was it a deliberate move, given the fact that the herders in all likelihood pay a tax to #ISWAP in order to be able to access grazing land there (the Nigerian military has been hitting at ISWAP's war economy of late)? Or was it a mistake?
Whatever the truth is, it heralds what we are going to get more and more of: as people redeploy (and are redeployed) in the vicinity of the Lake, they will want to access its agricultural resources, and will have little choice but to pay ISWAP.
Reading the alleged report by Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mamadu Turé on the 1 Feb incidents at the Palacio do Governo in #GuineaBissau, available at the website ditadura e consenso (a usually good source for documents). ditaduraeconsenso.blogspot.com/2022/02/tentat…
This is not an official source, however, so the authenticity of the report is not certain. Nor is it clear that the content of the report is accurate – as I mentioned before, accounts of many key events in Bissau are controversial, sometimes decades after the deed...
A number of opposition politicians and (pro-opposition?) civil society figures have made it very clear that they did not believe the official version of the story, some of them hinting that this was a ploy against the opposition PAIGC, which is to hold its Congress soon.
Tout le monde, et encore plus ceux qui s'intéressent aux relations diplomatiques entre Etats africains, allez lire cette archive absolument fascinante - on y voit des petites saynètes du off entre hommes d'Etat africains - Blaise, Sankara, Kadhafi et Rawlings qui discutent...
Autre épisode intrigant... Selon l'ancien président ghanéen, le soutien qu'il donnait à l'opposant togolais Sylvanus Olympio, et l'évocation par ce dernier d'une unité Ghana/Togo aurait agacé Mitterrand et pourrait expliquer la tentative d'assassinat contre Olympio...
Plus, la France aurait rassemblé des soldats d'Afrique francophone au Togo et tenté des provocations militaires pour déclencher une guerre avec le Ghana et renverser le régime Rawlings...
De ce point de vue-là, et puisque la question revient régulièrement, on peut citer le travail remarquable de @SmallArmsSurvey sur le Niger, cas intéressant, puisque le pays est au croisement des deux zones du djihad ouest-africain: le Sahel central et le Lac Tchad/Borno.
Dans l'étude ci-dessous, Small Arms Survey essaie de tracer la provenance des armes saisies par les forces nigériennes sur ces deux fronts. Pour le Lac Tchad, le gros des armes utilisées sont bien des prises de guerre. smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/…
Autre résultat très intéressant: les deux fronts du djihad ouest-africain sont deux bassins de circulation très peu connectés (à l'époque, en 2017 - on se demande bien sûr ce qu'il en est maintenant).
A thread on recent events in Sambisa. There are some reasons to think #ISWAP has largely prevailed for now in the struggle that broke out in August with malcontent #JASDJ groups who refused to rally. #BokoHaram
A 15-minute ISWAP video has been circulating for a few days, which discusses the issue of the JASDJ dissenters. The video comprises of four segments.
First, there is a short extract by Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi, the official spokesperson of the Islamic State, taken from a speech he made after Shekau’s death. The extract chosen welcomes the victory of ISWAP over the “khawarij”, the “extremists”.
About the reports on #BokoHaram associates defecting in Cameroon & Nigeria... a thread... First, it is a welcome development, and it is clear that it has a lot to do with the Lake Chad states setting up and advertising defection/reintegration programmes.
Jihadis would not come out if it were not for those programmes, which make clear to them that there is a safe way out. It seems previous defectors play a big role in facilitating additional exits, too - informing potential defectors & contacting the authorities on their behalf.
So much for critics of these programmes... Yes, these pgs come with flaws, but if they can get some people to stop fighting, they are useful.