Everything here is wrong for reasons typical of lazy, knee-jerk MAGA analysis:
1. Deterrence is deeply structured by local & historical factors. Defeats in one place don’t necessarily drive expansionism elsewhere. The Soviets also withdrew from Afghanistan, in the 80s. That
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1. Deterrence is deeply structured by local & historical factors. Defeats in one place don’t necessarily drive expansionism elsewhere. The Soviets also withdrew from Afghanistan, in the 80s. That
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https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/1496129817057669130
didn’t encourage the US to attack Mexico or West Germany to attack E Germany. When the US withdrew from Vietnam, the only dominoes to fall were Laos and Cambodia. All the credibility fears of the 60s were overblown. The US right’s fetishization of US presidential ‘weakness’ as
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a driver of foreign dictators’ bad behavior is really just a tell of their American parochialism - everything must be about us! - and their ignorance of other countries & the particulars of their conflicts. In this case, Putin’s been banging on against Ukrainian independence
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for 20+ years. This has nothing to do with some random US deployment change 6 months ago.
2. How is Ukraine possibly driven by the XL cancellation? Have any Russia experts even mentioned that in the last 3 months? Other than as an anti-Biden talking point, I can think of no
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2. How is Ukraine possibly driven by the XL cancellation? Have any Russia experts even mentioned that in the last 3 months? Other than as an anti-Biden talking point, I can think of no
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reason to mention this or what the causal logic is.
3. European energy security is at least in the ballpark, but it’s not an incentive to invade; it’s a constraint on Europe’s response. Putin’s ranting about NATO, history, and Ukraine as a fake country make pretty clear why
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3. European energy security is at least in the ballpark, but it’s not an incentive to invade; it’s a constraint on Europe’s response. Putin’s ranting about NATO, history, and Ukraine as a fake country make pretty clear why
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he attacked. Russian gas and pipelines have, instead, long been intended to give Russia general leverage over Western Europe. This has been an issue for 20 years, is well-know, not particular to the #UkraineCrisis (although it is a constraint now), and Germany, to its credit,
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Addendum:
Cuba and Nicaragua in the 80s, rather than Mexico, would have made the point about variegated deterrence better.
As another example of differing commitments to different places, N Korea apparently asked China if it could attack SK again after the US defeat in
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Cuba and Nicaragua in the 80s, rather than Mexico, would have made the point about variegated deterrence better.
As another example of differing commitments to different places, N Korea apparently asked China if it could attack SK again after the US defeat in
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Vietnam. That’s what you’d expect from the superhawk logic that all commitments everywhere are connected, and that the US defeat in Afghanistan therefore encouraged Putin to attack Ukraine.
But apparently the Chinese said no, presumably bc they thought, likely correctly, that
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But apparently the Chinese said no, presumably bc they thought, likely correctly, that
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that the US would fight in Korea, even though it had just lost in Vietnam.
This is why all this hawkish hyperventilating that CN will attack Taiwan bc of Ukraine is almost certainly wrong.
It’s a crisis, esp for Ukr of course. But it’s geographically limited, at least now.
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This is why all this hawkish hyperventilating that CN will attack Taiwan bc of Ukraine is almost certainly wrong.
It’s a crisis, esp for Ukr of course. But it’s geographically limited, at least now.
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