Now and back then, the logic of sanctions is they do work. What I have been trying to argue is theory behind sanctions is standard one. In that theory high finance is unquestioned and access to it treasured. An economy cannot exist without it. What if it’s weak theory?
2/
Price fluctuations in the FX, stock and bond markets do affect some economies—that too much rely on standard econ theory—but not very much those that build their economic model around own money unit of account. 2014- sanctions on Russia assumed the int’l finance status quo.
3/
Purim’s return to presidency in 2012 did bring, as Ukraine experienced first hand, a sharp departure from the past path. Well Kremlin rhetorics have been steady for a long time now. My argument in this FT editors letter was Kremlin did a shift in econ model! 4/
That shift is kind of own survival of the Kremlin people. Btw, these ppl were quite unpopular among the Russian folks already in 2012 and they were figuring out what is the way out. Ukraine appeared a useful tool, a distraction for that purpose and sadly it is still.
5/
*Putin’s return…
Narratives such as “Ukraine and NATO” etc were welcomed by Kremlin as they served their purpose. Instability in the “near abroad” where, as Kremlin media say Ukraine, is situated — has been a perfect stimulator of domestic opinion shaping exercise.
6/
According to the sanctions logic the future is within established boundaries of thinking. What if Russia’s logic is beyond the boundaries of the spectrum of opinions?
I tend to think along the lines that “Ukraine-NATO/EU-crisis” is a distraction. A bigger battle is ahead.
/END
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This piece of early 2016 in Ukrainian was handed to many quite top ppl in the 🇺🇦 private financial markets industry and even to the ppl who have in charge of economic reforms in 🇺🇦 such as today’s econ advisor of office @ZelenskyyUa
The matter is that since 2014 Russia has been under US/EU sanctions due to its annexation of Crimea and parts of Donbas, both are #Ukraine’s territories.
Mainstream economists in the West have tended to see sanctions as a tool that would crush, punish, and restrain Russia.
3/
In 1886, great Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy published a non-fiction piece called 'What Then Must We Do?'.
There is a chapter on #money, which in effect sounds very much familiar and close to the #MMT motto -- #taxes-drive-money.
1/4
Tolstoy: "Any money is getting accepted between people only when they are forcefully demanded to be delivered by everybody. When every person needs money to redeem herself/himself from violence, only then money will obtain stable exchange value..."
Tolstoy (cont'd): "... And what is demanded by the government [to be delivered by people as payment of taxes, fees, etc] obtains value, not what is convenient for exchange."
@INETeconomics By a chance, the article saying #MMT "theorists ignore how their policies could hurt developing countries" places #Ukraine currency #hryvnia (notes of 20 hryvnia's) as its cover picture.
1/n
@INETeconomics Btw, another time when #MMT-related literature opted by a mere chance to associate itself with #Ukraine's currency was the book 'Can "It" Happen Again?' written by Hyman Minsky (2nd ed published in 2016).
This time there is a jar of coins 5 kopecks each (5 #копійок).
2/n
@INETeconomics I am #Ukrainian, having a 22-year experience in the Ukraine's financial sector (1995-2017) and working full-day jobs first as bank officer doing debts/credits and then as research economist. I worked in the banking sector as well as in the non-banking financial sector.
3/n