Et markant nybrud er, at den demokratiske samtale flytter fra forsamlingshuset til sociale medier.
Vi mangler viden & data. Derfor præges debatten ofte af myter fx om ekkokamre.
Men vi skal ud af ekkokamret om, ja, ekkokamre.
🧵 om de store spørgmål & forskningens svar. (1/15)
Når man skal forstå et fænomen på sociale medier, fx ekkokamre, misinformation eller had, bør man altid stille 3 spørgsmål:
1) Hvor udbredt er X? 2) Hvad er årsagerne til X? 3) Hvad er effekterne af X?
Hvad siger forskningen om de 3 spørgsmål ift. ekkokamre? (2/15)
Et første skridt er at erkende, at forskningen om sociale medier er i sin vorden. Mange antagelser har vist sig forkerte. Og et enkelt studie giver sjældent sandheden.
Man må basere sig på opdaterede reviews fra internationalt førende forskere. (3/15)
Tråden baseres på 4 reviews fra de bedste forskere i verden:
Ekkokamre findes i ekstreme miljøer, men de er ikke udbredte.
Alle reviews slår fast, at ekkokamre i form af en ensidig eksponering for nyheder, der passer til ens overbevisning, fylder mindre end antaget.
Her fra review #4.👇
(5/15)
Review #3 understreger, at der er "homophilly" i folks sociale medie netværk. 👇Venstreorienterede er mere tilbøjelige til at følge venstreorientede.
Men som påpeget i selvsamme review samt review #2, så er spørgsmålet om, der er mere "homophilly" online end offline? (6/15)
Det leder til spørgsmål 2: Hvad er årsagerne til ekkokamre?
Begreberne om "filterbobler" og "ekkokamre" adskiller sig ved årsagen. "Filterbobler" er algoritme-drevne ekkokamre, mens begrebet om "ekkokamre" holder årsagen åben. (7/15)
Review #4 (jf. 👆) afviser "filterbobbel"-tesen kategorisk ift. nyheder. Det betyder ikke, at algoritmer ikke kan påvirke strukturen i online netværk. MEN: "homophily" afspejler sig i alle interaktioner vi har 👇(annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.114…). Selv-selektion er nulhypotesen. (8/15)
Review #2 argumenterer faktisk for, at "homophily" må forventes at være *mindre* online end offline. 👇 (9/15)
Men selvom ekkokamre er mindre udbredte & mindre algoritmer-drevet kan de godt være problematisk. Derfor spørgsmål 3: Hvad er effekten?
Forskning viser, at debat i lukkede grupper af ligesindede kan skabe polarisering. Ekstremisternes ekkokamre *er* uhensigtsmæssige. (10/15)
Men forskningen tyder også på, at nogle af udfordringerne med had og polarisering på sociale medier hænger sammen med *fraværet* af ekkokamre.
Studierne i review #2, der viser, at sociale medier polariserer, fokuserer netop på eksponeringen af modsatte synspunkter. 👇(11/15)
Det er konsistent med forskning fra mit eget @ROPHproject, som viser, at folk i højere grad oplever had fra fremmede online end offline (cambridge.org/core/journals/…) & at hadefulde individer indtager mere centrale positioner i online netværk (psyarxiv.com/tp93r/) (12/15).
Hvis ekkokamrerne i mindre grad er udbredte på sociale medier end mange tror, hvorfor er der så stadig et "ekkokammer om ekkokamre"?
Review #1 giver 3 grunde. 👇 (13/15)
Der mangler stadig masser af viden. Den viden hindres af lukkede platforme, data & algoritmer. Og der er ingen tvivl om, at vi særligt mangler viden om danske forhold. Forskningen er stadig i sin vorden. Netop derfor skal man passe på med forsimplede forståelser. (14/15)
De sociale medier er formentlig de mest komplicerede sociale økosystemer som findes. De kan ikke blive reguleret hensigtsmæssigt uden opdateret viden & uden åbne data. Det vil være som at sætte en blind kioskejer til at regulere det finansielle system. (15/15)
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Individuals who fight in armed conflict tend to be anti-democratic.
With one exception: Violent resistance in defence of democracy.
🧵 on our research on the psychology of violence & why the ultimate defense of democracy requires understanding anti-democratic impulses. (1/14)
Democracy is the principled recognition of equality in power. Autocracy is the opposite.
Psychologically, an orientation to autocracy draws its strength from so-called dominance motivations (doi.org/10.1177/095679…). (2/14)
All humans seek status. But paths differ (doi.org/10.1037/a00303…). *Prestige* is status in exchange for problem-solving. *Dominance* is the desire to acquire status from fear via intimidation & aggression.
In the game of status, dominance is the strategy of the predator. (3/14)
Political cleavages have previously been found to elicit prejudice (doi.org/10.1111/ajps.1…), e.g., exclusion from family relationships. Here we ask if there is prejudice between groups defined by COVID-19 vaccination status? (2/16)
Media, governments & influencers are often accused of "fear-mongering". Such strategy would clash with insights on risk-communication: doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.1…. Effective communication is clear about the threat *&* how to deal with the threat. Actionable advice builds hope. (2/8)
During the pandemic, we examined the relative efficacy of threat- & hope-oriented communication. The context was the race between the Alpha variant & implementation of vaccines. The need was to "buy time" via stronger interventions until vaccines took effect. (3/8)
PSA to anyone interested in informing public discourse about the severity of the epidemic situation in Denmark (and maybe elsewhere):
Show extreme care when sharing screenshots of cases & admissions from @OurWorldInData or similar
Let me explain in 3 plots. (1/6)
Omicron generates very high case counts but lower severity, disrupting the indicators & patterns we have all been tracking for 2 years.
The plots I'll now show are all from Danish Center for Disease Control's (@SSI_dk) weekly monitoring report: ssi.dk/-/media/cdn/fi…. (2/6)
#1
With a lot of infections many will be admitted with but not because of covid. The plot below shows the development. Red is "because of". Right now only 55 % of admissions with a positive test are because of covid. (3/6)
Twitter is so terrible because with social media even the illiterate masses get to voice their views, right?
Wrong.
In a new preprint, we find that the most hateful in political discussions are more resourceful: Engaged, efficacious & educated: psyarxiv.com/tp93r/
🧵(1/10)
We obtained US survey participants' Twitter IDs in order to connect their psychological & political profile to Twitter activity (N=2012). In addition to toxicity & sentiment, we assessed their tweets' level of political hate with this classifier: psyarxiv.com/8m5dc/. (2/10)
Our preferred measure ("political hate") is significantly predicted by political engagement, political interest, internal efficacy and education. For toxicity and sentiment, results are in the same direction. We see no evidence that hostility is higher among the unengaged. (3/10)