<THREAD>Why nuclear power plant accidents probably become significantly more likely in a war--the danger of a "common mode" failure at Ukraine's reactors.
Some wonk-ish thoughts to add to my analysis yesterday. (1/n)
Nuclear safety relies on defense in depth--multiple safety systems have to go wrong for an accident to occur.
The thinking here is that if a system fails only rarely, and its backup also fails only rarely, the the likelihood of both failing at the same time is very small. (2/n)
The problem with this logic is that in a war, failure probabilities are unlikely to be independent, i.e. the conditions that lead to one system's failure could lead to the failure of its back-up too. This is called a common-mode failure.
Here's an example.
(3/n)
Nuclear power plants use electrical power from the grid to cool a reactor if it's shut down. But power grids are often targeted in a war. Moreover, attacks on the electrical gird (not to mention other targets) can cause fires. (4/n)
Now, power plants also have emergency backup power sources (typically including but not limited to diesel generators). But no reactor operator wants to be without a grid connection with an approaching fire. (5/n)
Under normal circumstances, of course, the fire service would come and deal with the fire. But in a war? Are communications available to send out an alert? Are fire trucks tied up in relief efforts elsewhere? Would they be targeted in responding to the fire at the plant? (6/n)
It may not be possible to restore the grid connection quickly. So how much diesel is available on site (especially given that multiple reactors could be affected)? How much is available elsewhere (given the ongoing war effort)? Can it be transported to the site? (7/n)
In short, under normal circumstances, it's extraordinarily unlikely that a reactor would lose grid connections AND that it'd be faced with a fire AND that the fire service wouldn't be able to respond AND that diesel couldn't be transported to the site. (8/n)
In a war, however, this sequence of events, which could culminate in a major accident, becomes much more likely. Still unlikely in absolute terms, perhaps--but in relative terms, the unimaginable could become entirely conceivable. (9/n)
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<THREAD>What does raising the alert level of Russian nuclear forces entail?
Russian nuclear forces can be divided into strategic (which can reach the US) and nonstrategic (which can't.) I'm looking to see whether strategic forces, nonstrategic forces, or both are alerted. (1/n)
Day to day, Russian nonstrategic warheads are kept separate from delivery systems in "centralized" storage (an organizational not a geographic term).
A first step to prepare these warhead for use would be to move them to the sites where the delivery systems are located. (2/n)
Some strategic delivery systems--silo-based ICBMs and SSBNs at sea--are kept ready for use with minimal preparations. Russia may be able to send additional SSBNs to sea. (3/n)
...@CarnegieEndow's fantastic library staff chased down the article, which is based on an on-the-record interview with a U.S. official, Rich Wagner (who, as it happens, met professionally a few years back). So I think it's a solid number.
I meant to post a screenshot of the article. Here it is:
Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
I think it's quite likely that China will restart fissile material production--but I am NOT convinced by the argument in CMPR that it has already decided to do so.
China is believed to have ceased production of missile material for weapons, but it has never declared a formal cut-off. Presumably, it wants the option to restart production. And, given other developments, no-one should be surprised if it exercises that option.
BUT... (2/n)
I'm somewhat skeptical that China's fast reactor program is--today, at least--intended to produce plutonium for weapons. It requires China to master two difficult technologies: operating fast reactors and reprocessing oxide fuel. (Fuel fabrication may not be simple either). (3/n)
<*Really* wonky THREAD>Did China's recent test of a probable gliding orbital nuclear weapon catch the U.S. by surprise, as @HudsonInstitute and others claim?
I think NO. I suspect the U.S. IC has been monitoring the development of the glider since 2014--if not earlier. (1/n)
Back in Jan 2014, reports started to surface that China had begin testing of a glider, first called Wu-14 (a U.S. label) and subsequently DF-ZF (a Chinese one). (2/n)
At least seven tests between January 2014 and April 2016 are known based on notifications China released to warn aviators. It's quite possible there were more tests. (3/n)
Personally, I'm open to both possibilities. Perhaps the denial is untrue and a G-FOBS test really did occur. Perhaps, the @FT report (which, frankly, was pretty confused) was wrong.