Thread by @james_acton32

<THREAD>What does raising the alert level of Russian nuclear forces entail?

Russian nuclear forces can be divided into strategic (which can reach the US) and nonstrategic (which can't.) I'm looking to see whether strategic forces, nonstrategic forces, or both are alerted. (1/n)

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1497921990455353350

Day to day, Russian nonstrategic warheads are kept separate from delivery systems in "centralized" storage (an organizational not a geographic term).

A first step to prepare these warhead for use would be to move them to the sites where the delivery systems are located. (2/n)

Some strategic delivery systems--silo-based ICBMs and SSBNs at sea--are kept ready for use with minimal preparations. Russia may be able to send additional SSBNs to sea. (3/n)

Russia's road-mobile ICBMs are not survivable when in their garrisons, but are highly survivable when dispersed (likely more survivable than SSBNs). So, these would likely be dispersed as part of any alert of strategic forces. (4/n)

Warheads are not mated to strategic bombers on a day-to-day basis, but they are located on-site. It is possible that warheads could be loaded on these aircraft. Even more aggressively, aircraft could be placed on airborne alert. (5/n)

There could well be numerous changes to other aspects of Russia's nuclear posture: more troops called up, airborne command-and-control aircraft alerted, security as bases increased. (6/n)

I'm looking for which forces are alerted (strategic forces=clear signal to US; nonstrategic forces=more directed at Ukraine). And how far the alert proceeds. (7/n)

The basic idea here is clearly to scare "the West" into backing down. But part the danger here is that it's not clear to me Putin has a clear de-escalation pathway in mind (except for the capitulation of Ukraine). (8/n)

It's difficult for the West to create an de-escalation pathway; much presumably depends on how Putin view's the domestic consequences of his backing down--something over which the West has no control. (9/n)

But we can at least reduce the costs to his backing down by making it clear that the most punishing sanctions--central bank and SWIFT--will be lifted if the status quo ante is restored. (10/n)

I encourage others to think creatively now about other elements of a potential off-ramp for Russia. To be sure, it's unsavory to think about providing inducements to Putin for backing down while Ukrainians are being slaughtered. (11/n)

However, Ukraine and Russia are now reportedly engaged in negotiations. We can strengthen Ukraine's hand in negotiations by making the consequences of a deal more attractive for Russia. (12/12)