<THREAD>On Sunday, Putin ordered Russia's "deterrence forces" to be placed on "high combat alert." So far, the U.S. has not observed any change to Russia's nuclear force posture. What does this mean? (1/n)
First off, the lack of change is a Good Thing! It doesn't alter the fact Putin made an explicit nuclear threat on Sunday, but it does dial down the aggressiveness somewhat. (2/n)
I had been expecting some observable change to Russia's nuclear force posture. Two Russian analysis I respect, @russianforces and @KomissarWhipla, suggested the changes would solely be to nuclear command and control.
The problem for Putin is that, to extract concessions using nuclear threats, he needs to credibly threaten first use. Preparing nuclear command-and-control systems sends out a vague message of readiness for nuclear war, but isn't really much of first use threat. (4/n)
Perhaps Putin is fine with that. Perhaps his threat, as @BWallaceMP put it, is just "a battle of rhetoric."
But I'm not so sure. The Putin-is-a-bluffer theory hasn't worked out so well this year (and isn't one that @BWallaceMP has subscribed to before now). (5/n)
I don't think Russian nuclear use is imminent. But I wouldn't assume Putin has ruled it out. All his alternatives look bad right now. Basically, he can negotiate a cease first that respects Ukraine's sovereignty or continue the bloodbath of a conventional war. (6/n)
If he continues the war (as seems likely for now), things could look very bleak for him. @scharap put it well.
Putin's reported obsession with Gaddafi's death suggests he worries about the same fate. (7/n)
In these circumstances, nuclear use is a possibility IMO. I wouldn't be surprised if in the next days or weeks, absent some dramatic Russian victories, there are observable changes to Russia's nuclear force posture, possibly accompanied by more warnings. (8/n)
I have no sense whether strategic forces (threatening the United States) or nonstrategic forces (threatening Ukraine) or both would be alerted. (9/n)
Helpful observation from @russianforces about the possible nature of the alert. (10/n)
Finally, as someone who has spent a lot of time thinking about unintentional escalation, I think deliberate escalation is more likely in this particular scenario because of NATO's noninvolvement. (11/n)
There's plenty of scope for accidents, but historically, isolated accidents don't tend to lead to escalation. Major misunderstanding are a much bigger problem, but are less likely in this situation than a truly desperate Putin, IMO. (12/12)
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<THREAD>What does raising the alert level of Russian nuclear forces entail?
Russian nuclear forces can be divided into strategic (which can reach the US) and nonstrategic (which can't.) I'm looking to see whether strategic forces, nonstrategic forces, or both are alerted. (1/n)
Day to day, Russian nonstrategic warheads are kept separate from delivery systems in "centralized" storage (an organizational not a geographic term).
A first step to prepare these warhead for use would be to move them to the sites where the delivery systems are located. (2/n)
Some strategic delivery systems--silo-based ICBMs and SSBNs at sea--are kept ready for use with minimal preparations. Russia may be able to send additional SSBNs to sea. (3/n)
<THREAD>Why nuclear power plant accidents probably become significantly more likely in a war--the danger of a "common mode" failure at Ukraine's reactors.
Some wonk-ish thoughts to add to my analysis yesterday. (1/n)
Nuclear safety relies on defense in depth--multiple safety systems have to go wrong for an accident to occur.
The thinking here is that if a system fails only rarely, and its backup also fails only rarely, the the likelihood of both failing at the same time is very small. (2/n)
The problem with this logic is that in a war, failure probabilities are unlikely to be independent, i.e. the conditions that lead to one system's failure could lead to the failure of its back-up too. This is called a common-mode failure.
...@CarnegieEndow's fantastic library staff chased down the article, which is based on an on-the-record interview with a U.S. official, Rich Wagner (who, as it happens, met professionally a few years back). So I think it's a solid number.
I meant to post a screenshot of the article. Here it is:
Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
I think it's quite likely that China will restart fissile material production--but I am NOT convinced by the argument in CMPR that it has already decided to do so.
China is believed to have ceased production of missile material for weapons, but it has never declared a formal cut-off. Presumably, it wants the option to restart production. And, given other developments, no-one should be surprised if it exercises that option.
BUT... (2/n)
I'm somewhat skeptical that China's fast reactor program is--today, at least--intended to produce plutonium for weapons. It requires China to master two difficult technologies: operating fast reactors and reprocessing oxide fuel. (Fuel fabrication may not be simple either). (3/n)
<*Really* wonky THREAD>Did China's recent test of a probable gliding orbital nuclear weapon catch the U.S. by surprise, as @HudsonInstitute and others claim?
I think NO. I suspect the U.S. IC has been monitoring the development of the glider since 2014--if not earlier. (1/n)
Back in Jan 2014, reports started to surface that China had begin testing of a glider, first called Wu-14 (a U.S. label) and subsequently DF-ZF (a Chinese one). (2/n)
At least seven tests between January 2014 and April 2016 are known based on notifications China released to warn aviators. It's quite possible there were more tests. (3/n)