Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine 👇🧵
Most important development IMO:🇷🇺 forces have reportedly crossed Dnpr in the South a. are advancing north of Nova Kakhovka meeting heavy 🇺🇦 resistance. This means Russian forces could cut off bulk of 🇺🇦 forces east of Dnpr.
This would be a very bad situation for 🇺🇦 Ukrainian forces. It is unclear who will win this race to the Dnpr as of now. 🇷🇺 must step up operational tempo and move more troops in which will put even more pressure on Russian logistics.
Most likely Russian military objectives at this stage of the war: encircle/capture/destroy bulk of 🇺🇦 forces out in the open; prevent 🇺🇦 forces from retreating to urban centers/create new strongpoints, regroup/reestablish defense lines.
I suspect the need for speed, plus botched logistics, is also the reason why we have seen little evidence of combined arms maneuvers a. well coordinated actions of 🇷🇺battalion tactical groups (BTGs) as one would have expected.
BTGs apparently were split into smaller groups along multiple axes of advance with little tactical recon/flank protection etc too keep up with what dturne out to have been unrealistic time tables. This enabled 🇺🇦 forces to strike from the air and land.
This also explains why some Russian units have been caught outside air defense bubbles. More info on an average BTG order of battle (from @IISS_org report on Russia's military modernization).
There has also been lots of evidence about lack of intra-service/inter-service coordination on the 🇷🇺 side made worse by the fact that Russian forces have simply not have had any experience with these types of large-scale military campaigns in recent history.
One of the key question for the days ahead is whether Russian forces will be able to regroup and adapt at the tactical and operational level to implement a rather unrealistic war plan. Another big question in this regard is whether 🇷🇺 forces can maintain their fighting morale.
Remember, I don't think Russian plans in this opening phase of the war are to occupy cities. Rather to encircle them, probe their defenses while destroying bulk of 🇺🇦 forces as a result of rapid maneuvers and superior firepower.
I would take 🇷🇺 announcement that they have established air superiority with a grain of salt. As long as we see TB2 strikes this is not true. Also, air superiority is relative. As long as there are Stingers on the ground any airborne operation involving helicopters will be risky.
🇺🇦 fighting morale remains high; forces have fought organized delaying actions; 🇺🇦 are conducting ambushes behind Russian lines; 🇺🇦air defenses still active. Key for 🇺🇦 forces remains a.) avoid encirclement; b.) hold on to Kyiv.
I'd avoid any larger judgements about how this war will turn out from a military perspective. We are still in the early stages of this campaign.
Last point: One determinant will be whether the Russian Armed Forces are a learning organization. 👇
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 2) 👇🧵
~80 percent of the combat power that 🇷🇺 had pre-deployed along the 🇺🇦 has now entered the country (per US DoD). Overall operational picture has seen some change over the past 24 hours (caveat: the fog of war).
🇷🇺 forces are still in the process of regrouping, getting re-supplied, a. adapting. There is little evidence of BTGs operating as whole units; Russian air power is still holding back it seems; Reports of low 🇷🇺morale--especially among conscripts--could turn into a real problem.
🇷🇺 forces continue to suffer from poor logistics (food, fuel and even occasional ammo shortages). This will likely be made be worse once BTGs/other 🇷🇺 formations begin conducting combined arms maneuvers (I saw no signs for such a switch just yet) on a large-scale.
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine 👇🧵
Russia has moved around 75% of its forces it had previously deployed along the U. borders into 🇺🇦 (per US DoD). Appears that only a fraction of these have been engaged in combat yet.🇷🇺 forces are massing for assault on Kyiv.
🇷🇺 forces are in the process of regrouping, getting re-supplied, a. adapting to 🇺🇦 attacks. While 🇷🇺 are still committing tactical blunders, there are signs emerging that 🇷🇺 have abandoned their "mad dashes" to occupy key territory without support and coordinate better.
Expect to see more 🇷🇺combined arms maneuver/combat in coming days; heavier reliance on ground-based fires/more use of airpower. As others have pointed out, we will likely see BTGs fighting as whole units. Alas, this means we are entering a much deadlier phase of the conflict.
Short summary of mil. situation in Ukraine: 🇺🇦 forces by and large are fighting orderly delaying actions; morale remains very high; air-defenses still operational; air force remains active (armed UAVs are hitting 🇷🇺 targets of opportunity); 🇺🇦mechanized forces counterattack.
The key for 🇺🇦 for Ukrainian forces will be to fight a orderly retreat Dnepr river, cross it, regroup a. establish new defensive positions where possible. 🇷🇺 forces meanwhile have to try to do everything not to lose contact with main elements of Ukrainian forces/keep pressure up.
So in very simple terms: this is a race to the Dnpr today characterized by fast advances along the main roads, flanking movements, while 🇷🇺 forces will deploy their fire power more indiscriminately against Ukrainian targets.
Short summary: 🇺🇦 defenses have held; its air force is still flying; air-defense still in parts intact; troops are digging in in Kyiv. Morale is high. No signs of imminent collapse. A very bloody day/night ahead I am afraid to say. 🇷🇺 will massively step up military pressure.
Some 🇷🇺 2nd echelon troops have moved in; despite rapid progress on some fronts casualties have been heavy; noticeable reckless behavior of some units (e.g., operating outside air defense bubbles); lack of inter-service coordination; noticeable combined arms maneuver deficits.
Also, noticed some logistical difficulties (🇷🇺Russian armor running out of fuel); also seems that some units got lost. Learning curve for the attacker during these types of mil. operations is always steeper/bloodier than for the defender.
On urban combat in Kyiv: there are various historical examples where hastily constructed defenses, strong points, paired with hit-and-run tactics/ambushes were able to inflict significant losses on an attacking force.
Remember this is a fight the Russians want to avoid. Attack/defender ration is 6 or 10 to 1 in some instances. Huge drain on 🇷🇺manpower and materiel. I therefore think they will probe 🇺🇦defenses, use airpower, missile strikes without committing significant g. forces just yet.
Full scale- urban combat would be absolutely devastating for the civilian population. In a terrible way, the best outcome for Ukrainian defenders (inflicting huge casualties on Russian troops) would be among the worst for the civilian population in terms of human loss.
Ich werde eine analytische Sprache um die anhaltenden militärischen Operationen in der 🇺🇦 einzuordnen verwenden. Hinter jeder einzelnen dieser Aktionen aber steht immenses (und unnötiges) menschliches Leid und Zerstörung. Krieg ist einfach nur dreckig und grauslich.
Bis jetzt deutet alles darauf hin dass die russische Militärdoktrin der operativen Ebene Punkt für Punkt durchexerziert wird. Boden-gestützte Feuer währten nur kurz vor dem Angriff der gepanzerten Verbände. Berichte von Luftlandetruppen fließen ebenso ein.
Von russischer Seite wird alles versucht werden in mehreren rapiden Zangenbewegungen die 🇺🇦 Streitkräfte einzukesseln und zu zerschlagen. Ein Mehrfronten Bewegungskrieg unter dem Schutzschirm der russischen nuklearen Abschreckung (sollte man nicht außer Acht lassen).