Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 2) ππ§΅
~80 percent of the combat power that π·πΊ had pre-deployed along the πΊπ¦ has now entered the country (per US DoD). Overall operational picture has seen some change over the past 24 hours (caveat: the fog of war).
π·πΊ forces are still in the process of regrouping, getting re-supplied, a. adapting. There is little evidence of BTGs operating as whole units; Russian air power is still holding back it seems; Reports of low π·πΊmorale--especially among conscripts--could turn into a real problem.
π·πΊ forces continue to suffer from poor logistics (food, fuel and even occasional ammo shortages). This will likely be made be worse once BTGs/other π·πΊ formations begin conducting combined arms maneuvers (I saw no signs for such a switch just yet) on a large-scale.
Side note: the apparent deficits in Russian military communication genuinely surprised me. Another piece of evidence how tactically/logistically/operationally poorly this early stage of the campaign has been handled by π·πΊ.
π·πΊ forces continue to mass for assault on Kyiv. The aim is to surround the city and force mass evacuations of πΊπ¦civilians (expect missile strikes and artillery strikes on the city to terrorize the population; don't expect an imminent assault on the city just yet).
Since the Russian military convoy up in the North was in the new a lot yesterday.The fact that it exists can tell you three things:
1: πΊπ¦ have depleted their surface-to-surface strike capabilities
2: πΊπ¦ air power has been severely reduced
3: π·πΊ air/missile defenses are in place
Airspace over the country remains contested. However, the tide seems to be slowly turning and there is little evidence of πΊπ¦TB2 UAV strikes and other operations. At lower altitudes the airspace will remain contested as long as the πΊπ¦ forces have MANPADS (Stingers).
There is some evidence that Russians are moving heavier forces into urban combat in some cities. This below looks like a standard combined arms urban operation.
Just a quick note on the fronts. π·πΊ have made progress in the South and are advancing (Russians in Kherson) North; so far πΊπ¦ forces continue to fight delaying actions and counter-attack but overall operational picture is worsening in the South.
(map per militaryland.net).
In the North, it looks like πΊπ¦ Ukrainian forces in the Chernihiv area could soon be encircled and cut off due to Russian advances from the East (map per militaryland.net).
π·πΊ equipment losses remain exceptionally high; πΊπ¦ forces are also suffering substantial losses.
The human/materiel cost of high-intensity war is simply devastating (not to speak of the emotional/psychological terror) oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attackβ¦
Summary:Russians continue to make progress; πΊπ¦ morale remains high;more urban combat ahead; π·πΊ will sooner or later control πΊπ¦skies at higher altitudes; π·πΊ will still try to encircle/cut off πΊπ¦ forces where possible in pincer movements; π·πΊ will deploy/use more ground-based fires.
This map captures the current military situation quite well IMO. Notice the advances in the South following crossing of Dnpr. (map by @washingtonpost)
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Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 4) ππ§΅
π·πΊ forces are advancing in the South and East; their advance in the North is slow (northeast) and stalled in some sectors; no large-scale ground assault on Kharkiv, instead heavy bombardment.
In the South, π·πΊ troops are steadily advancing (reports of engagements in/near Voznesensk). Unclear where the main π·πΊ effort North of Dnpr river is. πΊπ¦ forces are fighting orderly retreats/conduct counterattacks, but cannot hold their ground.
(map per militaryland.net)
Just a quick note on the importance of the fall of Kherson in the South: This opens up large chunks of the Dnpr for military operations. π·πΊ can now more actively deploy its Black Sea Fleet to attack cities, use it for logistical support ops, and split πΊπ¦ in two.
Brief summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 3) ππ§΅
Russia has now moved the bulk of forces it had pre-staged along the πΊπ¦ border into Ukraine (per US DoD).
Still unclear what % of π·πΊ forces have been committed to combat.
This map captures the situation quite accurately IMO.
π·πΊs have taken their first regional capital in the South (Kherson);πΊπ¦ counterattacks have reportedly pushed π·πΊ forces out of Mykolaiv.
Watch out of for π·πΊbreakthroughs in Donbas; overall situation in Mariupol is grave.
π·πΊ are continuing their advance in the South while regrouping/adapting. Logistical issues persist with π·πΊsupply convoys coming under repeated πΊπ¦ attacks. Also, there has been uptick in the Russian use of air power (video: strikes of Su-25s outside Kyiv)
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine ππ§΅
Russia has moved around 75% of its forces it had previously deployed along the U. borders into πΊπ¦ (per US DoD). Appears that only a fraction of these have been engaged in combat yet.π·πΊ forces are massing for assault on Kyiv.
π·πΊ forces are in the process of regrouping, getting re-supplied, a. adapting to πΊπ¦ attacks. While π·πΊ are still committing tactical blunders, there are signs emerging that π·πΊ have abandoned their "mad dashes" to occupy key territory without support and coordinate better.
Expect to see more π·πΊcombined arms maneuver/combat in coming days; heavier reliance on ground-based fires/more use of airpower. As others have pointed out, we will likely see BTGs fighting as whole units. Alas, this means we are entering a much deadlier phase of the conflict.
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine ππ§΅
Most important development IMO:π·πΊ forces have reportedly crossed Dnpr in the South a. are advancing north of Nova Kakhovka meeting heavy πΊπ¦ resistance. This means Russian forces could cut off bulk of πΊπ¦ forces east of Dnpr.
This would be a very bad situation for πΊπ¦ Ukrainian forces. It is unclear who will win this race to the Dnpr as of now. π·πΊ must step up operational tempo and move more troops in which will put even more pressure on Russian logistics.
Most likely Russian military objectives at this stage of the war: encircle/capture/destroy bulk of πΊπ¦ forces out in the open; prevent πΊπ¦ forces from retreating to urban centers/create new strongpoints, regroup/reestablish defense lines.
Short summary of mil. situation in Ukraine: πΊπ¦ forces by and large are fighting orderly delaying actions; morale remains very high; air-defenses still operational; air force remains active (armed UAVs are hitting π·πΊ targets of opportunity); πΊπ¦mechanized forces counterattack.
The key for πΊπ¦ for Ukrainian forces will be to fight a orderly retreat Dnepr river, cross it, regroup a. establish new defensive positions where possible. π·πΊ forces meanwhile have to try to do everything not to lose contact with main elements of Ukrainian forces/keep pressure up.
So in very simple terms: this is a race to the Dnpr today characterized by fast advances along the main roads, flanking movements, while π·πΊ forces will deploy their fire power more indiscriminately against Ukrainian targets.
Short summary: πΊπ¦ defenses have held; its air force is still flying; air-defense still in parts intact; troops are digging in in Kyiv. Morale is high. No signs of imminent collapse. A very bloody day/night ahead I am afraid to say. π·πΊ will massively step up military pressure.
Some π·πΊ 2nd echelon troops have moved in; despite rapid progress on some fronts casualties have been heavy; noticeable reckless behavior of some units (e.g., operating outside air defense bubbles); lack of inter-service coordination; noticeable combined arms maneuver deficits.
Also, noticed some logistical difficulties (π·πΊRussian armor running out of fuel); also seems that some units got lost. Learning curve for the attacker during these types of mil. operations is always steeper/bloodier than for the defender.