One gets the sense that folks in this town smell blood in the proverbial water regarding the stability of the (odious) Putin regime. Let's file that under "careful what you wish for". Thread. 1/7
The scenario of a liberal reformist successor coming to power who begs forgiveness for Putin's sins would be great, but it would also be great to win the lottery. Equally if not more plausible are regime change scenarios that work out badly for everyone, Ukraine included.2/7
This regime is unlikely to go down without a fight against enemies domestic and foreign, real and imagined. Regime security = national security in the leaders' minds, and they'll treat threats to the former as threats to the latter. 3/7
Keep in mind that Russian strategists have long posited that the (US) attempt to take them down will combine threats on the periphery, domestic unrest, and external military aggression. see ch 4 of the report @MassDara and I co-led: 4/7 rand.org/pubs/research_…
And if they are convinced that our policy is aimed at regime change, they will hit back, hard. 5/7
One real possibility is that an even-more-hardliner than Putin comes to power. Gorbachev 2.0 is far from inevitable. 6/7
Regime change in Russia might seem like the only way out of this tragedy. But on closer examination it poses huge risks and is no more likely to make things better, than it is to make them worse. 7/7
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Brief thread on my new @FT oped:
"Russia has launched an unprecedented act of aggression against Ukraine. The United States and its allies must respond forcefully." 1/x
"But as they do, they should take into account the possibility of triggering a spiral of escalation that could lead to the only outcome worse than the invasion of Ukraine itself: a hot war between Russia and Nato." The piece briefly describes the risks and offers 4 recs. 2/x
"First, the US and Nato military chiefs should maintain the channels of communication they have with their Russian counterparts." 3/x
One thought about what Russia's exit from the Minsk agreements — aka recognition of DNR/LNR — tells us about what is to come. Thread 1/x
Minsk was a mechanism for Russia to cement its influence over Ukraine by returning the Donbas on its terms -- a constitution renegotiated with its proxies and an asymmetric confederal structure with hyper-empowered pro-Russian regions. 2/x
By recognizing the republics' "independence," Moscow has given up on ever getting that mechanism. But the Kremlin has certainly not given up on its objective of cementing its influence over Ukraine. 3/x
Main takeaway from that barnburner of a speech is that Russia now has given itself a pretext to respond to "attacks" on DNR and LNR with no need to conceal its direct military involvement. thread 1/x
Putin not only recognized the DNR/LNR, he also signed "friendship and cooperation" treaties with them, essentially security guarantees. 2/x
whereas before this, Russia didn't have a justification for overt military intervention even under its own laws, now it will. This is an important element of the narrative that was missing. 3/x
Some thoughts on the ongoing show/RF security council meeting: Shoigu now going off on the potential for Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Now claiming Ukraine plans to retake the ORDLO by force.
Medvedev now being rolled out to denounce Kyiv's willingness to implement Minsk.
This is an important point. It also underscores the absence of a “playbook” that we’ve heard so much about in recent weeks. In 2014, Moscow only had to twist reality in constructing narratives. This time, they’re just making things up. Thread 1/8
In 2014, there was a revolution led by an armed far-right nationalist vanguard that ousted a democratically elected (though repressive and autocratic) govt dominated by pols from the south and east. 2/8
They actually had a banner of Bandera’s portrait on the Maidan. Really. Clearly there was a *lot* more to the Maidan Rev than that, but those images provided ample material for Russian TV. 3/8