I must confess, I've been wondering for a while how sustainable Russia's significantly reinforced fleet in the Mediterranean was going to be (niche, I know🙄). The scrapping of the 2015 access agreement with Cyprus would certainly make it harder... knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus…
This logistical limitation, along with the creation of a defensive bastion for the base itself, may well be one of the reasons behind the concentration of the fleet around the Syrian base at Tartus, rather than following @French_CSG & @USSHARRYSTRUMAN
Interestingly (& entirely coincidentally it must be emphasised!) @French_CSG ran an exercise last year practising operations against just such an overseas naval base at Djibouti
Potentially, the defensive, bastion posture of the Russian fleet at Tartus (perhaps also somewhat pinned by the presence of @French_CSG) may be contributing to the freedom for @USSHARRYSTRUMAN to be operating in the enclosed waters of the Northern Aegean
1) Okay, since there seems to be something of an interest Russian military logistics at the moment, to the usual lack of public demand, a little #thread🧵 on why Russia's naval logistics, particularly in the Mediterranean, have always been a critical time limit on the #UkraineWar
2) An absolutely critical part of Russia's military buildup to its current #UkraineWar was & remains a series of very visible signals, from the High North to the Pacific, to @NATO & others, to not interfere.
3) The most visible of these tended to be at sea most notably with the massive reinforcement of the Mediterranean with two Slava Class cruisers - the Pacific Fleet's flagship Varyag & the Northern Fleet's flagship Marshal Ustinov. It is also by far the most logistically exposed.
1) Okay, an interesting proposal that obviously one has to caveat with the obligatory point that the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines particularly, have, in fact, been training annually in the Arctic for years.*
*Okay, one doesn't actually *have* to, but I'm going to do it anyway😂
2) However, it's not just the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines who can & do operate there, indeed the @RoyalAirForce is already busy lifting & shifting @BritishArmy@ArmyAirCorps Apache gunships (among much else), to Norway for the annual Exercise Clockwork 2022.
3) While, earlier this year, the @RoyalAirForce were testing new tactical refuelling capabilities to enable rapid deployment of Typhoon strike fighters to Norway.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 Okay, if I may have a go at breaking down @RoryStewartUK's account in the piece there: 1) He is absolutely correct in his assertion that the rapid departure of US air power and technical support has had a catastrophic effect. I don't think anybody sensible is questioning that.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 2) Likewise I don't think anybody would particularly quibble with the fact that this was a comparatively small commitment with few (as @PatPorter76 correctly points out, injuries do still count) casualties, & under little domestic political pressure *at current levels* (& this...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 bit is critical). 3) The point at which his account runs into a fatal problem is the following, & that is that the war is considerably wider than the West's current military commitment. He correctly asks "who exactly, who is President Biden asking to fight?" & then unfortunately
A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…
For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.
For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.
With the announcement in this @BBCNews piece by @bealejonathan, that the @RoyalNavy is to receive a new "Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship", to be in service by 20204, it's perhaps time for a little speculative #thread🧵(apologies, as always in advance😉) bbc.co.uk/news/uk-564726…
1st up, this isn't the first we've heard of something like this. Elements of the @RoyalNavy's survey squadron are approaching replacement point, most particularly @HMSScottRN which is currently scheduled to go in 2022, but @HMS_Echo & @HMSEnterprise are similarly due around 2028
The form & purpose of this new vessel would appear to be different, however, with a new emphasis on undersea cables. This isn't actually the 1st we've heard of this either as @AdmTonyRadakin raised it at Christmas (4.06 H/T this & much else to @NavyLookout)
On this day 1941, the @RoyalNavy's Force H under V/Adm Sir James Somerville, aboard the battlecruiser HMS Renown, with the battleship HMS Malaya, aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal & cruiser HMS Sheffield, arrived off the Italian port of Genoa & opened fire #WW2
Just a week before, Force H had attempted to breach the enormous Santa Chiara dam on Sardinia’s Tirso River (two years before the famous attack by @RoyalAirForce's @OC617Sqn), using torpedoes dropped by @RoyalNavy Fairey Swordfish from 810 NAS aboard HMS Ark Royal.
Led by Lt/Cdr Mervyn ‘Johnnie’ Johnstone, this spectacular attack on one of Europe's biggest dams was unsuccessful, thwarted by a combination of foul weather, Italian AA fire & what was believed to be an unexpected sandbank that grounded the torpedoes before they hit the dam wall