Many seem to be stuck on instituting a US/NATO No Fly Zone (NFZ) in Ukraine. Some asking for this compare doing so to what happened in Iraq and the Balkans.
I don't think it's a good idea, for several reasons. So here's a quick thread. 1/11
The concept of a NFZ is such that a nation puts aircraft into a contested area to prevent another nation from using aircraft against an ally.
It seems simple: Put aircraft in the sky, and stop someone else from using their aircraft from doing bad things. 2/
There's a couple problems to this:
First, in order to ENFORCE a NFZ, you have to be prepared to shoot the other aircraft down. If you're not worried about doing that because you have the power that nothing else bad could happen, you're okay. 3/
The US instituted a NFZ after Desert Storm in Iraq, and during the uprising in the Balkans.
In both those conflicts, it was understood by both Iraq (against the Kurds or Shia) and Serbia (over Bosnia/Herz) that if they tried to fly aircraft they would be shot down. 4/
The operation in Iraq - Northern & Southern Watch - covered about 70,000 square miles,required LOTS of a/c, a place to land (carriers, UAE, and Turkey), & the dangers of Iraqi Air Defense systems (not very good).
The Serb actions over Bosnia & Herzogovina - countries of a combined 21,000 square miles - also had some "sportiness," with Serbia having multiple engagements and a few aircraft (to include US) shot down by Air Defense. Here's a wiki readout on that: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation… 6/
In both of these operations, there was overt contesting of US Actions.
In Ukraine - a country big as Texas, 233,000 sq miles - there's this problem of active combat from two other sides.
But what Russia also has that neither Iraq nor the former Yugoslav states have is nuclear capabilities. And, unfortunately, Putin has implied he will use them.
Additionally, at every Russian "exercise" I ever attended, the commander always used nukes to "ENDEX." 8/
Now, responsible nation-states - when they go to war - determine risks...and then calculate ways to mitigate those risks.
Irresponsible nation states - like Russia under Putin - tends to gamble. There is no mitigation to a gamble...you either go big, or go home. 6/
Right now, horrific things are going on between RU & UKR. It remains a regional conflict & Russia has FAILED to achieve any of it's strategic objectives.
Putin has not: 1. Subjugated Ukraine 2. Divided NATO 3. Further divided the US 4. Gained any kind of economic advantage 7/
Changing the dynamic from a regional conflict to a potential global nuclear conflict is a pretty big gamble.
8/
Additionally, RU air force is no where near reaching Air Supremacy. It's a joke to say they even have Air Superiority, as they've had dozens of jets, helicopters, and a few transports shot down by UKR air and Air Defense Systems. 9/
What is causing the vast majority of the horrific civilian casualties in UKR today are RU Artillery, Missiles, and Rocket systems, some of which are in Russia or Belorus.
A NFZ does not address ground systems. 10/
Best to continue to provide Ukraine technologically superior weapons, intelligence & humanitarian aid.
The Russians are on the verge of culmination & Ukraine continues to have the spirit and will required to maintain their freedom 10/11
Bottom line: NFZ is a catch phrase, that most don’t understand. Zelesky wants any help he can get, and he sees this as a way to get allies into the fight. The US and NATO are not gambling on global nuclear war.
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A thread on an experience I had in 2004 with a Russian General. 1/12
In returning from Iraq in 2004 as a one-star general, I was assigned as the commander of the US Army Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Beautiful place, and one of my favorite jobs during my career. 2/
This is a place where we conducted training and exercises with US forces, but my boss had given me the task to turn it into a multinational training center for our NATO allies and other partners. 3/
I was a major during Desert Storm. Other armies have attempted to model our actions during that 45 day air campaign & 4 day/100 hour ground campaign.
But they don’t understand the things we applied during that fight. 1/8
The US/alliance had brilliant political leadership in Bush & Powell. There was operational competence in the generals. There was a masterful plan that relied on coordinated intel, logistics & the principles of war. 2/8
Perhaps most importantly, there was a new generation of professional & trained military personnel, with great equipment, sound doctrine, realistic training & terrific leadership development. (A new school for planners -SAMS- also played a huge part). 3/8
After one of my @CNN appearances, one of the anchors asked me off-air why I had confidence in Ukraine's army to push back agains the illegal Russian military onslaught.
I used a bit of "battlefield math" to explain my rationale. 1/16
Their are two major factors most military folks consider to determine combat power: the force's resources and the force's will.
There are more elements under each of these categories that contribute to military capabilities. 2/
The force's RESOURCES: that's quantity (size of the force, Number of different capabilities...like air, artillery, # of soldiers), quality of equipment, extent and specificity of their training, their logistics & ability to resupply, their intelligence, etc. 3/
It appears the city of Kharkiv may be an objective of Putin and the Russian Army. My Ukrainian counterpart - Col-Gen Vorobyof - took me on a tour of that city (his hometown) in 2011. My impressions: 1/8
First, it is a beautiful city, and relatively modern. The city had suffered through 4 different battles during WWII, so it was mostly rebuilt. But many buildings had beautiful architecture. 2/
The citizens were very welcoming to me, as an American (likely because of my host’s influence & my Army rank at the time). It was my first taste of samovar tea, but we also had excellent Kharkiv vodka. 3/
Earlier, I commented about a reporter in @PentagonPresSec briefing asking whether @82ndABNDiv would parachute into Poland.
Since then, lots (LOTs) of paratroopers commented on in-flight rigging, how it would send a message, how it's been done on exercises etc. 1/7
From a theater commander's perspective, here are the pros and cons:
Pros: 1. Yes, you can do in-flight rigging (but it's difficult and takes excessive space). 2. Yes, it would send a message (but not a good one, given we are not trying to be excessively provocative). 2/7
3. Yes, the 82d has parachuted into Poland (and Germany, and several other countries in Europe) before (but almost all were in the summer, as part of an exercise, and with other nations). 4. Yes, I'm a tanker & therefore a "leg" (but I know a bit about airborne ops in EU). 3/7
I had the pleasure of engaging a group of Professional MBA students this weekend in a"Strategic Leadership" class
As an adjunct, these classes are fun, especially since we discuss application of knowledge in the real world 1/12
Last semester, these students received an introduction to "leadership theories."
For info, there are literally *dozens* of theories on leadership, but we wanted groups of students to do a deeper dive on 4 different theories, their meaning & potential application. 2/
The theories the 4 groups analyzed were: 1. Leader-Member Exchange (or LMX) theory 2. Servant Leadership Theory (which most wanted to analyze, because they felt they were "servant leaders") 3. Transactional Leadership Theory, and 4. Transformational Leadership Theory 3/