Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 8) 👇🧵
Nearly 100 % of the Russian combat force prestaged at the Ukrainian border is now committed to the fight in Ukraine (per US DoD).
🇷🇺 forces are preparing for next phase of ground offensives across 🇺🇦.
Nearly 100 % of the Russian combat force prestaged at the Ukrainian border is now committed to the fight in Ukraine (per US DoD).
🇷🇺 forces are preparing for next phase of ground offensives across 🇺🇦.
Russians are still regrouping/replenishing. No large-scale offensive ops in 24 hours (that we know of) despite fighting on all fronts--especially in North around Kyiv--where 🇷🇺 is massing its forces (near Irpin) for an eventual assault with new units (eg, Chechens) arriving.
Russian forces🇷🇺 made some gain gains in North, Northeast, South and East; a small 🇷🇺 attack against Mykolayiv airport failed; 🇺🇦 conducted at least one successful counterattack near Mariupol in Southeast. 🇷🇺 forces from Crimea and Donbas have linked up.
(map:@Militarylandnet)
(map:@Militarylandnet)
Main objective remains Kyiv; Russians will likely seek to avoid large-scale urban combat in other cities. How this can be done I not unsure. Enveloping cities will require substantial manpower/resources too.
Recent combat videos show evidence of more 🇷🇺combined arms operations.
Recent combat videos show evidence of more 🇷🇺combined arms operations.
Russian forces are increasingly relying on long-range fires. There is also an uptick on attacks on Ukrainian airports. (Video appears to show Kalibr cruise missiles about to hit an airfield near Zhytomyr.)
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1500861257074847745?s=20&t=UugZsUbKE3mWI7mz0n91Zg
This may be true for now. There have been a few indications that Russian reinforcements are being assembled throughout 🇷🇺 for ops. in 🇺🇦. Either way, given Russian loss rates in Ukraine, reserves will need to be moved in within a short timespan.
https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/1500909714716209156?s=20&t=ZIIZcuIjvU0Rf8pxFYW1_Q
We'll be slowly entering a phase of the war for which 🇷🇺 Ground Forces are not well set up. By and large 🇷🇺 battalion tactical groups in comparison to e.g., NATO-style light infantry units cannot generate sufficient infantry support for urban combat ops.
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1500819885559103492?s=20&t=UugZsUbKE3mWI7mz0n91Zg
One takeaway for me so far from the #UkraineRussiaWar has been that the whole cyber dimension of it can serve as a an excellent pretext for a military escalation (both cyber and kinetic) beyond Ukrainian borders.
https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1500724760011067403?s=20&t=UugZsUbKE3mWI7mz0n91Zg
A note on armed TB2 UAVs: Russia has so far only been attempting to establish pockets of air superiority throughout 🇺🇦. Theoretically TB2s could still operate and attack targets (e.g. supply convoys) of opportunity. dw.com/en/how-useful-…
However, operational status of TB2s is unknown. (No videos of TB2 strikes have been published in past days AFAIK). TB2s can't operate in a highly contested environment.
🇷🇺major equipment losses suffered in Ukraine are exceeding 900. Just to reiterate: With manpower losses in the 1000s this is becoming slowly an unsustainable situation for 🇷🇺 in a few weeks time. At the same time, 🇺🇦 forces are taking heavy losses too.
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
Please read this by @ErrantStrategry👇. As I said repeatedly past 10 days, we are caught in an 🇺🇦 narrative of the war and know little about combat status of most Ukrainian forces. Overall picture of this war remains incomplete/murky.
https://twitter.com/ErrantStrategry/status/1500904280034885635?s=20&t=40O8kR4yq1HlhtjFErQkTQh/t @KofmanMichael
Re. footage of strikes: I am not sure when a lot of these TB2s videos where actually recorded.
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1500942046009438208?s=20&t=40O8kR4yq1HlhtjFErQkTQ
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