Agreed--a dangerous proposal, offering no compelling reason why escalation would be controlled. Much like the open letters calling for unseating Saddam in 2002-2003: An understandable, well-intentioned, but poorly thought-through appeal
2/ Partly the issue is that NFZ's typically *do not work* to achieve their humanitarian goals. Air power often isn't the major threat to civilians. Even if it is, the aggressor can pivot and rely more on ground forces, missile strikes, other means warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-da…
3/ "Operations to protect civilians during war are often much costlier and carry much greater risk than anticipated. No-fly zones ... seldom provide substantial protection to civilians without additional and significant military efforts on the ground" tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
4/ So we begin an NFZ, it fails to protect civilians, and then either (1) we admit failure or (2) we escalate further, striking ground targets and intervening w/NATO forces. An invitation to an escalatory spiral--with NATO in a poor posture for ground operations
5/ Putin has staked his legacy on this invasion. There is a strong chance he simply cannot back down. In which case, the assumptions of the letter are dangerously mistaken--and they give us *no reason* to believe those assumptions, only assertions foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
6/ Then, too, NATO allies are unlikely to support this, at least not as a bloc. A NFZ carries a high risk of fracturing the impressive coalition + consensus assembled so far. If that occurs, the NFZ may collapse anyway, and alliance solidarity will have been ruined
7/ Talks are underway between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine shouldn't have to accept extreme concessions at the point of a gun, but a highly imperfect negotiated settlement may be better than any other realistic outcome. We should not escalate before we see if that is possible
8/ The US properly decided that, while it would seek to punish this criminal aggression + help Ukraine in many ways short of direct combat, US interests + escalatory risks did not recommend going to war. Reversing that judgment on the fly would be dangerous and irresponsible
9/ It cannot be stressed strongly enough: The powerful moral obligation to aid a beleaguered people is matched by a parallel obligation to avoid a larger war that would cause vastly greater human carnage (*including* in Ukraine). We must seek a balance between these obligations
10/ The Iraq case offers another warning: The role of "value driven imperatives," the sense of urgency that overrides careful analysis + generates a "leap of faith," often into tragedy. The consequences of such a leap in this case could be catastrophic publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/michael…
This letter begs us to take just such a leap of faith. That Putin will not escalate. That Russian aircraft won't hit NATO planes, and ground escalation won't be needed. That wider war can be avoided. There's no evidence for that. And if they are wrong, tragedy awaits, yet again
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A quick thread about moral injunctions, imperatives, MiGs, no-fly zones, and the standards for effective judgment.
Overall message: Acting on the basis of imperative-driven thinking, especially under time pressure in a crisis, is a common prelude to disaster
2/ Researching the basis for the US decision to invade Iraq, I was struck by the powerful sense of urgency, the need to act almost regardless of consequences, that drove senior officials. This skewed the whole decision process publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/michael…
3/ Looking more widely I found this to be a common problem: Decision makers so driven by urgent imperatives that they stopped taking outcomes seriously. They became "indifferent to consequences"; what they "had" to do overwhelmed any real risk assessment link.springer.com/book/10.1007/9…
In midst of Ukraine tragedy, the ROK presidential election isn't getting much attention--but the outcome may portend notable shifts in Seoul's foreign policy, accelerating the regional alignment of democracies + partners already underway foreignaffairs.com/articles/south…
Many uncertainties: Candidates say things elected presidents sometimes ignore; constraints on resources + time; parliamentary obstacles. But the agenda Yoon laid out points to a "deeper," "comprehensive" alliance w/US, coop w/China but tougher stance ... voanews.com/a/south-korean…
... more active role in promoting free + open Indo-Pacific, improved ties w/Japan. Combined w/ongoing trends in Japan, Australia, India + other, this will strengthen the regional grouping willing to push back vs PRC and collaborate on multilateral security initiatives
The argument for increasing clamp-down on energy, given the callous nature of Russian operations, is persuasive. But I'm increasingly worried about a historical parallel which, while imperfect/many differences, offers tremendous reason for worry: Japan 1941 [THREAD]
2/ Spent the last 2 days (re)reading two superb accounts of the road to war in 1940-1941. One = Eri Hotta's "Japan 1941," which has to be one of the best accounts of a nation's decision for war ever written. Worrisome parallels to Russia today, including: penguinrandomhouse.com/books/203635/j…
3/ --Country infuriated by sense of being discriminated against by a US-led int'l order
--Rise of anti-Western hyper-nationalism, including some sr officials
--Aggression (v. China) undertaken w/wishful thinking + vague sense of goals which triggers condemnation + sanctions
I get the signaling value of more defense $. But w/ (1) Russia possibly facing an extended COIN war, (2) having suffered significant losses, (3) showing much less capacity for large scale warfare than we assumed, and (4) EU bolstering its own budgets ... breakingdefense.com/2022/03/no-dou…
2/ ... it's hard to see the argument that the Russian threat to Europe is operationally *greater* than before in a way that demands a bigger budget. If anything, now and for several years, the objective Russian operational threat is likely to decline
3/ The Russian military on display seems less capable of rushing through the Baltics, or Poland, than we thought. @KofmanMichael and others have rightly warned about tilting too far in the other direction. But this isn't an urgent crisis of mil. power warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
The shaming of Mearsheimer as a Russian stooge is wrong + dangerous. But this interview does illustrate another point: His theory, and especially its application to specific cases, is totally incoherent when it gets beyond the most generic truisms THREAD newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/w…
2/ For one thing, the dialogue w/@IChotiner shows how Mearsh's perspective simply can't incorporate normative issues. Chotiner keeps trying to distinguish great power machinations from legitimate Ukrainian aspirations; Mearsheimer can only see it via great power interests lens
3/ More broadly, a consistent problem w/offensive realism is its refusal to accept the role of norms and institutions, despite ample evidence of their real-world effect. Mearsh. can't explain the global normative reaction to this invasion belfercenter.org/publication/in…
100% right. This is an understandable emotion but not a considered policy position. Publicly taking that stance = zero incentive for compromise from Putin or anyone close to him, creating the most dangerous possible situation
Remember what McNamara learned from Castro about the Cuban missile crisis in 1992: In the event of a US invasion, Castro was prepared to endorse the use of nuclear weapons even though he knew the Cuban people would "disappear" armscontrol.org/act/2002-11/fe…
Embracing regime change would also shift the narrative in wholly self-destructive ways. Potential to fragment global consensus vs Russia. W/in Russia, it would endorse Putin's lie that this is all a necessary response to Western aggression + potentially boost his support