Thread by @MMazarr

A quick thread about moral injunctions, imperatives, MiGs, no-fly zones, and the standards for effective judgment.
Overall message: Acting on the basis of imperative-driven thinking, especially under time pressure in a crisis, is a common prelude to disaster

2/ Researching the basis for the US decision to invade Iraq, I was struck by the powerful sense of urgency, the need to act almost regardless of consequences, that drove senior officials. This skewed the whole decision process
publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/michael…

3/ Looking more widely I found this to be a common problem: Decision makers so driven by urgent imperatives that they stopped taking outcomes seriously. They became "indifferent to consequences"; what they "had" to do overwhelmed any real risk assessment
link.springer.com/book/10.1007/9…

4/ You get to a point in Vietnam, for example, where LBJ admits that "there ain't no daylight"--but nonetheless concludes that "I guess we've got no choice," and he plunges ahead w/escalation. Approving one troop increase, he said: "My answer is yes. But my judgment is no."

5/ McGeorge Bundy later admitted that he "did not even consider it necessary to posit a precise military objective for the escalation he was advocating." Why would he, when further escalation--in service of anti-communism, credibility, "winning"--was such an obvious imperative

6/ That's the whole judgment trap of urgency. Decision makers are no longer looking for the option that produces the best result relative to their goals. They become locked in a perception that one action is required, and thought closes down

7/ This pattern of "imperative driven thinking" is littered all over the transcripts, records, + memos of groups marching righteously toward disaster. Iraq 2003. Vietnam 1964-5. Market Garden 1944. Moscow + Afghanistan, 1979. CEOs of financial firms bounding into CDOs pre-2008

8/ I would guess we'll someday discover that similar imperative-driven mindsets prevailed among Putin + his cronies before this war. Believing Ukraine--and their dream of Russia as a great power--were sliding away. Concluding they *had to act* regardless of the consequences

9/ Once an imperative clicks into place, dissent is marginalized. One common term, as I heard from the Iraq case again + again, is, "You just don't get it." This has to happen, dissenters would be told; their worries were silly, foolish, morally repugnant

10/ As we confront the need to aid Ukraine in every responsible way possible, it is tempting to get caught up into imperative-driven thinking of our own. It feeds our sense of moral worth. It simplifies a hugely complex problem: "Stop thinking; we just *have* to do X or Y"

11/ But abandoning a focus on risks, consequences, + outcomes is a guaranteed avenue to bad judgment, and possibly disaster. Falling into this trap out of a very real + legitimate urge to do as much as we can to relieve suffering would not benefit anyone, least of all Ukraine