What's happening in #ViennaTalks? A state of play, best as I can tell [Thread]
2/ Last week, the main - but not sole - area of disagreement was over Iran's @IAEAOrg safeguards probe. U.S./E3 as well as the agency were clear that closing it was a non-starter.
DG Grossi went to Tehran on Saturday, secured an roadmap to address this.
One step forward.
3/ But the same day, right after 🇮🇱 PM’s visit, Russia's FM threw a wrench into the mix:
Facing what he described as an "avalanche of aggressive sanctions" against 🇷🇺 over 🇺🇦 Lavrov called for guarantees that these would not "in any way damage our right to free and full trade".
4/ Not clear if the Iranians had any clue this was coming. U.S. quickly and repeatedly underscored that any sanctions relief on Iran is not a carte blanche for other potentially sanctioned entities (ie, Russian) to be immunized. French called it "blackmail".
5/ Now, for the Russians, there's a non-proliferation interest in seeing the JCPOA revived. But there's a countering interest in freeing a rival oil exporter and taking one item off the West's immediate to-do list.
Seems clear the balance has tipped toward the latter.
6/ So, you ask, can't the Russians just be bypassed? Why the complication? Well, two things:
A. Russia is a member of the JCPOA's Joint Commission, which makes decisions by consensus. If they're opposed to the adoption of a re-entry framework, could try to block it.
7/ B. The Russians have a practical role as well, in terms of civil cooperation projects as well as potentially receiving Iran's enriched uranium stockpile beyond JCPOA's 300kg cap. Similar to what was done in 2015 👇
8/ At this stage, neither adamancy of Russian demands nor exact scope seems clear. If it necessitates workarounds on nuke side, there might be some options.
But now we know exactly why the negotiating mantra all along has been:
Nothing is agreed till everything is agreed.
9/9 Not able to defy one of the sole countries it can rely on, Iran has gone as far as blaming the US for the current deadlock. Let’s hope that behind the scenes they and others are trying to find solutions to avoid yet another crisis in these troubled times.
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Why should we listen to policy makers who have been consistently wrong? These Democrats supported Trump's withdrawal and are responsible for allowing Iran to advance to the verge of nuclear weapons. jewishinsider.com/2022/03/eleven…
You'd be hard-pressed to find three people who've been as wrong over as long a period on how to address Iran's nuclear program. [Thread]
2| Here's @SenatorRisch talking to @NPR in 2017, prior to Trump's withdrawal. He laments the deal's sunsets (not 10 years, BTW), and says the solution is... sanctions. Well, we know how that worked out - no nuclear restrictions at all!
3| Here's @SenJohnBarrasso on @FoxNews in 2019, lauding the decision to withdraw because "it didn't step them from getting the path to the weapon".
Yet here we are, with Iran enriching near-weapons grade, under limited monitoring, weeks from breakout capability.
🧵گروه بحران: ششمین گزارش از وضعیت اجرای برجام بر اساس نزدیک به ۵۰ مصاحبه با مقامات کشورهای عضو برجام، آمریکا، منطقه و سازمان ملل. «مهلت نهایی» [ترجمه فارسی] @CrisisGroup
۲/ایران و آمریکا چند ماه است که به صورت غیرمستقیم بر سر احیای برجام در حال مذاکرهاند اما موفق نشدهاند راهکاری برای بازگشت مشترک پیدا کنند. جای تعجب ندارد که هر یک تقصیر را به گردن دیگری میاندازد. تروئیکای اروپایی و آمریکا در یک جبهه و روسیه و چین تا حدودی با ایران هم موضعاند.
۳/ ما تنشزایی هستهای ایران در سال گذشته را مرور کردیم. از نظر کمی و کیفی، مثل غنیسازی ۶۰٪ بعد از حمله به نطنز، پیشرفتها تصاعدی بوده. اگرچه هنوز اثری از ساخت سلاح هستهای نیست، اما زمان گریز – دستیابی به میزان کافی اورانیوم برای ساخت یک بمب اتمی – به سه هفته رسیده است.
🧵 New from @CrisisGroup: Our 6th - perhaps final - report on the status of the 2015 nuclear deal, based on more than 50 interviews conducted with officials from JCPOA parties, the U.S., UN and regional governments over the past several months 👇crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| U.S. & Iran have engaged in months of indirect talks aimed at restoring JCPOA. These have failed to deliver a framework for mutual compliance. Unsurprisingly, each sees the other at fault. E3 aligned w/ U.S.; Russia & China not unsympathetic to Iran but within limits.
3| We review Iran's nuclear escalation over past year, during which it made quantitative and qualitative leaps, inc raising enrichment to 60% - highest ever - after April attack at Natanz. Though still no evidence of weaponization, breakout time now a matter of weeks.
بیش از یک دهه است که بر بحران هسته ای ایران تمرکز کرده ام. در این سالها انواع اتهامات به من زده شده: از داماد زاهدی گرفته تا کارمند سیا، از لابی ج.ا. و مشاور ظریف گرفته تا هزاردستان و کارمند سوروس. هرگز اهمیتی به این حرفها و هجمه ها نداده و نمی دهم. اصل مواضع فرد است 1/
مهمترین مواضع من و گروه بحران در سالهای اخیر به این شرح بوده است:
- مخالفت با اقدام ترامپ در تضعیف برجام حتی پیش از خروج آمریکا 2/
- مخالفت با فشار حداکثری و یکی از رساترین صداها در مخالفت با تحریم ها و لابی های مربوطه
3/
2/ Note the phrase "since the election" - a neat dodge over the fact that increase to 20%, uranium metal production, & limits on IAEA inspections all put in motion in Dec 2020, after assassination of Fakhrizadeh.
Yet this key fact is curiously omitted in the FDD history.
3/ And again in April 2021, we see the escalation of enrichment from 20% to 60%, somehow failing to mention the explosion at Natanz barely 48 earlier.