2/ Note the phrase "since the election" - a neat dodge over the fact that increase to 20%, uranium metal production, & limits on IAEA inspections all put in motion in Dec 2020, after assassination of Fakhrizadeh.
Yet this key fact is curiously omitted in the FDD history.
3/ And again in April 2021, we see the escalation of enrichment from 20% to 60%, somehow failing to mention the explosion at Natanz barely 48 earlier.
4/4 The notion that Iran's nuclear escalation is "exploiting America's declining pressure" brazenly elides the fact that maximum pressure lit the fuse, sabotage added tinder, and the arsonists are now trying to blame the firefighters while recommending yet more dynamite.
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بیش از یک دهه است که بر بحران هسته ای ایران تمرکز کرده ام. در این سالها انواع اتهامات به من زده شده: از داماد زاهدی گرفته تا کارمند سیا، از لابی ج.ا. و مشاور ظریف گرفته تا هزاردستان و کارمند سوروس. هرگز اهمیتی به این حرفها و هجمه ها نداده و نمی دهم. اصل مواضع فرد است 1/
مهمترین مواضع من و گروه بحران در سالهای اخیر به این شرح بوده است:
- مخالفت با اقدام ترامپ در تضعیف برجام حتی پیش از خروج آمریکا 2/
- مخالفت با فشار حداکثری و یکی از رساترین صداها در مخالفت با تحریم ها و لابی های مربوطه
3/
162 days after they last recessed, JCPOA negotiations resume in Vienna tomorrow.
It's fair to say they are not burdened by the weight of excessive optimism.
A breakdown of what's changed since June, what hasn't, and what to watch [Thread]
2/ Let's start with one big thing that's changed: Iran's government.
Raisi administration is far more conservative in nature, and far less convinced of the merits of engaging the West, than its predecessor. The views of its negotiating team range from JCPOA sceptics to critics.
3/ Iran's nuclear program has continued expanding: Breakout is now estimated at a month, stockpiles at 20 and 60% growing, concern over irreversible knowledge gains deepening and international monitoring/verification hampered by lack of cooperation with IAEA.
1/ Iran has begun commemorating the 1st anniversary of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's killing.
I think there's a strong argument to be made that after Trump's 2018 JCPOA withdrawal, this is the single most important and consequential event in the current nuclear crisis [thread]
2/ @ronenbergman & @farnazfassihi did a deep dive into the assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist earlier this year that gets into the why/how of what happened that Fri in Absard. 👇 Long in Israeli crosshairs for his work on Iran's nuclear program.
3/ The Trump admin and Netanyahu government had for several months been discussing the revival of sabotage operations and killing nuclear experts. The then-director of Mossad proposed killing Fakhriazdeh as one option, and Trump admin officials briefed on the idea backed it.
On the JCPOA, guarantees, and political realities: A thread 🧵👇
Let's start with one thing Tehran and many pro-JCPOA voices agree on - the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal raises real & reasonable concerns regarding Washington's long-term commitment to an agreement.
2/ These concerns are made all the more credible when anti-JCPOA voices in DC are loudly and repeatedly threatening that in the event power changes hands under the next admin, they will work to renege on U.S. commitments just as Trump did.
آنچه که امروز حیات برجام را بیش از پیش به خطر انداخته توقف مذاکرات وین است. به عنوان کسی که پرونده هستهای ایران را بیش از یک دهه دنبال کرده و از زمان آقای احمدی نژاد-جلیلی در چندین دور از مذاکرات حضور داشته، در این رشته توییت به تحلیل وضعیت کنونی پرداختم. 👇🧵
دلیل اصلی تعلیق مذاکرات این است که: به زعم تهران ایالات متحده نمیخواهد/نمیتواند به تعهدات خود در زمینه رفع تحریمها عمل کند؛ ادامه تنش باعث عقبنشینی طرف مقابل خواهد شد؛ کشور اوج فشار اقتصادی را پشت سر گذاشته و میتواند بدون رفع تحریمها هم به حیات خود ادامه دهد. ۲/
در مقابل، آمریکا نمیخواهد به صورت یکجانبه امتیازی بدهد تا تهران را برای بازگشت به میز مذاکره قانع کند؛ اتحادش با کشورهای اروپایی دوباره برقرار شده؛ در آژانس و سازمان ملل نفوذ قابل توجهی دارد؛ همچنان ابزار تحریم در دستانش است. ۳/
I've followed the nuclear negotiations across 3 US & 3 Iranian administrations, been on the ground at multiple negotiation rounds, and written more reports pre- and post-JCPOA than I care to tally.
Based on that, some modest thoughts on where we stand. [Thread]
The deal's demise was predicted or pronounced from the day it was reached: It wouldn't survive because Iranians would cheat. It couldn't survive because Trump's withdrawal would doom it. And now, it won't survive - or is already dead - because negotiations have stalled. 2/
Why? Tehran believes the U.S. won't/can't deliver on the sanctions relief the deal envisions. That continued escalation could leverage greater concessions. And that having survived the worst of max pressure, their economy can muddle through even without those benefits. 3/