Thread by @AliVaez

🧵 New from @CrisisGroup: Our 6th - perhaps final - report on the status of the 2015 nuclear deal, based on more than 50 interviews conducted with officials from JCPOA parties, the U.S., UN and regional governments over the past several months 👇crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

2| U.S. & Iran have engaged in months of indirect talks aimed at restoring JCPOA. These have failed to deliver a framework for mutual compliance. Unsurprisingly, each sees the other at fault. E3 aligned w/ U.S.; Russia & China not unsympathetic to Iran but within limits.

3| We review Iran's nuclear escalation over past year, during which it made quantitative and qualitative leaps, inc raising enrichment to 60% - highest ever - after April attack at Natanz. Though still no evidence of weaponization, breakout time now a matter of weeks.

4| As a senior European official put it: “If Iran’s nuclear program was a Fiat back in June, it is now a Ferrari”.

5| And while nuclear capabilities were growing, transparency with @iaeaorg was shrinking. Among the areas of disagreement b/w Tehran and the agency is demand that a probe into undeclared activities be closed as a condition for JCPOA compliance. No way, said the IAEA.

6| On sanctions front, Iran's govt believes that recovering growth since mid-2020 means worst is past.
But positive figures bely deep problems of mismanagement, corruption, unemployment, inflation, currency & recurrent protests re basic services [chart via @WorldBank].

7| Said a Tehran-based diplomat: "On the surface, there’s construction, booming service econ … But there’s also frustration & a sense that this isn’t sustainable. Cost of living is up, purchasing power is down, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer".

8| Meanwhile, regional tensions b/w Iran and the U.S. continue to manifest on multiple fronts, notably Iraq, where recent days have punctured a relative lull, as well as Syria & maritime. While not quite on a hair trigger, escalatory risks significant. bit.ly/3K7Qrul

9| Tensions b/w Iran and Israel also high on multiple fronts, while relations with Gulf Arab states improving.

Said a senior UAE official: "Iran is not an enemy... Escalation will affect us first, so we're improving our ties on all levels while the JCPOA issue resolved".

10| We then dive into JCPOA talks. Biden's initial dithering & lack of clarity on what Iran wanted - a gesture-for-gesture or restoration in toto - eventually led to 6 rounds of talks w/ Rouhani admin. There was decent progress, before 5 month hiatus.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

11| Long delay b/w rounds 6-7 underscored several dynamics: domestic Iranian debates over the Vienna process, internal jockeying for influence among ascendant hardliners, and a sense that because of its nuclear advances, time was on Tehran's side. To growing U.S./E3 frustration.

12| Said a senior European diplomat on fraught 7th round:

“It all about گفتگو برای گفتگو [talks for talks]... I have never heard the word ‘logical’ so many times in the course of one day as I have heard from the Iranians in laying out their impractical proposals”

13| This brings us to round 8, ongoing since late Dec. Overall mood improved, all sides note progress, though U.S./E3 in particular emphasizing that pace of progress is unacceptably slow, with eyes on technical point of no return in coming weeks. See @SecBlinken on Thu 👇

14| Given that reality, quite a bit of thinking going into potential Plan Bs once inflection point reached: interim deal, more coercive diplomacy from Western powers inc UN snapback, and, inevitably, possible mil options. Each has risks, which is why Plan A still preferred.

15| The fact is that neither U.S. nor Iran are going to get everything they want: Elements of nuclear advancement cannot be totally reversed, and real limits to what admin offer on sanx relief or "guarantees" that simply can't be given. But can they get what they need?

🆈🅴🆂.

16| We offer concrete ideas on how to bridge the remaining gaps, including on the thorny issue of guarantees as noted in this @WSJ report by @laurnorman:
wsj.com/articles/iran-…

17/ For obvious reasons, U.S. won't give up on sanx w/out clear steps from Iran on rolling back nuke program. And Iran doesn't trust U.S. to actually deliver on econ relief. But moving in tandem on initial move followed by staggered resumption of mutual compliance is doable.

18| U.S. & Euros both have a role in ensuring trade consistent w/ JCPOA delivers. And Iran should be willing to bring nuclear activities fully in line with obligations, as well as cooperating fully w/ IAEA. This is the best foundation for wider constructive engagement.

19| Too, ample scope for cooperation on other issues: regional security, humanitarian trade, and notably the fate of dual nationals detained in Iran. Not enough was done in 2015/6 to seize JCPOA momentum on other areas of disagreement - a mistake that shouldn't be repeated.

20| If JCPOA talks fail, diplomatic options should take clear precedence over military ones. Nuclear latency carries risks, but so too do pre-emptive strikes - with uncertain non-proliferation benefits & clear potential for major escalation in the region.

21| Since JCPOA was implemented, far more time has been spent trying to salvage it than build on it. We now know the downsides of its demise: economic pain for the Iranian people, a growing non-proliferation threat and regional tensions brought to the brink of conflagration.

END/ What brought U.S./Iran/P4+1 to Vienna is the recognition that JCPOA offers 𝕓𝕖𝕤𝕥 available framework to address a global strategic concern & only framework for Iran to normalize its econ ties w/ the world.

A last chance to save it mustn't be lost.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…