One of the arguments I'm seeing essentially amounts to "why doesn't NATO just act like Putin - just flagrantly lie, ignore potential Russian escalation and act crazy and unpredictable."
And the answer is, "because we're not Russia and operate under different constraints." 1/
That's not, "we have to be the good guys" or "we have to be rational because Putin isn't" or anything like that.
We have different systems of government that operate under different ideologies with different processes and that imposes different constraints. 2/
So why not lie a bunch and threaten crazy things?
Putin can do this because he is an autocrat whose support relies on just a handful of key supporters. He can lie to everyone else, including his own people, and remain in power. 3/
But the USA and the other NATO states are to some degree democracies (caveats for Turkey and Hungary).
While democracies can do small things covertly, any kind of major action requires building consensus among a host of stakeholders. 4/
At the very least, you have to rally dozens of key politicians in each of the 30 member states. In practice most of those key politicians have one eye on their constituents and aren't going anywhere without popular support.
Hard to keep big secrets in that environment. 5/
Consequently, while politicians do of course fib a lot, there is a level of contempt for the truth they generally don't feel they can engage with - and that same level of contempt is where Putin lives basically 24/7. 6/
The same goes for 'unpredictability' - threatening to do something 'wild' doesn't generally work for democracies because it isn't credible, because anyone can see the popular support isn't there.
Whereas Putin is a dictator who *can* just invade another country on a whim. 7/
In a more complex sense the problem comes back to Andre Beaufre and his 'false note' (discussed in this week's post: acoup.blog/2022/03/11/col…)
Humans have a status quo bias and deterrence is all about predictability within the status quo. 8/
Consequently the sort of actions that carry big costs in indirect strategy are not morally bad actions, but actions which break with the state's stated 'logical thesis' - not because they are bad, but because the shatter that status quo predictability. 9/
But precisely because of that status quo bias, that means that dictators pay less of a strategic price, for instance, for brutal repression than liberal democracies do.
Putin intentionally targeting civilians does not force a sudden, wrenching reassessment of the status quo. 10/
But NATO doing so absolutely would - it would infuriate their publics, and tarnish their international reputations in a way that it simply doesn't have that reputational cost for Putin because he has no humanitarian reputation to lose.
Status quo bias. 11/
You can see this pretty clearly looking back at the Cold War - most of the shady stuff the United States did remain permanent black marks on its record.
The generally much worse stuff the USSR did provokes less comment...because it was a brutal autocracy so of course it did. 12/
In the end that means that the liberal democracies play by different rules than the autocracies: their ideologies and democratic institutions compel them to be more cautious, more predictable, more committed to human rights and more wary of direct escalation. 13/
On the flipside, those same institutions tend to correlate with vibrant, technologically advanced, productive rich societies that as a result have the reputational and economic capital to crash the Russian economy in just a few weeks. 14/
It *sounds* like a terrible disadvantage to have to at least solidly pretend to be the white-hat in all of this, but then you look at the USA's comically long allies list & remember that Putin's best allies are Belarus & Syria. Even China is at best a fair-weather friend. 15/
Given that the liberal democracies triumphed in both world wars and the cold war and currently hold the upper hand now, it seems to me at least that the constraints they work under are at least not a crippling disadvantage. end/
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So why would Russia use WMDs (probably chemical, in this case)?
In a way, Putin resorting to chemical weapons would be an admission that the Russian Armed Forces is no longer capable of doing 'modern system' warfare...as we've all seen over the past 2 weeks. 1/
The upshot is that 'modern system' (term via S. Biddle, Military Power (2004)) armies want to move quickly, disorient the enemy, maintain high tempo. 2/
Chemical weapons offer basically nothing to that. Other expensive modern-system armies can defend against them fairly easily and against less sophisticated armies, they gum up the battlefield and slow things down which isn't what your modern system army wants. 3/
On a less serious note: really enjoying Elden Ring - not super far in yet (just did the Glintstone Dragon - that fight was wild and fun).
The range of apparently fully viable playstyles - melee, ranged, magic, etc. is really neat.
My one tip for getting through a FromSoft game is this: use the co-op system.
Now, I am stubborn, I insist on beating all bosses solo. Have since DS1. So instead I use the co-op system to scout the bosses before risking my runes/souls/whatever.
Especially for bosses without a convenient site-of-grace, putting a gold summon right in front of the boss door can get you a bunch of fairly rapid tries at the boss to learn move sets and patterns, again without risking your runes.
Seeing a lot of chatter about Ukraine needing to 'prepare for insurgency' but also that they can't do insurgency.
And I think this is a definition problem because depending on how your define insurgency, Ukraine is either 1) already doing it or 2) probably won't ever do it.
1/
If what you are expecting by 'insurgency' is something that looks like AQI in 2006 or the Taliben in 2011, that's unlikely to happen for the simple reason that the Ukrainian army still exists and as a result Ukraine has other options to resist with. 2/
As I've noted elsewhere, insurgency in this sense - operating in territory the enemy controls (rather than just moves through) using the population as covering terrain without the support of a conventional military - that sort of insurgency is a hard way to fight. 3/
People need to prepare themselves for what the end of hostilities in Ukraine might look like, though it doesn't seem imminent.
Because peace agreements are rarely clear, clean things AND also because folks need to be prepared for NATO and Ukrainian interests to diverge. 1/
Ending a conflict like this one - especially in a shorter time-scale - is likely to involve messy compromises. A truly protracted war might have a clearer, cleaner ending, but involve much more death and destruction, as we've discussed: acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…
2/
I think regime change in Kyiv is, at this point, an unlikely outcome; I don't think Russia has the juice for it. Instead, negotiations seem to revolve around the Donbas, Crimea, and Ukraine's joining the EU and NATO.
There are lots of possible combinations in that space. 3/
It seems relevant to point out that the Russian strategy of fostering 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan create a number of crisis points where, if Russian state backing suddenly evaporated, we could see hostilities reignite.
By contrast a lot of comments in the original thread are focusing on things that only happen in Risk games (China invading Siberia).
But imagine there are discussions right now in Chisinau, Tbilisi and Baku trying to figure out what Russian success OR failure means for them.
Though I wouldn't expect this to 'save' Ukraine or anything like it; I doubt anyone will jump until they're sure which way the wind blows. More likely that Russian failure in Ukraine, if dramatic enough, may trigger a series of 'Ukraine War Afterparties' as Russian power recedes.
You know it is the most trite thing, but the thing that keeps popping into my head watching the ramshackle Russian operations in Ukraine is that scene in Kingdom of Heaven where Saladin patiently explains to his subordinate how battles are won.
"...battles are determined by God, but also by preparation, numbers, absence of disease and availability of water. One cannot maintain a siege with the enemy behind."
That last line could be the caption to every photo of a burned out Russian truck.
Of course that line is a bit funny in context because at Acre in 1191 the crusaders absolutely did maintain a siege with *Saladin* behind counter-besieging, so, you know, no absolutes.
Still a bad sign when movie strategists appear to understand it better than a real world army.