So why would Russia use WMDs (probably chemical, in this case)?
In a way, Putin resorting to chemical weapons would be an admission that the Russian Armed Forces is no longer capable of doing 'modern system' warfare...as we've all seen over the past 2 weeks. 1/
The upshot is that 'modern system' (term via S. Biddle, Military Power (2004)) armies want to move quickly, disorient the enemy, maintain high tempo. 2/
Chemical weapons offer basically nothing to that. Other expensive modern-system armies can defend against them fairly easily and against less sophisticated armies, they gum up the battlefield and slow things down which isn't what your modern system army wants. 3/
Consequently, modern-system armies abandoned chemical weapons not because they were morally bad or horrible but because they were less effective than high explosives (delivered with ever increasing precision). 4/
But of course the Russian Armed Forces have spent the last two weeks demonstrating to the whole world that they aren't actually capable of *doing* the modern system. Combined arms failures, targeting failures with PGMs, logistics failures, all of it. 5/
Russia's military is increasingly showing itself - whatever its expensive systems - to be what I call a 'static system' military. And in the static system - which tries to win through attrition because it can't do maneuver - unfortunately, chemical weapons can make sense. 6/
In particular, while it is fairly easy and cheap for wealthy countries to protect their soldiers against chemical weapons, civilians (and the soldiers of poorer countries) often remain very vulnerable to them, lacking proper protective (NBC) equipment. 7/
Thus, as Russia settles down to a series of urban sieges (several that seem to me to be unlikely to succeed without substantial changes in battlefield conditions), incapable of taking cities 'by storm' the likelihood of WMD use rises. 8/
And that's bad!
The USA/NATO are already signalling that the use of chemical weapons would be an unacceptable escalation. I think it is one scenario where you might actually get some direct NATO intervention (e.g. NFZ/air campaign, which = war).
What I'd hope is Putin realizes the last time NATO said he'd pay "a severe price" and he tried to call bluff, NATO responded by cratering his entire economy and providing Ukraine with a free-flowing river of arms with which they are mauling his army.
They aren't kidding! 10/
I'd *hope* that would establish credibility.
I *fear* that Putin will reason from the experience in Syria: a lot of tough talk about chemical weapons, but in the end no one did anything meaningful. 11/
The problem with that logic is pretty obvious: people with power care a lot more about Ukraine than about Syria. I know it's not fair, it's not just, but it is true.
Consequently, the response to chemical use in Ukraine would be much stronger, I suspect. 12/
All of that said, Putin has backed himself into a corner, having staked all on a foolish war, conducted foolishly, for evil and foolish purposes.
Desperate leaders often seek bigger and bigger gambles to try to win back the pot. 13/
Consequently, while two weeks ago I'd say the chance of seeing WMDs used in this conflict was extremely low, now I am not so sure - Putin's foolishness has created the use-case for chemical weapons.
His next foolish step may create the conditions for a wider European war. end/
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One of the arguments I'm seeing essentially amounts to "why doesn't NATO just act like Putin - just flagrantly lie, ignore potential Russian escalation and act crazy and unpredictable."
And the answer is, "because we're not Russia and operate under different constraints." 1/
That's not, "we have to be the good guys" or "we have to be rational because Putin isn't" or anything like that.
We have different systems of government that operate under different ideologies with different processes and that imposes different constraints. 2/
So why not lie a bunch and threaten crazy things?
Putin can do this because he is an autocrat whose support relies on just a handful of key supporters. He can lie to everyone else, including his own people, and remain in power. 3/
On a less serious note: really enjoying Elden Ring - not super far in yet (just did the Glintstone Dragon - that fight was wild and fun).
The range of apparently fully viable playstyles - melee, ranged, magic, etc. is really neat.
My one tip for getting through a FromSoft game is this: use the co-op system.
Now, I am stubborn, I insist on beating all bosses solo. Have since DS1. So instead I use the co-op system to scout the bosses before risking my runes/souls/whatever.
Especially for bosses without a convenient site-of-grace, putting a gold summon right in front of the boss door can get you a bunch of fairly rapid tries at the boss to learn move sets and patterns, again without risking your runes.
Seeing a lot of chatter about Ukraine needing to 'prepare for insurgency' but also that they can't do insurgency.
And I think this is a definition problem because depending on how your define insurgency, Ukraine is either 1) already doing it or 2) probably won't ever do it.
1/
If what you are expecting by 'insurgency' is something that looks like AQI in 2006 or the Taliben in 2011, that's unlikely to happen for the simple reason that the Ukrainian army still exists and as a result Ukraine has other options to resist with. 2/
As I've noted elsewhere, insurgency in this sense - operating in territory the enemy controls (rather than just moves through) using the population as covering terrain without the support of a conventional military - that sort of insurgency is a hard way to fight. 3/
People need to prepare themselves for what the end of hostilities in Ukraine might look like, though it doesn't seem imminent.
Because peace agreements are rarely clear, clean things AND also because folks need to be prepared for NATO and Ukrainian interests to diverge. 1/
Ending a conflict like this one - especially in a shorter time-scale - is likely to involve messy compromises. A truly protracted war might have a clearer, cleaner ending, but involve much more death and destruction, as we've discussed: acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…
2/
I think regime change in Kyiv is, at this point, an unlikely outcome; I don't think Russia has the juice for it. Instead, negotiations seem to revolve around the Donbas, Crimea, and Ukraine's joining the EU and NATO.
There are lots of possible combinations in that space. 3/
It seems relevant to point out that the Russian strategy of fostering 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan create a number of crisis points where, if Russian state backing suddenly evaporated, we could see hostilities reignite.
By contrast a lot of comments in the original thread are focusing on things that only happen in Risk games (China invading Siberia).
But imagine there are discussions right now in Chisinau, Tbilisi and Baku trying to figure out what Russian success OR failure means for them.
Though I wouldn't expect this to 'save' Ukraine or anything like it; I doubt anyone will jump until they're sure which way the wind blows. More likely that Russian failure in Ukraine, if dramatic enough, may trigger a series of 'Ukraine War Afterparties' as Russian power recedes.
You know it is the most trite thing, but the thing that keeps popping into my head watching the ramshackle Russian operations in Ukraine is that scene in Kingdom of Heaven where Saladin patiently explains to his subordinate how battles are won.
"...battles are determined by God, but also by preparation, numbers, absence of disease and availability of water. One cannot maintain a siege with the enemy behind."
That last line could be the caption to every photo of a burned out Russian truck.
Of course that line is a bit funny in context because at Acre in 1191 the crusaders absolutely did maintain a siege with *Saladin* behind counter-besieging, so, you know, no absolutes.
Still a bad sign when movie strategists appear to understand it better than a real world army.