I said it yesterday on @cnn, I'll say it again today.
Having worked w/ UKR's army, I expected them to be very good. And they have been better than I expected.
Having seen Russian forces in training & exercises, I expected them to be bad. They are worse than I expected. 1/10
But having said this, I've also learned a few things in my career:
1. Don't ever underestimate your enemy 2. The army that continues to adapt fastest usually wins. 3. You never know what the enemy "commander" (in this case, Putin) will do that may radically change things. 2/
While UKRs Army & Territorial forces are performing magnificently, they are on the horns of a dilemma:
Continue their resistance/continue with a very effective active defense OR siphon off manpower for massive humanitarian relief efforts (moving civilians, medical aid, etc). 3/
UKR will soon be faced with logistical challenges of their own...not just to their Army but to their civilian population who are suffering.
Resupply of weapons (AT, Anti-Air, drones, etc), but also food, medical aid, electricity, etc. 4/
The RUs face a bigger dilemma:
Culminate from the offense, and go into the defense sooner...and continue to deplete their logistics w more arty, missile, rockets, limited air, from "safe" locations
OR
Find a way to pull out (unlikely)
OR
Continue assaults (dumb) 5/
I won't comment on casualty numbers, but will say RU did not expect as many as they've seen (killed, wounded, deserted, captured). These are larger than what's being reported.
RU also didn't likely predict 3 key generals KIA in one week (with more replaced back in Moscow). 6/
The announcement of thousands of paid Syrians mercenaries joining the fight is a head scratcher to me. As is the limited missile attack on Lutsk.
No military advantage in either, and there could be significant downsides to both (more wasting logistics). 7/
Any use of chems/tactical nukes by Putin will be met with RU paying a "severe price." And Putin has now seen @potus means what he says.
Either could be a game changer, in both deaths and suffering. With no strategic goal.
Is Putin dumb enough? He has proven to be so far. 8/
RU will continue to cause horrific damages & increased refugee flow. But doubt they will "secure" or "control" any large city (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Mariupol). They don't have troop-to-task to do it & it will further stretch logistics.
They will continue scorched earth 9/
What I'll be watching the next few days:
-RU actions toward Kyiv & attempts to bypass/isolate Mykolaiv (to get across the difficult Bug River)
-As well as the heroic fight of UKR forces, especially around the capital.
-Volume of RU indirect strikes.
-Refugee flow 10/10
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But let’s add some context:
-the circumference around Kyiv is 30 miles
-there’s a major river flowing through the city
-3 million people live w/in the city limits
-the 3 “arrows” (axis of advances) on left (30k RU troops) have been stalled for 96 hours 1/4
-the 1 arrow on right (about 15k troops) has been beat up in Sumy & Chernihiv
-all logistics columns have and continue to suffer significant losses
-an attack takes a 3:1 advantage; a siege takes much more. 2/4
-it’s very cold, RU troops are hungry & wet, have been in the field in UKR (enemy territory) for 17 days & in Belarus several months before that
-UKR is defending their capital…RU troops don’t know why they were there.
3/4
Lot of recent talk about Russian (and Ukrainian) casualties.
Reports vary, based on who provides them, and how they are counting the losses.
History shows that in war, those who are conducting the offense (Russia), casualties tend to be higher...in the defense, lower 1/18
But number of casualties are also affected by other things:
-the type of conflict (conventional vs insurgency)
-the method of war (infantry vs tanks/aircraft)
-the quality of medical support 2/
This war is different than what Americans are used to seeing in Iraq & Afghanistan, with patrols taking fire or vehicles hitting IEDs.
In an insurgency/counterinsurgency, casualties are mostly among infantry, engineers, support personnel...and there are fewer killed/injured. 3/
Many seem to be stuck on instituting a US/NATO No Fly Zone (NFZ) in Ukraine. Some asking for this compare doing so to what happened in Iraq and the Balkans.
I don't think it's a good idea, for several reasons. So here's a quick thread. 1/11
The concept of a NFZ is such that a nation puts aircraft into a contested area to prevent another nation from using aircraft against an ally.
It seems simple: Put aircraft in the sky, and stop someone else from using their aircraft from doing bad things. 2/
There's a couple problems to this:
First, in order to ENFORCE a NFZ, you have to be prepared to shoot the other aircraft down. If you're not worried about doing that because you have the power that nothing else bad could happen, you're okay. 3/
A thread on an experience I had in 2004 with a Russian General. 1/12
In returning from Iraq in 2004 as a one-star general, I was assigned as the commander of the US Army Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Beautiful place, and one of my favorite jobs during my career. 2/
This is a place where we conducted training and exercises with US forces, but my boss had given me the task to turn it into a multinational training center for our NATO allies and other partners. 3/
I was a major during Desert Storm. Other armies have attempted to model our actions during that 45 day air campaign & 4 day/100 hour ground campaign.
But they don’t understand the things we applied during that fight. 1/8
The US/alliance had brilliant political leadership in Bush & Powell. There was operational competence in the generals. There was a masterful plan that relied on coordinated intel, logistics & the principles of war. 2/8
Perhaps most importantly, there was a new generation of professional & trained military personnel, with great equipment, sound doctrine, realistic training & terrific leadership development. (A new school for planners -SAMS- also played a huge part). 3/8
After one of my @CNN appearances, one of the anchors asked me off-air why I had confidence in Ukraine's army to push back agains the illegal Russian military onslaught.
I used a bit of "battlefield math" to explain my rationale. 1/16
Their are two major factors most military folks consider to determine combat power: the force's resources and the force's will.
There are more elements under each of these categories that contribute to military capabilities. 2/
The force's RESOURCES: that's quantity (size of the force, Number of different capabilities...like air, artillery, # of soldiers), quality of equipment, extent and specificity of their training, their logistics & ability to resupply, their intelligence, etc. 3/