Thread by @PhillipsPOBrien

Logistics Rule--look at the map. You might be wondering why the Russian invasion of Ukraine looks like a group of almost equidistant road-linked thrusts stretching from Russian and Belarus into Ukraine. (thanks to @Nrg8000 for this)

Turning to this War on the Rocks piece, it is said that the average Russian unit has a truck lift to take it to 90 miles (140km) from the closest large supply dump (see below). You would have to double the trucks on hand to get to 180 miles. warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…

Here is the map with a 140km/90mile line (handdrawn, apologies) in black in the middle. What you can see is that there have hardly been any Russian thrusts that have exceeded the natural limit set by their truck lift.

Indeed there has been only one thrust that greatly exceeds the 140km/90mile limit, and that is the long thrust from Sumy to Kyiv. That might have taken two resupplies or a significant extra truck allocation--which is not terribly reassuring in 16 days of campaigning.

Indeed, most Russian thrusts seem to have stopped dead after going forward something close to the original 140km. Even after 16 days of war, they are having great difficulties getting units beyond that distance from their home supply dumps.

This, btw, is directly the opposite of what the Russians should be doing according to their doctrine--which is to be fast moving to exploit openings, and adjusting flexibly to the opportunities allowed by battle.

What we see is the opposite of this. Mostly short, equidistant thrusts, with a few, slow, halting longer movements which are taking much longer to occur than the Russians would like.

The Russian campaign seems to be being controlled by logistic limitations, severely restricted by Ukrainian attacks on their trucks. Logistics rule because they limit

Hoping @MargaretAtwood sees this! @BoringWar

Institute for the study of war daily report, Ukrainian attacks in the northeast are causing Russian problems. Btw these attacks to the northeast threaten the supplies of the long Russian attack from Sumy to Kyiv. The most precarious supply line

https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1502767739722768396

Btw not saying that logistics is the only limiting factor or that the Russians are not getting supplies in at places along the line, they clearly have in the south: just that there seems to be a general limiting advance on how far they have been able to push forward

Here is the full Institute for the Study of War update for yesterday if you’re interested.

Another interesting map on supply lines with a distance indicator. From the U.K. MOD.

https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1502633349717938178

Focusses on the longer thrusts, gives a visual representation of the long Sumy to Kyiv supply lines and where down south the Russians have been able to press further.

Using the above map, it also might help explain the success of the Russian thrust in the south earlier in the invasion. People have mentioned it in response to this thread, and likened it to the US attack on Baghdad.

In logistical terms comparing this to something like a lightning thrust in other wars is bizarre and smacks of desperation from people trying to talk up Russian military performance.

The thrust along the south coast was from supply dumps to supply dumps (between Crimea and Donetsk/Luhansk). It’s the opposite of a deep lightning strike into an enemy position. Rare in war that it happens, so needs to be put in context

Another interesting attempt to map the war, clear differentiation between where the Russians control blocks of territory and where they are confined to the roads.

https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1503054185943683072

Obviously the road limited thrusts would be more vulnerable and it seems the Ukrainians have been trying to break the supply lines for the narrow thrust from Sumy to Kyiv.