After the rumor that Russia was asking for Chinese equivalent of Meals, Ready to Eat (MEEs) @hawaiidelilah asked my opinion of the logistics indicators of the Russian force.
The military uses “classes of supply” to categorize things armies need. 1/6
Heres my evaluation, based on what I’ve seen, of Russia’s state of logistics, and where they are failing. (Note, I have no data on any of this, but it’s my gut feel). 2/
-Class I: food, rations and water:F
-Class III: Petroleum, fuel, lubricants: D
-Class IV: Fortification and barrier material: untested, likely F
-Class V: Ammunition: on artillery, missiles and rockets, declining; all others unknown, likely D. 3/
-Class VI: Personal Items: based on scenes looting of UKR stores: F
-Class VII: Major end items (replacement vehicles & equipment): based on deserted/ abandoned equipment: F
-Class VIII: Medical support & supplies: based on observed lack of air & ground casualty evacuation, F 4/
-Class IX: Repair parts: little indication of either maintenance ability by mechanics or supply of parts available: F
-Class X: Miscellaneous supplies (for example, items to support civil affairs activity or support of population): F. 5/
Those are the classes of supply. Add to this the personnel replacement function, given RU has asked for Chechen, Syrian and other mercenary fighting, all this points to poor planning and clumsy logistics and personnel execution. Again, no proof, but just things I’m seeing. 6/6
Sorry, MRE, not MEE
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The 5 US Army divisions that have tanks contain from 101 up to 303 tanks, because US division vary from 1 to 3 armored brigades.
That’s hard for civilians to understand, but each Division is organized for different missions. 2/
Current US Army divisions have from as few as 15,000 Soldiers (in a division of only two Armored Combat Arms Brigades) to well over 20,000+ Soldiers (in Divisions where there are four ACABs). 3/
But let’s add some context:
-the circumference around Kyiv is 30 miles
-there’s a major river flowing through the city
-3 million people live w/in the city limits
-the 3 “arrows” (axis of advances) on left (30k RU troops) have been stalled for 96 hours 1/4
-the 1 arrow on right (about 15k troops) has been beat up in Sumy & Chernihiv
-all logistics columns have and continue to suffer significant losses
-an attack takes a 3:1 advantage; a siege takes much more. 2/4
-it’s very cold, RU troops are hungry & wet, have been in the field in UKR (enemy territory) for 17 days & in Belarus several months before that
-UKR is defending their capital…RU troops don’t know why they were there.
3/4
I said it yesterday on @cnn, I'll say it again today.
Having worked w/ UKR's army, I expected them to be very good. And they have been better than I expected.
Having seen Russian forces in training & exercises, I expected them to be bad. They are worse than I expected. 1/10
But having said this, I've also learned a few things in my career:
1. Don't ever underestimate your enemy 2. The army that continues to adapt fastest usually wins. 3. You never know what the enemy "commander" (in this case, Putin) will do that may radically change things. 2/
While UKRs Army & Territorial forces are performing magnificently, they are on the horns of a dilemma:
Continue their resistance/continue with a very effective active defense OR siphon off manpower for massive humanitarian relief efforts (moving civilians, medical aid, etc). 3/
Lot of recent talk about Russian (and Ukrainian) casualties.
Reports vary, based on who provides them, and how they are counting the losses.
History shows that in war, those who are conducting the offense (Russia), casualties tend to be higher...in the defense, lower 1/18
But number of casualties are also affected by other things:
-the type of conflict (conventional vs insurgency)
-the method of war (infantry vs tanks/aircraft)
-the quality of medical support 2/
This war is different than what Americans are used to seeing in Iraq & Afghanistan, with patrols taking fire or vehicles hitting IEDs.
In an insurgency/counterinsurgency, casualties are mostly among infantry, engineers, support personnel...and there are fewer killed/injured. 3/
Many seem to be stuck on instituting a US/NATO No Fly Zone (NFZ) in Ukraine. Some asking for this compare doing so to what happened in Iraq and the Balkans.
I don't think it's a good idea, for several reasons. So here's a quick thread. 1/11
The concept of a NFZ is such that a nation puts aircraft into a contested area to prevent another nation from using aircraft against an ally.
It seems simple: Put aircraft in the sky, and stop someone else from using their aircraft from doing bad things. 2/
There's a couple problems to this:
First, in order to ENFORCE a NFZ, you have to be prepared to shoot the other aircraft down. If you're not worried about doing that because you have the power that nothing else bad could happen, you're okay. 3/
A thread on an experience I had in 2004 with a Russian General. 1/12
In returning from Iraq in 2004 as a one-star general, I was assigned as the commander of the US Army Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Beautiful place, and one of my favorite jobs during my career. 2/
This is a place where we conducted training and exercises with US forces, but my boss had given me the task to turn it into a multinational training center for our NATO allies and other partners. 3/