Three weeks since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The Battle for Kyiv is the focus of this thread. A caveat – it is not certain the Russians are capable of surrounding, attacking or seizing Kyiv. 1/25 kyivindependent.com/national/russi…
3/25 Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions. As I noted two days ago, the Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. Image - @UAWeapons
4/25 With the strain on the Russian forces (and their slovenly plans) showing, the Russian high command has gone back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. We are now seeing Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine.
5/25 Plan C can be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure & manufacturing as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers. Pic FT.com
6/25 The new Russian campaign also seems to have a punitive, almost medieval, aspect to it. The Russians appear to be punishing the Ukrainian people for daring to stand against the Russian bear, while hoping they capitulate. ‘Hope’ is a bad course of action in war.
7/25 A key part on Russia’s ‘Plan C’ appears to be the Russian encirclement and capture of Kyiv. On 6 March, I explored how Russia might capture Kyiv. In the 11 days since, the Russians have slowly, inexorably closed on the Ukrainian capital but at very high cost. Image - BBC
8/25 Why does Kyiv matter? The capture of Kyiv is the main effort for the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. Russian possession of Kyiv is essential for Putin’s desired political end state for the war – Ukrainian subservience.
9/25 Kyiv’s importance to the Ukrainians has only grown as the war has progressed. It remains the centre of Ukraine’s democratic government. It is from here that President Zelensky leads his nation – and shapes world opinion about the war.
10/25 Holding Kyiv also provides a major psychological boost for Ukraine’s soldiers and civilians. So, to the Russian President, the capture of Kyiv is essential to ‘his’ defeat of Ukraine. Image - ABC
11/25 What might be the key features of any battle for control of Kyiv? First, the Russians are severely short in personnel. They can’t take the whole city. They will focus only on key nodes & parts of the city where Ukrainian politicians, government officials & military HQ are.
12/25 Second, urban operations are significantly more expensive in human life than combat operations in other environments. We will see a spike in casualties – both civilian and military. It will be a large spike. icrc.org/en/document/ne…
13/25 Third, perhaps because of the high threat posed by urban operations, we may see more autonomous systems on the ground, and in the air, to reduce risk to human combatants. It is one thing I expected to see more of in this war. madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/120-autonomous…
14/25 Fourth, we can’t visualise this as a single massive battle. It won’t be. It will be thousands of micro-battles between different combatants in streets, buildings, rubble, tunnels, towers, in the air & info domain. This will be very difficult for either side to control.
15/25 Fifth, this lack of control, combined with limited visibility and the brutalisation of soldiers that occurs in this kind of combat, means that the potential for war crimes is significantly increased in any fight for Kyiv.
16/25 Sixth, both sides will need to fight in combined arms teams that are well lead and logistically supported. This means tanks, accompanied by infantry, logistics, UAVs, repair and recovery assets, and many, many combat engineers.
17/25 And if they are smart (which there has not been a lot of evidence for on the Russian side in this war), lots and lots of armoured bulldozers. We know for sure the Russians have them. popsci.com/russia-unveils…
18/25 Finally, airpower and air defence, are important. Currently, the Ukrainians are holding their own in the air fight. As for the Russians, I don’t think the head of the Russian Army will be sending a Christmas card to the Russian Air Force this year. Image - @Sierra__Alpha
19/25 However, this remains a hypothetical for now. There have been many predictions of ‘imminent’ Russian assaults against the capital. But as @danlamothe notes in his latest Pentagon update, the Russians remain bogged down on Kyiv’s eastern & north-western approaches.
20/25 What are Russia’s chances of a successful seizure of Kyiv? My assessment is ‘low’. Urban operations are much more complex to plan and execute than other conventional operations. And the Russians have not shown high competence in their normal ops. Image - @UAWeapons
21/25 The rough rule for urban attacks (not COIN) is about 3-5 attackers for each defender. Given the number of Ukrainian defenders & complexity of the defences, the Russians will need tens of thousands of soldiers to attempt an attack into Kyiv. Tens of thousands.
22/25 And in the information battle, an assault on Kyiv will only see things get worse for the Russians. The world will focus on Kyiv as the decisive fight of the war. And most of the world will be seeking – and supporting - a Ukrainian victory.
23/25 So any Russian attack on Kyiv will be very costly for soldiers (especially infantry, armour and commanders) and civilians. It will also be enormously destructive with a huge post-war financial impact.
24/25 As @LawDavf makes clear in his latest (and quite superb) analysis of the war and its financial impact on Russia, the economic costs of the Battle for Kyiv will be extraordinarily high. samf.substack.com/p/the-bankrupt…
25/25 If the Russians were to attack into Kyiv (not just missile attacks) it would be drawn-out battle that will last weeks, possibly months. Given the military disaster this campaign has already been for Russia, things could get much worse for them in Kyiv. End.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Russia's President needs a story line that preserves his Presidency, relaxes sanctions on his country & gives the appearance that Ukraine bore some success for Russia. In lieu of my normal longer thread, one based on my analysis in today’s @smh | 1/12 smh.com.au/national/putin…
2/12 More than 3 weeks into their invasion of Ukraine, Russia is yet to achieve its key military objectives in the north, east or south. But as President Putin made clear in his speeches in the past 48 hours, he still wants to claim victory. edition.cnn.com/2022/03/18/eur…
3/12 Even if his victory doesn’t look one to the rest of us. As @MaxBoot writes, “if Putin wants to avoid a quagmire, sooner or later he will need to moderate his maximalist objectives & end this evil war. The only sensible way out is to accept defeat while calling it a victory.”
3/23 Back on 1 March, I described how the Ukrainian military high command – among their many other priorities - will be keeping an eye on its western border regions. smh.com.au/world/europe/t…
Day 20 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine chemical weapons, why the Russians might use them and what the implications of any potential use might be. Warning – disturbing material ahead. 1/25 (Image – New Yorker)
3/25 In November 1989, as a new and inexperienced Lieutenant in the Australian Army, I attended a training course at the Sydney-based School of Military Engineering to learn about Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence.
Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
It is 18 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I explore initial lessons of the Russian military transformation program of the past decade against their military performance in #Ukraine. 1/25 (Image @UAWeapons)
3/25 In March 2017, the Commander of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov wrote an article about how the Russian military was being transformed so they could fight "war in modern conditions”. Several parts of the article standout. vpk-news.ru/articles/35591
It is 16 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I will examine the the importance of the adaptation battle in war, and how it is playing out in Ukraine. (Image - BBC)
3/24 It is impossible for the military to anticipate every eventuality in war. There are too many scenarios to accurately predict wartime events. As such, a key virtue for military organizations in war must be adaptability to unexpected events.