Russia's President needs a story line that preserves his Presidency, relaxes sanctions on his country & gives the appearance that Ukraine bore some success for Russia. In lieu of my normal longer thread, one based on my analysis in today’s @smh | 1/12 smh.com.au/national/putin…
2/12 More than 3 weeks into their invasion of Ukraine, Russia is yet to achieve its key military objectives in the north, east or south. But as President Putin made clear in his speeches in the past 48 hours, he still wants to claim victory. edition.cnn.com/2022/03/18/eur…
3/12 Even if his victory doesn’t look one to the rest of us. As @MaxBoot writes, “if Putin wants to avoid a quagmire, sooner or later he will need to moderate his maximalist objectives & end this evil war. The only sensible way out is to accept defeat while calling it a victory.”
4/12 Putin therefore needs a revised ‘theory of victory’. American scholar @EliotACohen describes this as “a story line explaining why we think things will turn out the way we wish.” theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
5/12 Capturing Kyiv is now probably beyond the Russian forces. Putin may need to look elsewhere to construct his new ‘theory of victory’.
6/12 The south & southeast of Ukraine are probably where he will look to for his ‘victory’. Russian forces have seized almost all of Ukraine’s coastline. This has delivered a corridor from Crimea to Russia, and a larger defensive buffer for Russia north of the Crimean Peninsula.
7/12 In the southeast, Russians & their proxies continue to pressure Ukrainian forces in Luhansk and Donetsk, while advancing from the north and the south in an attempted pincer movement to encircle all Ukrainian forces east of the city of Dnipro. (Map - @War_Mapper)
8/12 But surrounding Ukraine's eastern forces remains hypothetical. The Russians so far have not consistently shown the high-level planning skills to successfully coordinate and undertake a sweeping maneuver over such distances (Kharkiv to Dnipro is over 180km as the crow flies).
9/12 Despite this, the challenges for the Russians in the south and south east are less daunting than the immense military and political challenges posed by a Russian attack on #Kyiv. So, the south east theatre of war is a danger zone for the Ukrainian high command.
10/12 It may become more so if President Putin decides that he can build a revised theory of victory around successes in the south and southeast of the country, rather than risk a failed attack on Kyiv.
11/12 The Russian President may decide that the best way to end his disastrous campaign, while retaining a veneer of success with his people & the senior military, intelligence & businesspeople who keep him in power, is to look beyond Kyiv to another theatre of the war.
12/12 The Russian invasion of Ukraine has culminated. Without a major influx of fresh troops, a massive step up in air operations or major changes in strategy, further Russian gains will be minimal. A new Russian 'theory of victory' is required. Break tomorrow - back Monday. End
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Week 4 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine what culmination (current or pending) of Russian forces in Ukraine means. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Back on 15 March, I wrote that “The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate.” In the past 48 hours, there has been a growing consensus that this has either occurred or may occur soon.
3/23 Back on 1 March, I described how the Ukrainian military high command – among their many other priorities - will be keeping an eye on its western border regions. smh.com.au/world/europe/t…
Three weeks since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The Battle for Kyiv is the focus of this thread. A caveat – it is not certain the Russians are capable of surrounding, attacking or seizing Kyiv. 1/25 kyivindependent.com/national/russi…
3/25 Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions. As I noted two days ago, the Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. Image - @UAWeapons
Day 20 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine chemical weapons, why the Russians might use them and what the implications of any potential use might be. Warning – disturbing material ahead. 1/25 (Image – New Yorker)
3/25 In November 1989, as a new and inexperienced Lieutenant in the Australian Army, I attended a training course at the Sydney-based School of Military Engineering to learn about Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence.
Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
It is 18 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I explore initial lessons of the Russian military transformation program of the past decade against their military performance in #Ukraine. 1/25 (Image @UAWeapons)
3/25 In March 2017, the Commander of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov wrote an article about how the Russian military was being transformed so they could fight "war in modern conditions”. Several parts of the article standout. vpk-news.ru/articles/35591