Commodity markets are reacting to uncertainty in agricultural supply by sending futures through the roof. Will the #UkraineRussiaWar be a challenge to #FoodSecurity in the short to medium term? The short answer is YES. The long answer is a read through this thread ⬇️🧵 1/
#UkraineRussiaWar is disrupting physical, logistical & market dynamics in the Black Sea - a key hub for wheat, feed grains & sunflower seed to world markets. 🇺🇦 ports are all closed or blockaded by 🇷🇺 Navy. 🇺🇦 suspended port operations for commercial activities since 24/02. 2/
Most immediately, this will impact export of 🇺🇦 #corn, which has been harvested but not all shipped. Exports are predicted to drop by 18% due to trade disruptions and part of the stored grain being lost or damaged from shelling. 🇺🇦 exports 14% of all corn, so prices will raise 3/
Corn & barley are vastly used to feed livestock (esp. chicken). 🇨🇳 🇮🇳 source 84% & 70% of their imported corn from 🇺🇦, and 🇺🇦 corn is 50%+ of domestic corn supply for EU countries like 🇫🇮🇱🇻🇳🇱. Feed is ~55-65% of chicken production cost, so prices for European🐔 will increase 4/
Looking ahead, the next 🇺🇦 harvest could be severely compromised by the #UkraineRussiaWar. 🇺🇦 exports 10% of world's wheat, and 97% of Ukrainian wheat is winter-planted. This wheat is due to be harvested in summer 2022, but it is grown in areas that are now a battleground 5/
A large part of population in the areas where #wheat is grown has fled or taken up arms. Farmers need to put nutrients on winter-planted wheat during the spring, but the #UkraineRussiaWar is disrupting the process, with risk of abnormally low yield for the 2022 summer harvest. 6/
For corn, soy, sunflower & summer barley, #UkraineRussiaWar will disrupt sowing. Port blockages & transport issues mean farmers can't receiving the seed. FAO estimates that 20-30% of areas typically cultivated in 🇺🇦 will not be planted or be unharvested in the 2022/23 season 7/
All these factors will inflict a severe blow to 🇺🇦 grain production and export capacity. This comes on the back of severe droughts that compromised 🇺🇸🇨🇦 spring output, and record-breaking rains that damaged and delayed planting on about 30% of 🇨🇳total winter wheat acreage. 8/
The hit on food prices will be compounded by skyrocketing price of #fertilizers, of which 🇷🇺 is the world’s largest exporter. Fertilizers account for 35% of marginal cost of production for wheat & corn. A doubling of fertilizer prices leads to a ~44% increase in food prices. 9/
In poor countries, high fertilizer costs could lead to lower usage, with depressed yields adding to shortage of imports and putting #FoodSecurity at risk. Lebanon, Tunisia, Ethiopia are top of the list – relying on Ukraine for respectively 64%, 49% and 31% of wheat imports. 10/
Using FAO food balances, I calculate that a 50% cut in wheat imports from 🇺🇦 could reduce daily available food calories by ~30% in Lebanon, ~20% in Indonesia, Tunisia, Thailand. FAO estimates that undernourished people could increase by 7.6mn globally due to #UkraineRussiaWar 11/
Many poor countries have subsidies to shelter consumers from price fluctuations on wheat, but the fiscal cost is steep when supply is cut. #Egypt was recently forced to raise the price of subsidized bread for 1st time since 1980s. Geopolitical spillovers could hence be dire. 12/
So summing up: the #UkraineRussiaWar will continue to challenge grain supply well into next year. This will have an immediate effect on a number of low-income countries where food prices have proven to be a factor of significant political instability in the past. 13/
In the medium term, the combined effect of reduced grain supply with restrictions to export of fertilizers from 🇷🇺 will be to push farming costs and hence food prices higher – even in areas of the world that do not depend on Ukrainian exports for their food security. 14/
In the short term, EU countries have little room to counteract these effects. EC's proposal to let farmers temporarily grow crops on the 6% of EU agricultural 'fallow' land, as is the proposal to reduce blending of biofuel, and help package for farmers. 15/
For the longer term, this shock is an opportunity to focus on food & fertilizers security and on higher efficiency agriculture. The 'silver lining' is that innovative technique such as precision and vertical farming will likely receive a boost from this sad episode. end/
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I received an unexpected massive response to this (nerd energy tweet going viral, who would have thought!). So I wrote up the methodology, I updated with data as of end-August, added more scenarios and published. One Q deserves in-depth discussion ⬇️ algebris.com/market-views/e…
Some have pointed out that Italy has signed contracts for extra flows (compared to 2022) from North Africa in 2023/24. In my baseline scenarios (see here with data updated through end-August) I am not considering those future flows for two reasons (continues below).
First, details about quantity and timing of deliveries from these new contracts is scarce in the material published so far (I added links to press releases in the piece). Take Algeria: Sonatrach stated they would provide an extra 4 BCM in 2022 with delivery to start in August...
#EnergyCrisis: energy savings in 🇩🇪 versus 🇮🇹. In Germany, gas consumption has decreased by 15% on average during the first 6 months of the year compared to 2021. If it keeps saving energy at this rate, Germany will have enough gas to withstand a scenario with 0 Russian flows. 1/
In Italy, gas consumption has declined by just 2% on average over the first 6 months of 2022 wrt 2021. At this rate, Italy will run out of gas by the spring even if Russia keeps sending 10% of the flows. Italy needs to more than double its energy savings to weather the storm. 2/
Why this difference? One obvious counter-argument is that the share of gas used for electricity production in total consumption is higher in Italy (~35%) than in Germany (~15%) and this is an area where substitution may be difficult. 3/
It took me some time to make all puzzle pieces click in my head, but here is why I think the rouble gas payment scheme matters. For Russia, it is functional to undermine sanctions and to pursue long-term strategic geo-economic goals. #UkraineRussiaWar 🧵1/ algebris.com/market-views/r…
First, it cuts the middleman. Gas contracts typically structure payment as a direct transfer from the buyer to the seller’s designated account at a European bank, with the payment obligation deemed fulfilled when this transfer comes through. 2/
A lot of press has focused on the rouble element, but that’s marginal. The substantial change is that the new scheme prescribes gas to be paid for in hard currency in an account at government-owned Gazprombank in Russia, rather than at a Gazprom account in any Western bank. 3/
Europe Unplugged: can we give up Russian gas? In our latest ESG investor letter, we find that 🇪🇺 could make up for ~62% of energy needs tied to 🇷🇺 gas, at high economic and political cost. The remaining gas deficit would exhaust reserves in 5-10 months. 1/ algebris.com/insights/green…
🇪🇺 gas production declined by 20% over the past 20 years. Today 🇷🇺 supplies ~38% of European gas imports. With gas accounting for 45% of all energy imports and 🇷🇺 providing 95% of imported gas, 🇭🇺 is by far the most exposed. 🇩🇪 and 🇮🇹 would also bear much pain from cut-off. 2/
Substituting 🇷🇺 gas with LNG is difficult, for logistic and price reasons. The historical avg of European gas prices has been around 20 EUR per MWh. Paying for an additional 1300 TWh of LNG imports would translate into an annual cost of approximately 26bn euro for the EU. 3/
In light of interest in yesterday's tweet on central bank sanctions, let me add a few more details. 🧵
Russia has ~USD 630bn in reserves. After invading Crimea in 2014, CBRU has moved reserves out of Europe/USA and into gold and China. Clearly, they were thinking ahead. 1/
A similar picture if we look at currency composition of reserves: out of EUR/USD (down from a combined 87% in 03/2014 to 49% in 06/2021, which is the latest figure available) and into gold and Yuan (up from 9% in 2014 to 25% in 2021). 2/
What are reserves needed for? First, trade: ~80% of 🇷🇺 trade is settled in EUR or USD. 🇷🇺 imports are worth ~USD 307bn, 58% of which is from EU/US. Total reserves are worth ~2 years of total imports, and EUR/USD reserves are worth ~1.7 years of EU/US imports (current quantity) 3/
(...anche attuali Ministri degli Esteri). Ma lasciando perdere la facile ironia vorrei prendere spunto da questo tweet per parlare di alcuni dati che, pur essendo cruciali nel contesto della discussione di questi giorni, non mi pare ricevano abbastanza attenzione. Thread ⬇️
1) I salari in Italia praticamente non crescono da 20 anni, MA anche così sono cresciuti più della produttività (sia produttività del lavoro che TFP). È una situazione che nel lungo erode la competitività esterna, non è sostenibile, ed è il risultato di un circolo vizioso
2) In parte il problema è macro: burocrazia, ambiente non favorevole all'imprenditorialità (barriere in entrata e uscita), difficoltà di attrarre investimenti stranieri che non siano simil-predatori (read: Cina Belt and Road). Tutto arci-noto, materia di discussione nel PNRR