The "it was all about Donbas all along" rhetoric persists.
What should we make of it? A month into the war, Putin was convinced that Russia should cut its losses, claim territories in Donbas and call it a full victory.
Short thread 1/6
It is still too soon to take it at face value but a number of indicators point that Moscow may be starting to recognize that initial plans to "reinvent Ukraine" aren't happening. Heavy resistance from Ukraine, heavy losses on the Russian side are doing their job.
2/6
Does it mean that bloodshed will stop soon? No, or at least not yet. This might be a move towards the pause in bloodshed but we're still in the situation when facts on the ground define reality. If Russia can achieve a military victory somewhere on the ground there is nothing
3/6
holding same people saying that "in order to protect Donbas Russia needs to take Kyiv or Odesa" or whatever other objective the senior leadership will want to come up with.
So, any optimism is premature.
4/6
These developments are however indicative of the fact that if Ukraine continues to push back as they do now, there is a good chance to through invading forces back soon expect for the east of Ukraine. And then reach an agreement to pause violence.
5/6
Ukraine is winning but Russia still has resources to continue the war. It is not collapsing right now.
So any agreement would be only temporary. I do not see a possibility for Ukraine to recognize any military gains made by the Russian army in the long-term.
6/6
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How does Russia foreign policy expert discourse evolve a month into this war?
"After this war is over it will lead to a more stable security system based on mutual animosity.
Now they fear us - it is as good as respect"
Thread 1/10
Thesis one: prior to the war the West stopped believing that Russia would follow through on its threats. "Russia in decline" narrative began to take too much hold. By invading Ukraine we've proved that "we mean what we say". If they didn't fear us before, they fear us now.
2/10
Thesis two: this war is West's fault and now we made them recognize that (Josep Borrell recognition that NATO expansion promise was a mistake). Thus now they would listen to us more cautiously. Time will pass and new geopolitical reality will take hold. Emotions will go
3/10
What does the war in Ukraine mean for #Eurasia and Russia's regional integration aspirations? Well, there are no good options for the Kremlin with Russia's influence diminishing over time.
Thread 1/5
So far out of nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus we have a group of relative neutral countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Baku and Nur Sultan sent aid to Ukraine but only as a diplo gesture -both need Russia's good will. Uzbekistan is a bit more direct.
2/5
Armenia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are staying quite and abstaining from publicly commenting on war.
Georgia is the only country that voted for UN resolution condemning Russia's war in Ukraine but at the same time it continues to engage in trade with Russia.
3/5
What does the Russian war "Z" stand for? Do the Russians stand by it?
Who came up with it and why?
Thread 1/10
Russian's don't know what this war ("special military operation") is about. First most popular answer is "protection of the DPR and LPR " - 32% respondents; second answer is "I don't know" and that's 27%.
Available polls on the support of war efforts are useless since
2/10
people are inclined to say they support "special military operation" either as a proof of loyalty or because they are aware Russian state introduced laws that punish anything that might "discredit Russian armed forces"
3/10
Propaganda works. The more totalitarian it is the better. The more radical the lies the less convincing sound the rational debunking. The only question is how long it can work.
I mean those who do not know Russian context of today. Think of Trump, Bolsonaro, far-right
1/10
Since the war began we don't have reliable polls on Russia, we don't have any proper research being conducted. What we have are the stories from journalists that still work in Russia and stories from the community of Russians present on twitter, FB, telegram.
2/10
So, the following is observations only based on available data that does not represent all of the country but big cities primarily. Could be extrapolated by with adjustments. 1. The younger, the more chances are people understand that Russia is waging a war in Ukraine;
3/10
Russia has only once officially recognized 498 KIA in Ukraine on March 2nd. No official statements on the matter were published ever since. According to Russian law naming any figure beyond that would be fake news and a matter of criminal investigation.
1/7
Figures I'm seeing indicate a diapason from 5000 to 14000 dead with about 7000 being a more likely estimate. This is a pace beyond anything in Russian history since WWII. Afghanistan or Chechnya do not come even close.
2/7
It would be reasonable to assume that most of the families of the KIA that do not have affirmative information that their relative is alive want to think their loved one is either alive and fighting, MIA or captured. Key question is how long they are ready to wait
3/7
Timing is everything. And time is certainly not on the side of Putin. What is no less important is how much time does Ukraine have? Thread 1/12
You don't have to be a military expert to see that Russian offensive in Ukraine is not going according to a plan. Russia's advance is very slow, Russia is reportedly even pulling forces from the Caucasus to join the fight (let alone the "Middle East volunteers").
2/12
Evident brutality of shelling is a byproduct of the failure to execute a "fast campaign". But, given at least what's on the paper, Russia has enough forces and hardware to go at it for long time. Hardly, the issue of a Russian military defeat is in the cards.
3/12