Since the "#Moskva" battle cruiser sank, here is an #armscontrol story: the ship was launched in 1979. Until 1996 it was known as "Slava". In July 1989 the Slava took part in a unique, joined US-Soviet scientific collaboration: The Black Sea experiment. 1/5
2/5 The experiment tested the use of helicopter-borne neutron detectors to detect nuclear warheads on the Slava. At the time the issue of naval nuclear weapons was salient. More particularly, long range SLCM had become a contentious issue in the START negotiations.
3/5 The Black Sea experiment was part of a series, which produced mixed results: two helicopters flew by the Slava at close range (30 snd 80 meters) to detect emissions from plutonium in a warhead. Still, the political problem was ultimately solved.
4/5 In September 1991 President Bush unilaterally pledged to reduce US tactical nuclear weapons, including the removal of all warheads from surface ships, placing them in central storage. In October Gorbachev made a similar pledge: the so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
5/5 Yet, as Thomas Cochran writes (who participated in the experiment) the significance of the results of the Black Sea exercise was not in the physics but in the demonstration that even adversaries can work together in a collaborative effort to improve their relationship.
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What is the endgame, the strategy of #victory, or to put it differently, the vision for #conflict#resolution in #Ukraine? What are feasible scenarios of future relations between #Russia and the #West? Some thoughts. Highly speculative and simplified.🧵1/9
2/9 Scenario 1: Putin wins militarily in Ukraine and achieves his political goals: regime change and demilitarization. Oppression in Russia increases. Western sanctions intensify, aiming at regime change in Russia. European division becomes permanent. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
3/9 At the moment this scenario seems very much possible, unfortunately. The question is at what costs. Total destruction? Ukrainian statehood as we knew it will be lost but partisan warfare and sanctions over time may lead to an intra-elite coup in Russia as well (Scenario 3)
If Putin wants regime change, this could mean to kill, detain or push the Ukrainian leadership into exile. A point of no return. Alternative is to force them into signing agreements on demilitarization and neutralization. Little reason to assume that this will not happen. 1/9
2/9 Putin wins short-term but it gets all much more complicated afterwards. Whether brute force or coercive diplomacy, fundamental policy and/or regime change will need to be acceptable to the Ukrainian population if it shall be sustainable long-term. This is highly unlikely.
3/9 To be sure, Putin may be able to turn Ukraine into a political rump state for some time, leading to apathetic behavior, but the costs of stabilizing this situation will be immense & growing. Without constant pressure, the country could be sliding into partisan war over time.
The promise debate about #NATO enlargement is politically futile. This crisis is about #Russia’s position in Europe, its long-term #status and #power. 30 years of strategic failure, disappointments, and unintended consequences. A long🧵 1/x
2/ Gorbachev ended the Cold War and agreed to asymmetric disarmament to enable domestic reforms but also because he imagined a different international order: A US-Soviet co-dominium in a common European home. Soviet economic collapse and disintegration stopped this from happening
3/ Yeltsin’s government initially set out to integrate with the West. It accepted US leadership. Foreign Minister Kozyrev famously believed that Russia had no national interests different from the West. This “romantic” phase ended quickly. Domestic opposition was growing.
Much noise about this letter by Gen. Leonid Ivashov & the 'All-Russian officers assembly', calling for Putin's resignation. Yet, when the group was formed in 2003 they already demanded Putin's resignation, supported by communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. 1/ ooc.su/news/obrashhen…
2/ In 2008 they even decided to organize a military tribunal against his "destructive" behavior. In 2011 the tribunal found Putin unfit for public office, this time supported publicly by Communist Duma deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, who has been known as the "red prosecutor".
3/ The OOC is not a large group. In fact, there is no official membership list. OOC "members" are either part of the OOC Council, about 30 people, or belong to those, who registered at irregular (annual) meetings. OOC itself has no information who these people are prior to 2018.
2/4 "Letztlich ist es ein weiterer strategischer Puzzlestein, der aber wegen der Anzahl an Waffensystemen und der Verlegung von Truppen aus dem Fernen Osten #Russlands von großer Bedeutung ist."
3/4 "Die Schwierigkeit für Russland ergibt sich derzeit weniger im militärischen Bereich, denn das Land ist der #Ukraine in diesem Sinne klar überlegen", so Graef. "Doch das politische Ziel ist es nicht, wahllos Gebiete zu erobern, ...
#Russia wants a commitment to the "#indivisibility of security" concept but its meaning has shifted over time. In fact, the #West introduced it during the #CSCE negotiations 1972-1975 in order to establish a linkage between human (non-military) & politico-military security 1/11🧵
2/ At the time, the Soviet Union/WVO stressed the politico-military dimension but the West/Neutrals wanted both concepts to be treated as parts of #comprehensive security. Respect for #humanrights was to apply also within the Eastern Bloc in order to change the status quo.
3/ However, the term #indivisibility was only mentioned in the Preamble of the 1975 Final Act, where it was reduced to a vague notion of general common interests. After 1975 the debate over indivisibility focused on the indiscriminate implementation of human rights principles.