Die geplante Stationierung von US-#Mittelstreckenraketen in Deutschland steht im Kontext militärischer Entwicklungen der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Für die USA sind sie elementarer Bestandteil eines umfassenden Konzepts der Kriegsführung, das auch für die NATO maßgeblich ist. 1/13 2/13 Die neue Militärstrategie der Allianz von 2019 betont horizontale Eskalationsoptionen. Bei einem Angriff würden es Langstreckenwaffen ermöglichen Ziele in der Tiefe des gegnerischen Raumes zu zerstören. Seit 30 Jahren steht dieser Ansatz für die USA im Mittelpunkt.

The problem with deploying US intermediate range missiles in Germany is not the decision itself but the lack of public debate on and political clarification of some of the issues and trade-offs involved. Instead, one is fobbed off with platitudes about deterrence. 1/14 2/14 There is no official info about numbers, but most systems aren't (yet) widely available. The MDTF includes 1 LRHW (hypersonic) battery and 1 SMRF (mid-range) battery. LRHW has 4 launchers with 2 missiles each, SMRF 4 launchers with 4 missiles each. Low initial capability.

The next two years will be decisive in #Ukraine. #Russia has no rational reason to stop its military campaign other than for operational pauses during this time. Ceasefire talks are unlikely before the outcomes of the US Presidential elections in 2024 are clear. 1/10 2/10 A ceasefire is not a good option either, if it freezes the status quo. It would also create a list of new problems that in the long-run run would come back to bite. The post-Soviet space is rich of examples. Yet, soon enough, it might become the best among bad options.

A ceasefire in #Ukraine is not a good option, if it freezes the status quo. It would also create a list of new problems that in the long-run could come back to bite. The post-Soviet space is rich of examples. And yet, soon enough, it might become the best among bad options. 1/10 2/10 The main strategic concern of Ukraine and its partners is that Russia would use any ceasefire to replenish its forces, entrench itself and attack again later with greater means and resolve. This concern is not only reasonable but the most likely scenario under Vladimir Putin

New Publication: "'Let's forget that #Slovakia is small': @GLOBSEC, Status-Seeking, and Agency in Informal Elite #Networks",
forthcoming in "Agency, #Security and Governance of #Small States", edited by Harlan Koff & Thomas Kolnberger
1/8
routledge.com/Agency-Securit… 2/8 I look at #GLOBSEC from the perspective of how "small states" in Central & Eastern Europe set out to improve their positions within the social hierarchy of the Western community after they had joined the EU & NATO. Slovakia is a particularly interesting case for two reasons:

Much has been said about Medvedev's increasingly radical rhetoric. Some say he's going with the times, others see it as evidence that his liberalism has always been fake. But there is more to it than that. A🧵 1/14 2/14 About 35 years ago, Medvedev was a law student at Leningrad State University and assistant to his supervisor Anatoly Sobchak. When Sobchak got elected mayor of Leningrad in '90, Medvedev, then in his mid-20s, followed him but remained affiliated with the university.

Worth repeating that the #war against #Ukraine is not about territory, ethnicity or language. It is about both, #Russian identity and power in Europe. Because #Putin sees himself in the realm of loss, he has become risk-seeking. To him, it is not about expanding, but defense 1/6 2/6 This is what Putin meant in 2021, when he argued that "Russia has nowhere to retreat". NATO and EU enlargement (membership and partnership) are about the power to define rules, norms & values, but great power postures depend on the ability to project power where it matters.

The #Russian gov system has been in crisis since 2008/9. The elite has been looking for ways to generate political legitimacy & economic growth but w/o changing the domestic political order & the system of rent distribution. A struggle against decline. An (im)possible task. 1/20 2/ There have been several attempts of reform. In order to stimulate innovation, Putin, similar to Soviet times, decided to tap state resources and strengthen the military-industrial complex. Large conglomerates (Rostec, Rosnano etc) were supposed to enable civilian conversion.

Critics of #Mearsheimer seem to be more concerned with the moral implications of his argument and the implicit course of alternative action than whether it captures an important (though not the only) part of reality. 1/14 🧵 2/ Mearsheimer's argument that prospective NATO enlargement caused the Russian invasion in #Ukraine is about structural not immediate causes. Critics are right to point out that it can neither explain the exact timing, nor the explicit rhetoric and operational course of action.

Since the "#Moskva" battle cruiser sank, here is an #armscontrol story: the ship was launched in 1979. Until 1996 it was known as "Slava". In July 1989 the Slava took part in a unique, joined US-Soviet scientific collaboration: The Black Sea experiment. 1/5 2/5 The experiment tested the use of helicopter-borne neutron detectors to detect nuclear warheads on the Slava. At the time the issue of naval nuclear weapons was salient. More particularly, long range SLCM had become a contentious issue in the START negotiations.

What is the endgame, the strategy of #victory, or to put it differently, the vision for #conflict #resolution in #Ukraine? What are feasible scenarios of future relations between #Russia and the #West? Some thoughts. Highly speculative and simplified.🧵1/9 2/9 Scenario 1: Putin wins militarily in Ukraine and achieves his political goals: regime change and demilitarization. Oppression in Russia increases. Western sanctions intensify, aiming at regime change in Russia. European division becomes permanent. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…

If Putin wants regime change, this could mean to kill, detain or push the Ukrainian leadership into exile. A point of no return. Alternative is to force them into signing agreements on demilitarization and neutralization. Little reason to assume that this will not happen. 1/9 2/9 Putin wins short-term but it gets all much more complicated afterwards. Whether brute force or coercive diplomacy, fundamental policy and/or regime change will need to be acceptable to the Ukrainian population if it shall be sustainable long-term. This is highly unlikely.

The promise debate about #NATO enlargement is politically futile. This crisis is about #Russia’s position in Europe, its long-term #status and #power. 30 years of strategic failure, disappointments, and unintended consequences. A long🧵 1/x 2/ Gorbachev ended the Cold War and agreed to asymmetric disarmament to enable domestic reforms but also because he imagined a different international order: A US-Soviet co-dominium in a common European home. Soviet economic collapse and disintegration stopped this from happening

Much noise about this letter by Gen. Leonid Ivashov & the 'All-Russian officers assembly', calling for Putin's resignation. Yet, when the group was formed in 2003 they already demanded Putin's resignation, supported by communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. 1/ ooc.su/news/obrashhen… 2/ In 2008 they even decided to organize a military tribunal against his "destructive" behavior. In 2011 the tribunal found Putin unfit for public office, this time supported publicly by Communist Duma deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, who has been known as the "red prosecutor".

"Alexander Graef forscht am @IFSHHamburg. Er sagt: "Mit dem #Manöver, welches ausgerechnet in dieser kritischen Phase und in diesem Umfang in #Belarus stattfindet, wird die #Eskalationsstufe noch einmal erhöht." 1/4
mdr.de/nachrichten/we… 2/4 "Letztlich ist es ein weiterer strategischer Puzzlestein, der aber wegen der Anzahl an Waffensystemen und der Verlegung von Truppen aus dem Fernen Osten #Russlands von großer Bedeutung ist."

#Russia wants a commitment to the "#indivisibility of security" concept but its meaning has shifted over time. In fact, the #West introduced it during the #CSCE negotiations 1972-1975 in order to establish a linkage between human (non-military) & politico-military security 1/11🧵

https://twitter.com/IvoHDaalder/status/1488222215254339584

2/ At the time, the Soviet Union/WVO stressed the politico-military dimension but the West/Neutrals wanted both concepts to be treated as parts of #comprehensive security. Respect for #humanrights was to apply also within the Eastern Bloc in order to change the status quo.

The #EU has been sidelined in this crisis by design. Military security dialogue with #Russia remains outsourced to #NATO/#OSCE or takes place bilaterally. How could the EU contribute to managing military security beyond #deterrence? Some ideas 1/6
feps-europe.eu/component/atta… 2/6 The EU should establish a permanent expert dialogue with 🇷🇺on military security issues. Existing bilateral formats (Germany, France, Netherlands etc.) risk undermining unity. Possible starting point: Mil-to-mil dialogue between @ChairmanEUMC and the Chief of the Russian GS.

We don’t need #Yalta 2.0 or #Helsinki 2.0 in #Europe now. We need #Stockholm 2.0: The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984-1986. Crucial at the time, largely forgotten today. A thread. 1/14 2/For context: Before Stockholm East-West relations had hit rock bottom. In 1976, the SU started to deploy SS-20. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan & NATO took its double track decision. In Sep 1983 the SU shot down Korean aircraft 747. In Dec 1983 Pershing II arrived in Europe.

#Russian Foreign Ministry has published its proposals on security guarantees as submitted to the US and #NATO: "Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 9 articles mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol… 1/x 2/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", 8 articles, mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…

Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x mid.ru/foreign_policy… 2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.

Now public: On 22 December Russia send a verbal note to #Openskiestreaty members stating that w/o written guarantees until 1 January 2021 on data non-proliferation & territorial access, it might be forced to initiate withdrawing procedure. 1/5 sueddeutsche.de/politik/luftue… 2/5 Negative answer by 16 foreign ministers, including Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian, followed on 30 December. They are ready to organize an extraordinary OSCC meeting but otherwise want to discuss the Russian initiative at the next ordinary session on 25 January.