@alexhern@jamesrbuk@tim@lorenzofb@josephfcox@MikeIsaac So: When building Facebook Messenger Secret Conversations, as I've explained before I was asked whether it would be able to be "backdoored" in order to fight "Organised Crime"; the proposal being that <various narcos> would NOT REALLY be using E2EE.
The answer was no, BUT…
…amongst many of the reasons for "NO" was simply: where and how do you distribute the list of "bad people" in a secrecy-preserving manner?
It's not like you can/should check the list of phone numbers of FBI's Most Wanted, into the codebase and/or app configuration infra.
Hey Everybody - it's okay!
The EU will *give* you the technology to wire into your apps.
What could possibly go wrong?
Whilst we're here, the matter of "false positives" sent to Law Enforcement would be improved if @MissingKids stopped pushing vastly inflated statistics with duplicate and other forms of non-critical content.
Unsurprisingly the conclusion amongst the politicians is that "We need to spy on all content & activity in order to establish whether it is (C) CSAM, or (D) potential CSAM, and also we have to (E) monitor contact metadata to identify grooming"
Or spies. Whistleblowers. Whatever.
I concur with Ed on this, except that I think they will try to take the E-SIM approach of a tamperproof and opaque machine-learning model to inject into a predefined and obligatory app API.
The EU mindset—something that leaks out in the #DSA which (e.g.) @1Br0wn & @RDBinns are so fond of—is that enabling the world to be more open & connected is a societal & political pollution problem, and that "the polluter should pay"; ergo: bill GAFAM for enabling communications:
At least this proposal + the #DSA contains the seeds of [one means of] its own doom — that #interoperability will require/permit/enable the re-adoption of "OffTheRecord" (OTR) superencryption on top of existing platforms, thereby making all this useless: alecmuffett.com/article/14656
For those who are unaware, OTR is at otr.cypherpunks.ca and is the painful, clunky but effective analogue of "PGP over Email", but instead is E2EE superencryption on top of most of the popular contemporary instant messenger platforms.
I predict a retro comeback.
Ergo: once again the backdoors will only really impact *innocent* people, and the actual miscreants will be harder, ever-harder to detect. By incessantly focusing upon content signatures and matching, all CSAM content will be driven even FURTHER underground.
Aside: it'd be extraordinarily foolish for EU authorities to (e.g.) block DNS lookups for alecmuffett.com because of this document, but just in case such were to happen, it's also available on an unblockable onion site:
(1) speculative "freedom from" risk of abuse & degradation
…is more important than…
(2) concrete "freedom to" have privacy and confidentiality
…even where all parties in (2) — including the victims from (1) — are impacted.
Elsewhere I am currently working my way through @jon_rauch's audiobook "Kindly Inquisitors", and I feel this is closely aligned to his chapter regarding "speech as harm". amazon.co.uk/Kindly-Inquisi…
> [content] scanning is often the only possible way to detect [grooming] and…the technology used does not ‘understand’ the content of the communications but rather looks for known, pre-identified patterns that indicate potential grooming
One key observation for EU citizens — and indeed for people everywhere — to take from the ongoing "abortion" debates in the USA, is that your Government cannot & should not be excluded from the "threats" against which privacy is a necessary defence.
Social problems [like child abuse, grooming, even racism & hate speech] are not solvable via technical means; this is what #RanumsLaw has taught us for literal decades.
Good Morning! In case you missed it, today is the day that the European Union declares war upon end-to-end #encryption, and demands access to every persons private messages on any platform in the name of protecting children:
HEADSUP: about 40 (?) minutes until the official announcement.
If you want to track sentiment about European Union initiatives to stop #privacy and mandate #backdoors to "fix" #CSAM, you can see the latest discussion with a #ReadyMadeTwitterSearch at:
So: the official draft has been published at ec.europa.eu/commission/pre… along with all the expected framing material; a basic check with diffchecker.com/pdf-diff/ shows that the leaked draft is very accurate, apparently missing only a couple of sets of costings plus some renumbering.
Curiously (see diff in previous tweet) Article 83 in the final copy, appears to be missing? Or perhaps it has been abstracted elsewhere?
OMG #MUSTREAD - this is an important & *different* analysis thread on why the EU #CSAM#ChatControl draft legislation is misconceived and has clearly been drafted without input from diverse civil society viewpoints.
Elsewhere in EU regulatory pipe-dreams authored by people who apparently have more good intention than understanding, the #DMA means that @WhatsApp and @signalapp should both adopt #XMPP and thereby deliver a unified "inbox" of messages.
I'm delighted to have assisted @Twitter engineers in their adoption of #OnionServices & #OnionNetworking from @TorProject — providing greater privacy, integrity, trust, & "unblockability" for people all around the world who use @Twitter to communicate.
I am also honoured that they've chosen to adopt EOTK (the Enterprise Onion Toolkit) to power their onion platform, albeit with considerable though reasonable modification to meet their extraordinary production requirements:
1/ So @StevenLevy has written at length about the "Badge Posts" - the goodbye, final messages posted for other employees to read as they leave the company.
2/ But these are not just "human interest" stories; some are meant to achieve something, and in my case the goal was to move Facebook away from implementing national identities & censorship within the Facebook platform.
3/ But I felt that that was not enough to explain what was going on, how Facebook may be changed, and the critical importance of fostering frank and constructive engagement in order to make effective change.
Frances is talking to @CommonsDCMS tomorrow, so she should have opportunity to bring this message of privacy and safety to people who would benefit from it.