· (fractional) reserve rates were a thing until GFC 2008, and obsoletion redoubled during COVID 2020 when reserve requirements were suspended/lowered to zero
· since reserves are now abundant, POMOs and SOMAs can't influence FFR anymore
/3
...money multiplier myths (cont'd):
· in the Fed's modern "ample-reserves regime... IORB serves as a reservation rate, and affects market interest rates [via arb]...influences banks' decisionmaking about setting deposit and loan rates...lending and investment"
...longer-term effects of student loan forbearance:
😬 def stoked inflation via multiple channels (e.g. consumption/housing/etc) – esp since "most of the [subsequent] increase in debt is driven by mortgage payments" (
"artists can no longer appear real on their own" – a perverse notion of centralized platforms becoming gatekeepers for identity/authenticity verification...?
eh, the problem was that anyone thought appearance was reality to being with...
to whatever extent there's a crisis in the authenticity and verification of (mis/dis)information, it's concentrated among non-internet natives – i.e. Millennials/Zoomers aren't the problem 👇
It's worth adding to these $sivb snippets from @matt_levine and @benthompson – particularly Stratechery's "The End of Silicon Valley (Bank)", which was more nuanced than it sounds:
🅰️ I-95 Belt:
One thing that sank Greater Boston's thriving minicomputer/hardware/tech ecosystem was lack of (local) reinvestment – winners cashed-out vs SV VCs/founders continually reinvest time and money #flywheel
🅱️ SVB Bank Run:
VCs ran-the-gamut fm posterboys to paperboys to cheerleaders to D-linemen – that the outsized impact of a few snowballed to the many isn't signal of SV's downfall as much as classic panic
"The historical linkage between corporate tax rates and investment growth is non-existent [almost zero, but the correlation] between [interest] rates and investment actually has the wrong sign [they're positively correlated]"
"when profits are growing, so does investment [which] also shows a stronger connection with growth expectations – when CEOs expect stronger growth they also are planning higher levels of capex growth"
Why isn't increasing equity market implied correlation/comovement (and hence kurtosis) more attributable to rising financialization than specific passive/active share – i.e. stock market is increasingly a macro proxy instead of a collection of idiosyncratic stocks...?