1/With #Shanghai out of lockdown & COVID cases far lower than the April peak, is the Chinese #economy out of the woods? Not really. Any rebound in 3Q will be illusory as the underlying economy remains weak. @hzsong makes the case in his macro outlook: macropolo.org/analysis/3q202…
2/For one, consumption remains weak. It is sensitive to even modest lockdowns like those in #Beijing, and these smaller-scale lockdowns will likely be repeated across the country.
3/Second, Beijing continues to resist using the bazooka when it comes to stimulus. The recent news on #infrastructure spending won’t do much for growth. If anything, it will likely do the opposite and withdraw stimulus in 3Q: macropolo.org/chinese-econom…
4/Third, exports likely won’t save the day again. The US dollar has appreciated by 5% this year because of the Fed’s tightening. Historically, this spells bad news for global #trade and Chinese goods.
5/The bottom line is that Zero COVID remains the main variable in China’s growth performance, and that variable will likely remain in place until the end of the year. So expect a Chinese economy that will be in a mild recession until early 2023. macropolo.org/analysis/3q202…
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1/If China had a Camp David, it’d probably be Beidaihe, a summer retreat 3 hours from Beijing where political wheeling and dealing happens. Now that we’re officially into summer, it’s time for a thread on Beidaihe’s historical import and whether it still matters today.
2/Tons of attention is focused on Beidaihe, as it marks the final sprint of China’s quinquennial “election” cycle. Key personnel decisions and the timing of the 20th Party Congress will likely be made in a year where roughly 60% turnover of the Central Committee is expected.
3/A cottage industry has sprung up to divine political signals coming out of Beidaihe. Some argue that the conference no longer happens, nor does it matter much in the political process. For instance, Hu Jintao banned top leaders from vacationing there as early as 2003.
1/ From the team that brought you the #BRITastingMenu in 2018 and #USChinaat40 in 2019, we’re recounting Deng Xiaoping’s historic Southern Tour from exactly 30 years ago. COVID has thrown a wrench in our food outing, but we’ve still got our annual #ChineseNewYear thread.
2/ A bit of background: Deng spent the 80s liberalizing China’s economy and stabilizing relations with the United States. Here he is visiting a Texas rodeo in 1979.
3/ His influence was felt around the world, so much so that TIME Magazine named him Person of the Year not once, but twice.
1/ You've probably heard of "dual circulation." It has been widely interpreted as an inward shift, but we argue it's mainly about repackaging existing reforms to achieve organic growth - which will naturally make China’s economy more attractive & open. macropolo.org/beijing-formal…
2. Dual circulation is also simply an acknowledgement of reality.
China's economic rebalancing has not been sustainable, and policy advisors like Liu He has long argued for a more sustainable rebalancing based on domestic consumption & income growth. macropolo.org/beijing-formal…
As China kicks off its 5th Plenum this week, read our in-depth forecast of Xi Jinping's political plan for China in the next five years. macropolo.org/analysis/forec…
1/ In 2025, Xi Jinping will remain General Secretary of the CCP, Chair of the Central Military Commission, and President of the PRC.
He will likely emerge the strongest he has ever been after the 20th Party Congress in 2022. macropolo.org/analysis/china…
2/ We forecast that it’s unlikely that a clear successor will emerge from the 2022 political transition, to avoid diluting Xi’s authority as the CCP focuses on executing his domestic reform agenda. macropolo.org/analysis/china…
20 years after China's WTO accession, many have declared China a "winner" & the US rustbelt a "loser" of global trade. But what about the economic impact within China? Have all regions gained equally? Our Summer Associate Jessica Redmond explores the data: macropolo.org/analysis/china…
1/ The project tracked regional trade & FDI patterns from 1993-2019, and found that since WTO accession, the coastal provinces of Zhejiang & Jiangsu emerge as clear “winners,” and Heilongjiang, Liaoning, & Jilin provinces (Northeast rustbelt) as “losers:" macropolo.org/analysis/china…
2/ Although still far below the level of the east coast, the central & western regions such as Guangxi & Chongqing saw relatively large gains in trade after 2010.
Down south, despite always being a leading trade hub, Guangdong has seen a relative fall in trade: