This is the first Islamic State claim against African Union troops in #Somalia since Sept. 2018 and first in #Mogadishu since Oct. 2016 - though there does not appear to be any local corroboration for an IED targeting @ATMIS_Somalia today
To put in context, the Sept. 2018 claim against Ethiopian troops allegedly took place outside of Bosaso which was more than likely false. And the Oct. 2016 claim was against an unspecified AMISOM member (though likely Ugandan given the location) which was also never corroborated
Most of IS-Somalia's operational claims are in Mogadishu, though it very rarely ever claims anything against AU forces. This is just the 6th time since April 2016 which is when IS first starting claiming operations in Somalia
Well, one we need to define what "core AQ' even means. It has always been imprecisely defined and never took into consideration individuals who would be considered "core" but not based in AfPak (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Anas al-Libi, Khalid al-Suri, Jehad Mostafa, the Iran guys...etc)
And two, if we do take those guys into consideration, it would be clear that AQ's general command - which imo would be the "core" and not one singular nucleus in AfPak - has been geographically dispersed for quite some time. Nasir al-Wuhayshi being the GM as case in point.
That he was AQ's general manager would suggest he was also very high on the line of succession even though he was the regional emir of one its branches - and this was almost a decade ago. So the interpretation should be that this is unsurprising and is how AQ is modeled imo.
1. Pleased to finally share Team Bridgeway’s latest article @CTCWP on the ADF, this time looking at how last year, 2021, was the most transformative year for the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province. #Congo#Ugandactc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-thr…
2. Namely, 2021 saw the group transform in 7 major ways: surging in propaganda, producing beheading videos, beginning suicide operations, public outreach and da’wah, deepening foreign recruitment, exporting its terror abroad, and more frequent clashes with rival armed groups.
3. Meanwhile on the ground in eastern #Congo, the group’s areas of operation expanded exponentially, with it leaving almost 1300 civilians dead. This is almost three times the death toll of 2019 and more than a 50% increase over 2020’s total.
1. This is a very good @CrisisGroup report on the overall dynamics of the conflict in eastern #Congo and insanely informative, but its brief description of the ADF leaves a lot to be desired. crisisgroup.org/africa/great-l…
2. For instance, talking about “factions” within the group adds unnecessary detail. While there is indeed an anti-IS splinter faction, it likely has less than 30 people, has not conducted an attack (as of May 2022), and one of its top leaders was arrested earlier this year.
3. Meanwhile, ADF proper has over 2,000 fighters, is one of the most active groups in all of #Congo, and alone killed 1300 people last year. Not to mention, it is unified in its leadership and allegiance to the Islamic State. The splinter is operationally irrelevant.
1. Pleased to share my new long-form report @CTCWP providing a history and explainer of how and why al-Qaeda in northwestern Africa went from an Algerian-focused franchise to now threatening several littoral West African states. ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial…
2. Basically, if you were to tell someone from 2006 that Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat now threatens Benin or Ivory Coast, they'd be properly perplexed. This report sets out to explain exactly this dynamic to this hypothetical time-traveler.
3. This report thus argues that AQ, including or through its various local franchises, engaged in 5 basic tactics as part of its proverbial playbook: befriending or creating militant groups; local integration; grievance exploitation; dealing with dissent, and expansion.
1. Since June, the ADF / Islamic State Central Africa Province has mounted a sustained offensive in southern #Irumu#Ituri#DRC pushing further north towards Komanda. This represents a significant shift and expansion of its traditional AO in #Beni territory of #NorthKivu.
2. While most of its efforts are along RN4 between Eringeti and Komanda, it has also mounted a significant targeted campaign near Boga and Tshabi, also in southern #Ituri, killing and kidnapping nearly 100 people in this same timeframe. All of this data is available @KivuSecurity
3. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has heavily publicized the offensive along RN4, claiming 5 operations alongside 18 exclusive photos and one video. The pictures also detail the ADF's brief occupations of the villages of Ofai and Maniala, just a few kms south of Komanda.
1. Jihadists in #Syria are reporting that Abu Saloh, the founder and former emir of the Uzbek group Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (now part of HTS), was arrested by HTS' internal security yesterday after he reportedly defected to Jabhat Ansar al Din.
2. Abu Saloh left his position as emir of KTJ sometime last year, opting for more behind the scenes work and preaching. He founded the group in late 2014. Which I covered back in the day: thelineofsteel.weebly.com/news/katibat-a…