Starting June 2nd, Cu collapsed 29% in less than six weeks. How often did that happen?
Answer: not often! In past 25y Cu crashed only 8x >7% in a single week as in one week this June (stat below) & only 29x >5% (2x per week in June & July 2022).
Big quantamentel signals!
2/n
How is that possible, when global reported inventories (LME; Comex; Shanghai) are below their 10-year average? Aren't commodities priced on inventories?
Chart: Global Cu inventory (reported by exchanges); Source: Bloomberg 3/n
Answer: Copper price has zero correlation to reported inventories & as we explained below.
Instead, copper is best explained by paying attention to the Aussie $ as a proxy for China.
How else can we possibly confirm that the market may not be as tight as reported in reported (exchange) inventories?
For one, by looking at timespreads. 3-month spreads for the futures curve are in contango ($19.50/t).
Hardly a sign for tighness. There is more...
6/n
Treatment Charges (TC) for Cu concentrate (70% of mined Cu) are at $84/t (+160% since March 21).
Were Chinese smelters desperate to get a piece of the party (margin squeeze), they would on basis of a raising price outlook (but they know their order books).
Here is the news that does not yet get the coverage it deserves in the international media, given its relevance for global oil markets: #Russia is currently not shipping #Kazakhstan oil.
Kazakhstan produces 1.8mbpd in 2022 of which 0.4mbpd is consumed domestically.
Up to 1.4mbpd is exported, about 1.2mbpd through Russia via the 1,500km long Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to international markets and given its oil is basically landlocked.
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CPC loads at the "CPC Terminal" in the Black Sea which is usually summarised as part of Novorossiysk exports.
The first shipments left in Oct 2001. Since, it exported 767mt (733kbpd) & was regularly expanded as Kazakhstan brought new fields such as the Kashagan online.
Not a believer in geopolitical coincidence. Take natgas. In 2022, flows reduced exactly by the amount the EU managed to increase LNG imp (24bcm). The better than expected storage fills in the EU may made the Kremlin decide to slow deliveries down by 12bcm (NS1).
Here is the EU storage fill in %. It's on track to be 80% filled by August which would likely reduce some risk premium for the winter of TTF. That is unlikely in the best interest of the Kremlin while the war continues.
Libya’s 2-month-old partial blockade, which already disrupted 0.5mbpd of its 1.2mbpd production, is set to become a full-fledged 1mbpd shutdown.
Unconfirmed (by NOC) reports now say that Libya's Es Sider & Ras Lanuf export terminals (a combined 0.4mbpd) are shut down too.
1/4
We expect the political power struggle to take months to resolve. Take the Sharara field. Recent efforts to restart the 0.3mb/d field underline the depth of the problems, with armed protestors storming the field 24 hours after it announced a restart.
When bad geology meets great management, it is bad geology that wins.
#PARN is likely just that - an overvalued oil exploration company with a lot of OOIP within a challenging reservoir destined to disappoint the market's high expectations.
We encountered that for Hurricane Energy ($HUR) in 2017 after extensive due diligence work.
Back then, HUR was somewhat of a "darling stock" in the UK. Kind of the hope of an aging UK North Sea E&P industry. Why? For one, the 2017 CPR claimed a 1.1bnbbl 3P resource!
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Its CEO Robert Trice was a geologist & claimed to be one of only a handful "expert" globally on "Fractured Basements".
But the reservoir next to the Shetland Island was always a tough location while initial data was everything but straight forward.
Today, Ukrainian Transit Operator OGTSU annouced force majeure on gas deliveries from Russia to Slovakia (Velké entry point) due to damages of facilities in occupied territory which cannot be accessed for repairs.