1. Starting a running thread here documenting jihadist eulogies or laments now being released for Ayman al-Zawahiri:
2. Here is Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi, the emir of Jaysh al-Ummah, a pro-al Qaeda group in Gaza #Palestine. Abu Hafs wishes for Zawahiri the highest level of 'paradise.'
3. Another early one is from Abu Yusuf al-Muhojir, the leader of the Syrian branch of Katibat Imam al-Bukhari. The group also operates in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda. Muhojir asks for Zawahiri to be blessed with 'paradise' after a long life of service in jihad.
4. Here's former Hay'at Tahrir al Sham official now independent jihadist in #Syria Abu al-Abed Ashidaa calling for Zawahiri to be "rewarded" with paradise for his long service in jihad
5. In a post attributed to Abu Qatada al Filistini, the longtime al Qaeda ideologue argues that Zawahiri's legacy will be like the "invincible mountains."
6. Former al Qaeda senior leader Abu Hafs al Mauritani says that "the eye sheds tears" and "the heart is saddened" for the death of Zawahiri.
7. Here's two Hay'at Tahrir al Sham officials, Abu Mariyah al Qahtani and Abu Abdullah al Shami, eulogizing Zawahiri (h/t @azelin)
8. Here's a channel linked to the Chechen/North Caucasian jihadist group in #Syria Ajnad al-Kavkaz calling Zawahiri a shahid, or martyr, and extolling his long career in jihad
9. And here we have pro-AQ ideologue Akram Hijazi celebrating Zawahiri's 40+ years of "combating tyranny and the tyrants." (also h/t to @azelin)
10. Here's Sirajaddine Zureiqat, the former emir of the now disbanded al Qaeda affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades in #Lebanon and #Syria, both lamenting Zawahiri's death and calling for jihadi unity in the face of the "Zionists" and "Safavids," or Iran/Shia Muslims.
11. Hassan Dahir Aweys, the storied Somali jihadi figure who once led the AQ affiliated Al Itihaad al Islamiyya and is now under a form of house arrest, released a statement about Zawahiri directed to Joe Biden saying that "in this world or the hereafter, we will have victory."
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I have nothing major to add to today's great opining about the future of AQ, but I will say that it is disheartening to see this field fall into many of the same confirmation biases, groupthink, or other generalized consensus errors that happened after the death of bin Laden.
Many of the same arguments, or assessments of AQ, or its future therein, are being recycled today or being neatly repackaged as "new." But yet many of those arguments, analyses, or assessments turned out to be false - we can do better. We have to do better.
There's something to be said about how many of the arguments against Zawahiri's leadership is seemingly based off of his public videos. While for sure boring, there's a lot that happens behind the scenes we're not privy to.
Well, one we need to define what "core AQ' even means. It has always been imprecisely defined and never took into consideration individuals who would be considered "core" but not based in AfPak (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Anas al-Libi, Khalid al-Suri, Jehad Mostafa, the Iran guys...etc)
And two, if we do take those guys into consideration, it would be clear that AQ's general command - which imo would be the "core" and not one singular nucleus in AfPak - has been geographically dispersed for quite some time. Nasir al-Wuhayshi being the GM as case in point.
That he was AQ's general manager would suggest he was also very high on the line of succession even though he was the regional emir of one its branches - and this was almost a decade ago. So the interpretation should be that this is unsurprising and is how AQ is modeled imo.
This is the first Islamic State claim against African Union troops in #Somalia since Sept. 2018 and first in #Mogadishu since Oct. 2016 - though there does not appear to be any local corroboration for an IED targeting @ATMIS_Somalia today
To put in context, the Sept. 2018 claim against Ethiopian troops allegedly took place outside of Bosaso which was more than likely false. And the Oct. 2016 claim was against an unspecified AMISOM member (though likely Ugandan given the location) which was also never corroborated
Most of IS-Somalia's operational claims are in Mogadishu, though it very rarely ever claims anything against AU forces. This is just the 6th time since April 2016 which is when IS first starting claiming operations in Somalia
1. Pleased to finally share Team Bridgeway’s latest article @CTCWP on the ADF, this time looking at how last year, 2021, was the most transformative year for the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province. #Congo#Ugandactc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-thr…
2. Namely, 2021 saw the group transform in 7 major ways: surging in propaganda, producing beheading videos, beginning suicide operations, public outreach and da’wah, deepening foreign recruitment, exporting its terror abroad, and more frequent clashes with rival armed groups.
3. Meanwhile on the ground in eastern #Congo, the group’s areas of operation expanded exponentially, with it leaving almost 1300 civilians dead. This is almost three times the death toll of 2019 and more than a 50% increase over 2020’s total.
1. This is a very good @CrisisGroup report on the overall dynamics of the conflict in eastern #Congo and insanely informative, but its brief description of the ADF leaves a lot to be desired. crisisgroup.org/africa/great-l…
2. For instance, talking about “factions” within the group adds unnecessary detail. While there is indeed an anti-IS splinter faction, it likely has less than 30 people, has not conducted an attack (as of May 2022), and one of its top leaders was arrested earlier this year.
3. Meanwhile, ADF proper has over 2,000 fighters, is one of the most active groups in all of #Congo, and alone killed 1300 people last year. Not to mention, it is unified in its leadership and allegiance to the Islamic State. The splinter is operationally irrelevant.
1. Pleased to share my new long-form report @CTCWP providing a history and explainer of how and why al-Qaeda in northwestern Africa went from an Algerian-focused franchise to now threatening several littoral West African states. ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial…
2. Basically, if you were to tell someone from 2006 that Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat now threatens Benin or Ivory Coast, they'd be properly perplexed. This report sets out to explain exactly this dynamic to this hypothetical time-traveler.
3. This report thus argues that AQ, including or through its various local franchises, engaged in 5 basic tactics as part of its proverbial playbook: befriending or creating militant groups; local integration; grievance exploitation; dealing with dissent, and expansion.