@CommandDevTeam The issue that we have is that the #ATACMS simulation shows that the "impact" type, "no warning, no pictures of missles, sudden explosion", can be explained by the hypersonic, vertical impact of SRBM.
What can not be explained is the flight time (too short) and "twin impact".
@CommandDevTeam This is the data of the missle used in this Test #2, and an overview of the "overall situation".
Exactly like yesterday, Launch at Odessa by #ukraine, Target #SakiAirBase , missle used Iskander M to "simulate" the Ukrainian HRIM-2.
@CommandDevTeam As we can see here, the longer range SRBM (both HRIM and Iskander are significantly larger and longer range than ATACMS) take LONGER to reach the target, despite being faster.
This could very well be the match for @rrichcord 's analysis on flight speed observed.
@CommandDevTeam@rrichcord Another item that is seemingly modeled (maybe #cmo team can chip in) is an RV seperation and sharp acceleration in the reentry phase, at around 170km altitude.
This will be very apparent in the speed/altitude graph.
@CommandDevTeam@rrichcord The speed and trajectory of the longer range SRBM is far more extreme than the #ATACMS.
The Missle is pointing 70° down at hypersonic speeds, a mere 15km left to fly, at ~2km/s speed.
This is the speed and altitude plot. While unknown if #ukraine GRIM-2 has the terminal phase acceleration, this flight profile is plausible for observed data.
The dual launch also explains the dual impact. #SakiAirBase
Multiple sources reported MIG-29 today, from #ukraine Air Force. One Video that matches the reports was posted at @ennolenze .
Summarizing reports, a lot can be drawn from these spottings. Lets get into it (short thread)
@ennolenze Lets start of by looking at the jet in higher resoltion.
A #mig29, very clearly. Also six missles visible.
The four outer pylons have two identical missles, the two inner pylons have identical missles.
What can we learn from the plane, and mission, from that?
@ennolenze The inner pylon missles have very distinctive wings forward, and are very "pointy".
This strongly indicates that we are looking at R-27R, a medium range, radar guided missle, NATO Code AA-10 Alamo.
The bottom missle on this picture: de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wympel_R-…
I have checked the possible #ATACMS attack on #SakiAirBase in #CMO, which is never perfect, but always a very good guess.
Assumed launch site south of Odessa, launch time 10:00 ZULU/12:00 local.
(short thread)! #ukraine#ukrainewar
This is an attempt to understand flight times, speeds and possible impact angles and speeds, as we have seen fairly large craters.
We are using MGM-140 #ATACMS Block IA, has multiple warhead options, the fact that submunitions are chosen here is merely a cosmetic choice.
Also make sure to head over to @rrichcord on his analysis and @OSINTua for sat pictures.
A quick thread on key strategic elements of a possible #china#taiwan#usa conflict.
This aims at showing key facilities, areas of interest and a big picture and provide links where applicable, for those who want to dive into details.
Lets start with the overall picuture.
The western strategem in the pacific involves containment around island chains, acting as "unsinkable aircraft carriers and bases", with Taiwan at the core of the first chain.
Countering this strategy is a key component of the chinese expansion in the south chinese sea.
For this, china has forcefully expanded tiny atolls in the Spratly and Paracel Islands into military strongholds, including literally creating land.
This map shows the approxmate movement of the @USNavy Carrier Strike Group 5 in the South Chinese Sea in the past days.
The blue icons and circles are chinese installations in the spratly and paracel islands.
I believe this is directly related to #pelosi#taiwan.
My hypothesis:
@USNavy The US really wants to avoid confrontation.
The US also knows that diplomacy works best with a solid backing.
Is the CSG5 there to "support Taiwan"?
No. Okinawa is closer, the Phillipine Sea would be better for a CSG.
This is deliberate, a position between Paracel and Spratly
@USNavy I consider this positioning a very careful message to the PLAN that USN would cut spratlys and the lower SCS off, and if required, turn the carefully crafted islands, into a bunch of parking lots.
It is also a clear message regarding Chinese ASBM: We do not fear them.
Wie lässt sich der "gordische Knoten" der deutschen Handlungsunfähigkeit im Rahmen der #ukraine Krise lösen?
Ein Versuch, das unmögliche als Chance zu sehen, und in diesem Faden aufzuschlüsseln.
Annahmen, Konflikte, Lösungswege zu einer strategischen Handlungsfähigkeit (1/n):
(2/n) Grundannahmen:
- Die Sozialdemokratie ist ein wichtiges Element deutscher Politik.
- Die Reform einer "Volkspartei" geschieht nie in Regierungsverantwortung
- Die SPD ist nicht fähig, sich mit Scholz im Kanzleramt, vom aktuellen Kurs des Appeasement zu lösen
(3/n)
- Das Appeasement Russlands* (*durch die SPD) ist für die überwältigende Mehrheit der Grünen nicht dauerhaft tragbar
- Das Appeasement Russlands* ist für die überwältigende Mehrheit der FDP nicht dauerhaft tragbar
Das Kanzleramt stellt die Sachlage im Bezug auf die #ukraine stetig "kreativ zu eigenen Gunsten dar".
Ein Faden mit dem "Versuche der Korrektur" zu Munitionslieferungen- und Mengen, im kleinen 1x1. #ampel
Zum Leopard 1:
Es wird suggeriert, es gäb keine Munition.
Die Bundeswehr hat eventuell wirklich kaum Munition, das Kaliber ist jedoch standardisiert.
Andere NATO-Staaten haben garantiert noch volle Arsenale, mindestens die, die das Kaliber noch aktiv Nutzen, wie die USA im M1128.
Zu den "erheblichen Lieferungen von Munition", 16 Millionen Schuss. Das ist nicht erheblich.
Wenn ich pro Soldat 400 Schuss als Ausstattung ansetze, sowie 100 Schuss zur Ausbildung der frisch mobilisierten Soldaten, kann ich damit exakt 32.000 Soldaten ausrüsten.