Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 159-172. The first half of August has seen an emerging shift in the strategic initiative moving decidedly away from the Russia to that of Ukraine. With fall fast approaching the next several weeks may prove as critical as the early days of the war. #Ukraine

2/ I have included a few charts in this thread that address common phrase and acronyms used in the graphics below with their corresponding definitions. This listing will expand as needed.

3/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next 10-days will see temps range from 35-28 C during the day & 22-18 C at night. Cloud cover will not degrade air & missile strikes, while 71.5%-night illumination will significantly aid ZSU SOF/Partisan activity.

4/ Kharkiv OD. Little change to the Kharkiv OD during 01-14 August 2022. The ZSU and SVRF have moved a small number of additional forces into the OD, but not enough to provide a distinct tactical advantage. SRVF spoiling attacks will continue to hinder ZSU offensive actions.

5/ Donetsk Oblast OD. Perhaps the most significant change to occurred in the Ukrainian TVD in the past 30-days has been in the Donetsk OD. The Ukrainians are making the most of the SVRF redeployment to southern Ukraine to retake lost territory in the Izyum area. #Izyum #Bakhmut

6/ The ZSU has been counterattacking toward Izyum from SW of Izyum since about 30-31 July. These gains have forced a beleaguered OGORF-I to consolidate and shrink their defensive lines closer to Izyum & redeploy their base of supply closer to Kupyansk.

https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1559642155051802624

7/ Further east Russian offensive efforts against Siversk have devolved into small-scale tactical actions. It has been in the Bakhmut area that the SVRF have had their “greatest success”, gaining some ground of positional advantage relative to ZSU units defending here.

8/ The SVRF is pushing the 1st & 2d Army Corps hard to breakthrough lines the Ukrainians have held firm since 2014-15. 1st Army Corps forces have at least partial control of Pisky. Ukrainian fortified lines appear to have been breach in the Marinka area, fighting here continues.

9/ Zaporizhzhia OD. The SVRF has significantly increased their artillery, missile, and airstrikes in the Zaporizhzhia OD, likely to preempt any attempt by the ZSU to transfer to the offensive in this OD by forcing them to remain on the defensive.

10/ The ZSU appears to be replicating the conditions used to defeat the SVRF assault against Kyiv by leveraging precision artillery strike in SVRF deep areas combined with SOF-Partisan attacks in Russian rear areas to force the SVRF to seek disengagement.

11/ These deep attacks are forcing the Russians to pull away from their primary strategic objectives & instead focus on defending their logistical bases, therefore keeping them under unrelenting pressure & denying time to regain offensive equilibrium.

https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1559656255031050240

12/ Odesa-Kherson OD. The ZSU is replicating the same actions / conditions in the Kherson-Odesa OD. Successful deep & rear area attacks by the ZSU and resistance fighters have nullified the SVRFs relative advantage in ground combat power here. #Kherson #Mykolaiv #Odesa #enerhodar

13/ The ZSU counteroffensive in the south will not be initiated by grand maneuvers, it will more likely resemble the actions taken against the 2d GCAA and 41st CAA in the Sumy & Chernihiv Oblast during the early days of the war, but this time at scale.

14/ Ukrainian actions/activity in the Zaporizhzhia & Odesa-Kherson ODs are shaping conditions to conduct a counteroffensive in the most vulnerable VSRF Operational Direction to decisively seize the strategic initiative away from the Russians & throughout the fall & winter.

15/ Black Sea OTMO. The past two weeks has not seen a significant change in VMF activity throughout the Black Sea. Russian surface naval vessels continue to keep close to the Crimean coast or operate in the SW Black Sea. The bulk of the Black Seas Fleet remains at port. #Crimea

16/ Ukraine SVKO. Russian SVKO activity in western Ukraine continues to increase. The VKS has been attempting to expand its UAV coverage over a wider portion of western and central Ukraine at depth. PSU air defenses have been highly effective in shooting down VKS PGMs.

17/ In south and eastern Ukraine attempts at a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) campaign also remain generally ineffective. VKS combat air support missions still can only produce negligible results, mostly likely due to the reliance on toss bombing.

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1558375456960815104

18/ This open-source operational summary is based on publicly available information such as the ZSU daily operations brief, Russian MoD daily brief, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intelligence public statements, and Ukrainian/Western military analysts.

19/ This summary is indebted to the excellent reporting & analysis by @WarintheFuture @IAPonomarenko @DefMon3 @CovertShores @TheShipYard2 @volodymyr @Cyx_5 @EerikMatero @ChuckPfarrer @HelloMrBond @MalcolmNance @dupuyinstitute @KofmanMichael @Militarylandnet among so many others.

20/ Any errors to the information presented here are strictly my own and will be corrected as soon as they are identified.