Critics of #Mearsheimer seem to be more concerned with the moral implications of his argument and the implicit course of alternative action than whether it captures an important (though not the only) part of reality. 1/14 🧵
2/ Mearsheimer's argument that prospective NATO enlargement caused the Russian invasion in #Ukraine is about structural not immediate causes. Critics are right to point out that it can neither explain the exact timing, nor the explicit rhetoric and operational course of action.
3/ Mearsheimer's argument is about power, not security, however. Offensive realism expects Russia as a great power to strive for regional hegemony. As a result, Ukraine moving conclusively into the Western camp (NATO being just one aspect) is viewed as a threat to such ambitions.
4/ Critics argue that Moscow has no right to interfere with decisions of a a sovereign state. They also hold that the war is about neocolonial ambitions which have nothing to do with NATO or the West. Both points do not undermine Mearsheimer's argument, however.
5/ The first point is about the legitimacy of action, which has no place in offensive realism. Politics is about power. If Moscow perceives the situation as a threat to power, it will be real in its consequences. Realism requires decisionmakers to take such consequences seriously
6/ The second point certainly plays a role in explaining Russian conduct and rhetoric, but it is also a structural argument that reinforces Mearsheimer's point about power: Ukraine's ("pro-Western") identity, contradicts the Russian leadership's vision of history, power & status
7/ Now Mearsheimer suggests that if the West had stopped integrating Ukraine into its orbit (norms, rules, if not institutions), the war could have been avoided. It would have required to accept Western limits of power and allow Russia to regain influence in Ukraine.
8/ Critics rightly object that such policy would undermine previous Western policies and ignore Ukrainian agency, but, yet again, these points do not undermine Mearsheimer's argument for to him like Thucidides "the weak suffer what they must" or, have to bear the consequences.
9/ And that is what has happened: The war is the result of incompatible interests. The real question is whether they could have been made compatible through diplomacy and if yes, what kind of compromise would have been feasible. These are the actual points of contention.
10/ Mearsheimer sees no vital Western interests in Ukraine sufficient to risk war with Russia and possible nuclear escalation. Critics either do see vital interests, or play down/ignore the possible consequences (Russian military escalation) of pursuing such interests.
11/ Mearsheimer sees Western responsibility, because the West, in his view, could have easily backed down w/o loosing much (again, to him Ukrainian agency does not matter much). His critics wanted Russia to back down because its interests are perceived as illegitimate/irrational.
12/ Mearsheimer, however, abstains from making any moral judgments about the legitimacy of state interests or its methods (short of genocide etc). This is where his argument becomes implictly normative, because (offensive) realism is about stability and war avoidance, not change
13/ Overall, though, one has to give him credit where credit is due. He saw the situation quite clearly back in 2014 in terms of how the conflict would develop if interests could not be aligned. Whether a "neutral" Ukraine would have been sufficient though is a different issue. 
14/ In 2014 Mearsheimer also saw more clearly than most how a full-scale war would play out, if it happened.
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