The big difference between the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in dealing with local armed groups that cooperate with them is that #IS demands a merger under its complete control. #AQ, on the other hand, is satisfied with military cooperation without any control over these groups.
Al-Qaeda hopes to gain long-term loyalty by cooperating with these armed groups, even though they know that these groups do not pursue jihadist goals. The same tactics were used by jihadists in the past decades in countries like #Algeria, #Egypt or #Libya.
The jihadists burned in this wars their entire forces on the front lines in the hope of establishing a state according to their jihadist ideology. However, the end of these wars was always a truce between their former allies and their opponents.
The #IS, on the other hand, uses a different tactic that its former minister of war Abu Hamza al-Muhajir described in 2008 in "The First Interview" published by Al-Furqan Media.
There he says: "We learned from what happened in Afghanistan.."
There he says: "We learned from what happened in Afghanistan.."
"Because there were groups among us who were hoarding their weapons for the day when the occupiers will leave our country. So when the occupier leaves the country, the secular, nationalist and Baathist groups that have not fought a real battle.."
"..will emerge and take the assets and the weapons. And the mujahidin will be left with their injuries. And the result of all this will be a secular and nationalist state. And we saw this result everywhere in the last decades where the fruits of jihad were stolen."
End | In my estimation, #AQ is pursuing outdated jihadist tactics that will completely break their backs in the long run. And I guess #Mali will be the first example in the coming years. #IS, however, seems to have learned from past mistakes and tries a different tactic.
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