Russian President Vladimir #Putin declared the end of Russian military mobilization on October 28, likely to free up administrative and training capacity in time for the delayed start of the Russian autumn conscription cycle beginning on November 1. isw.pub/UkrWar102822
2/ Defense Minister Sergei #Shoigu, who joined #Putin, stated that #Russia mobilized 300K men, 82K of whom are deployed in #Ukraine and 218K of whom are training at Russian training grounds. Putin stated that 41K of the 82K servicemen in Ukraine are serving in combat units.
3/ #Russia‘s now-completed mobilization is unlikely to decisively impact Russian combat power. isw.pub/UkrWar102822
4/ #Putin described a 50-50 split between mobilized personnel in combat and support roles in #Ukraine. Applied generally, that ratio suggests a total of 150K mobilized personnel will deploy to combat roles in Ukraine after training is complete, likely sometime in November.
5/ #Russia’s deployment of 41K poorly trained combat personnel to #Ukraine may have temporarily stiffened Russian defensive lines, although these reservists have not yet faced the full weight of a major and prepared Ukrainian counteroffensive thrust.
5/ The deployment has not significantly increased Russian combat power. The deployment of an additional 110K or so mobilized men to combat units, therefore, remains unlikely to change the trajectory of the war. isw.pub/UkrWar102822
6/ #Putin may be attempting to reestablish #Shoigu’s authority in the Russian information space to balance the growing influence of the Russian pro-war siloviki faction (people with meaningful power bases within Putin’s inner circle who are fielding combat forces in #Ukraine).
7/ Putin could have announced the end of mobilization himself instead of in a meeting with Shoigu or could have tasked Shoigu with concluding the flawed mobilization effort on his own. Their staged public meeting is consistent with the recent surge in Shoigu’s media appearances.
8/ #Shoigu’s presence in the information space depends on the approval of the #Kremlin since #Putin can control when and whether Shoigu speaks publicly. Shoigu’s siloviki rivals control their own Telegram channels and speak freely to the media. isw.pub/UkrWar102822
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2/ A Russian information operation is pushing the narrative that Russian forces are making significant progress in #Bakhmut, likely to improve morale and possibly the personal standing of #Prigozhin, whose #Wagner forces are largely responsible for the minimal gains in the area.
3/ Russian forces have made limited advances towards the Ukrainian strong point in #Bakhmut but at a languid speed and a significant cost.
#Putin continues to reject Ukrainian sovereignty in a way that is incompatible with serious negotiations. His perpetuation of the narrative that #Ukraine and #Russia are a single people indicates his continued objective to destroy the Ukrainian state.
2/ #Putin’s recent statements reject the legal fact that #Ukraine is a fully sovereign state, that the Russian Federation recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty, and that the Ukrainian people exist as a distinct nation.
3/ Putin’s perpetuation of the narrative that #Ukraine and #Russia are a single people separated into different states by arbitrary historical circumstances indicates his continued objective to destroy the Ukrainian state and erase the notion of a Ukrainian people.
Russian officials continued to admit that #Russia is deporting Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of adoption and vacation schemes. isw.pub/UkrWar102622
2/ Russian media reported on October 26 that the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, adopted a Ukrainian child who was deported from Mariupol to Russia.
3/ Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian officials have brought 31 children from Mariupol to Russia and that her office is working to “rehabilitate” Ukrainian children from active combat zones.
2/ Prigozhin explicitly denied @TheStudyofWar's October 25 assessment and falsely insinuated that ISW receives classified intelligence.
3/ ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery & other geospatial data for our work.
Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s rhetoric indicates that he is not interested in negotiating seriously with #Ukraine and retains maximalist objectives for the war. isw.pub/UkrWar102622
2/ Putin stated that #Ukraine has “lost sovereignty” in a meeting with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) security officials on October 26.
3/ This language is incompatible with negotiations on an equal basis for a ceasefire, let alone a resolution to the conflict that #Russia began.
NEW: A @Reuters investigation of a document trove found in an abandoned #Russian command post in Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast, supports @TheStudyofWar's longstanding assessments about the poor condition of Russian forces.
2/ ISW has long assessed that the conventional Russian military in Ukraine is severely degraded and has largely lost offensive capabilities...that Russian strategic commanders have been micromanaging operational commanders' tactical decisions, and that Russian morale is very low.
3/ @Reuters' investigation found that Russian units near Balakliya were severely understrength, with a combat battalion at 19.6 percent strength and a reserve unit at 23 percent strength. reuters.com/investigates/s…