There's a few sources here to work with: official, local, and Rus. milbloggers (who either interpret or infer from events). This is an unconfirmed video (Ukrainian origin) accompanying the claim:
"MTR [SOF] on boats trying to cross the #Dnieper."
#Russian milbloggers don't deny these claims. In fact, they dispute the value of Kinburn (and areas) since it's landscape "is of rare forest, swamp, and fishing villages."
[Kinburn] is "impossible to surrender because it is impossible to control."
Interestingly, Anatoly Shariy (who may have been the origin of the claim "20,000 Russians stuck in Kherson," and is often hyperbolic) seems keen to highlight discontent among milbloggers. It's not clear if he agrees on the value of the operation.
Going back about a month (October 10) and the reports of Russian attacks emanating from the Kinburn peninsula become more apparent. Numerous instances of shelling along the coast reported by OK South.
First, the strategic value of the Kinburn peninsula is up-for-debate. It does imply control of the mouth of the Dnieper, but that's generally understood by control of Kherson.
12/
Second: an initial AFU attempt to establish SOF bridgehead to flank RAF now concentrated east of the Dnieper.
Third: as part of interdiction efforts to remove the threat of artillery, or drone launches, from the Mykolaiv coast.
On November 02 there is a mention to an article that quotes the claim from a recently-mobilized Russian solider "who was transferred to the Kinburn spit"
Regardless of the specifics of the claim (which remain unconfirmed) the Ukrainian tone appears increasingly confident of an actual military operation having taken place.
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And now it gets messy: two active and competing narratives re: #Kinburn .
But, it appears increasingly possible that an AFU operation likely took place. Russian sources shifting to claim 'defeat' of an operation, no longer deriding it as hyperbole.
Quick note: I've actively shifted this thread from part-deductive approach to tracking various pieces of the information environment re: Kinburn.
Part of my approach is understanding how various sources echo and complement each other, and which details make it out.
25/
Rus. channels have now released an aggregated assessment, tracking a sequence of claims. They don't outright refute claims re: Kinburn, and instead cite the absence of official confirmation from Ukr. sources.
The info space on #kinburnspit remains opaque. It has been another 12 hours and only one update on existing claims has been made (cross-posted several times).
An important detail re: #kinburnspit appears. ISW is now taking on the story, citing a Forbes article which describes the claim, but does not provide any new evidence.
Assume this will gain traction, and fast. Let's see if rumors turn into 'proof'.
Of note: there are a handful of comments by prominent Ukraine TG channels from early 11/15 (UTC+2) I'm holding onto, in anticipation of updates beginning 07:00 UTC+2 as daylight breaks in Ukraine.
However, there was an interesting element to the story from 11/13:
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This suggests willingness to broadcast the claim openly, and from a source more closely resembling an official one.
It is still unclear what is truth; however, #Ukraine appears intent on maintaining informational guardrails—a pattern repeated during sensitive operations.
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They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.
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From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.
Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.
This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.
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That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.
Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.
The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.
2|2
+1
Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.
If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️
Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.
Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.