| osint_east | Profile picture
Nov 12, 2022 40 tweets 23 min read Read on X
🤔

I thought working out a context/investigative thread on this developing story may be of use.

Recent posts suggest fighting in/near #Kinburn Peninsula [Кінбурнська] or vicinity of Herois'ke [Геройське].

The whole story is incomplete, but there is come context:

1/X
There's a few sources here to work with: official, local, and Rus. milbloggers (who either interpret or infer from events). This is an unconfirmed video (Ukrainian origin) accompanying the claim:

"MTR [SOF] on boats trying to cross the #Dnieper."

t.me/horevica/7571

2/
There was a corresponding (albeit cryptic) message from OK South pointing at military operations, later confirmed in an official post.

Note: on a Nov. 11 post OK So. mentions only Kinburn "remains to be liberated."

t.me/mykolaivskaODA…
t.me/mykolaivskaODA…

3/ ImageImageImage
#Russian milbloggers don't deny these claims. In fact, they dispute the value of Kinburn (and areas) since it's landscape "is of rare forest, swamp, and fishing villages."

[Kinburn] is "impossible to surrender because it is impossible to control."

t.me/mig41/22160

4/ Image
They shop these talking points around & are synchronized. It appears they're keeping pace with events & not overreacting.

Note: the events of Kherson are having an extremely adverse affect on the Russian narrative/info space.

t.me/mig41/22160
t.me/russ_orientali…

5/
Interestingly, Anatoly Shariy (who may have been the origin of the claim "20,000 Russians stuck in Kherson," and is often hyperbolic) seems keen to highlight discontent among milbloggers. It's not clear if he agrees on the value of the operation.

t.me/ASupersharij/1…

6/ Image
Locally, residents (?) are also aware of the impending (or current) operation. Calls for submitting "fresh information on the enemy."

Note the post is in Russian, corresponding with regional dialect.

t.me/vanek_nikolaev…

7/ ImageImage
Then this caught my eye, mentioned in reposts. A report on Nov. 05 suggesting RAF had used the Kinburn peninsula for launching drones.

A more recent post doesn't mention that reference, using OK South reporting line instead.

t.me/Tsaplienko/197…
t.me/Tsaplienko/203…

8/ Image
Going back about a month (October 10) and the reports of Russian attacks emanating from the Kinburn peninsula become more apparent. Numerous instances of shelling along the coast reported by OK South.

t.me/mykolaivskaODA…
t.me/mykolaivskaODA…

9/ Image
And then, it turns out, we have this report (unconfirmed) about two weeks earlier on September 26:

"The Armed Forces hit the control and training center of Iranian drones"

"...not far from the Kinburn spit."

t.me/hueviyherson/2…

10/ ImageImage
3 days earlier (Sep. 23), this report claiming the shoot-down of Mohajer-6 emerged. With a 200+ km range the specific launch point is unknown.

However, by AFU claims, and based on the strike on Sep. 26, the Kinburn area is at least suspected.

t.me/Tsaplienko/164…

11/
So what could be happening here? A few thoughts:

First, the strategic value of the Kinburn peninsula is up-for-debate. It does imply control of the mouth of the Dnieper, but that's generally understood by control of Kherson.

12/
Second: an initial AFU attempt to establish SOF bridgehead to flank RAF now concentrated east of the Dnieper.

Third: as part of interdiction efforts to remove the threat of artillery, or drone launches, from the Mykolaiv coast.

Or—maybe all the above.

@ThreshedThought ?

13/
It would appear a possible long-term intent would be focused on expanding viability of the second option.

But viability is unclear—the Kinburn peninsula is incredibly rugged, is narrow, has few paved roads, and can be readily surveilled by the RAF.

t.me/Tsaplienko/203…

14/ ImageImage
Now for a twist.

On November 02 there is a mention to an article that quotes the claim from a recently-mobilized Russian solider "who was transferred to the Kinburn spit"

t.me/suspilnekherso…

15/ Image
In that Nov 2. article the mobilized soldier is claimed as saying:

"they took us to the Kinburn spit, which seems to be considered the Mykolaiv region."

"...commanders say we will hold defense here in case of a landing from the Ukrainian side."

crimea.suspilne.media/ua/news/9577

16/ Image
We can now invite a fourth possibility to the event, which can be framed in two ways:

1) disinformation by AFU to further complicate & frustrate the Russian information space (in the wake of Kherson)

2) PSYOP intended to divert Russian forces away from other key defenses.

17/
Update: this claim is now moving around in the #Ukrainian information space re: #Kinburn

There's been an (approx.) 12-hour lull in reporting on this matter, until Volya Media (reliable) resurfaces it and releases a concise statement.

t.me/volyamedia/473 [18:49 UTC+2]

18/ Image
Within half an hour it makes its way across several Ukrainian reporting channels. They are seeking additional confirmation.

The working claim appears based on (local) reporting, and that sources await "official statements"

t.me/Tsaplienko/204… [19:34 UTC+2]

19/ Image
As the Ukr. info space is pacing based on available sources, Rus. milbloggers continue to deflect any claims.

They again cite A. Shariy as sowing hyperbolic statements (referencing his claim of "20,000 Russians trapped in Kherson).

t.me/swodki/190185 [15:38 UTC+2]

20/ Image
Regardless of the specifics of the claim (which remain unconfirmed) the Ukrainian tone appears increasingly confident of an actual military operation having taken place.

21/
And now it gets messy: two active and competing narratives re: #Kinburn .

But, it appears increasingly possible that an AFU operation likely took place. Russian sources shifting to claim 'defeat' of an operation, no longer deriding it as hyperbole.

t.me/boris_rozhin/7…

22/ Image
The updated claims are now moving across high-profile pro-Ukrainian accounts on Twitter.

Let's see how this plays out in the coming hours.

23/

Amid the claims of a Ukrainian operation, a key resignation sets in.

Milbloggers' tone suggest they are resigned to the conclusion that Kinburn is either no longer under Russian control, or don't care otherwise.

t.me/swodki/190339

24/ Image
Quick note: I've actively shifted this thread from part-deductive approach to tracking various pieces of the information environment re: Kinburn.

Part of my approach is understanding how various sources echo and complement each other, and which details make it out.

25/
Rus. channels have now released an aggregated assessment, tracking a sequence of claims. They don't outright refute claims re: Kinburn, and instead cite the absence of official confirmation from Ukr. sources.

These talking points are shopped around.

t.me/RVvoenkor/31781

26/ Image
12 hours have gone by & a local TG group (private) - same that asked for 'fresh information on the enemy' - had only two messages:

1) asking members not create 'informational noise'

2) forwarded earlier message claiming AFU activity in/on #Kinburn

t.me/vanek_nikolaev…

27/ ImageImage
The info space on #kinburnspit remains opaque. It has been another 12 hours and only one update on existing claims has been made (cross-posted several times).

"Kinburn is ours" - [unofficial]

Let's see how this affects the info space.

t.me/bochkala_war/9… [18:27 UTC+2]

28/ ImageImage
An important detail re: #kinburnspit appears. ISW is now taking on the story, citing a Forbes article which describes the claim, but does not provide any new evidence.

Assume this will gain traction, and fast. Let's see if rumors turn into 'proof'.

29/
Rus. milbloggers report about on time, and appear to push ready-made counter-claims which are specific and concise.

Notably, they have since updated the number of AFU soldiers killed, and provided specifics on AFU units involved.

t.me/milchronicles/… [18:56 UTC+2]

30/ Image
Rus. EOD assessments have been posted. A few details:

1) No apparent concrete knowledge of what's happening.

Updates on Kinburn pushed to bottom of assessment (unclear if intentional or not); repeat claims of "AFU destroyed" verbatim.

t.me/rybar/41153 [23:10 UTC+2]

31/ Image
2) Outright refuting (via reposted comments) the claims of AFU landings.

Also, the claims of Alyoshek [Алёшек] (Oleshky) are noted as also false — "a game"

MIR, exasperatedly: "Who are you listening to???"

t.me/mig41/22220 [22:40 UTC+2]

32/ Image
3) Continuing to question strategic value or purpose of any such operation.

Note suggestion (or speculation) that if any event took place, it was RECON only, and no actual landing took place.

t.me/RSaponkov/3980 [22:53 UTC+2]

33/ Image
Only one (apparent) update from Ukr. info space featuring a cross-posted video, claiming as AFU in boats attempting a landing.

The video is about as clear as the previous three (meaning it's not clear at all: location or when filmed).

t.me/Tsaplienko/204… [23:03 UTC+2]

34/ Image
Regardless of updates from Russian or Ukrainian sources, something else interesting is happening with disparate claims—Kinburn, Herosike, Oleshky:

They are implicitly fused together as a wider (rumored) op. along the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

35/

I think fusing the disparate claims is significant for the info environment for two reasons:

1) Should one turn out as false, it is at least arguable to prove another could be true.

2) If all turn out false, is enables channels to aggrandize the effort (a "grand" PSYOP).

36/
In Ukrainian info-space, only one EOD update: DEEPSTATE makes a pointed remark:

"await official confirmation" ... "on the enemy on the Kinburn pen, in the fire of battle."

The translation may be an issue (see how sentences combine).

t.me/DeepStateUA/14… [00:44 UTC+2]

37/ Image
Of note: there are a handful of comments by prominent Ukraine TG channels from early 11/15 (UTC+2) I'm holding onto, in anticipation of updates beginning 07:00 UTC+2 as daylight breaks in Ukraine.

However, there was an interesting element to the story from 11/13:

38/
HB Radio's evening broadcast hosted Dmytro Snegiryov, who's subtle remarks on #Kinburn repeat existing claims.

Interestingly, it is the *first* subject discussed, albeit it is not extensively detailed (unsurprising).

podcasts.nv.ua/episode/16720.… [HB-R]

39/ Image
This suggests willingness to broadcast the claim openly, and from a source more closely resembling an official one.

It is still unclear what is truth; however, #Ukraine appears intent on maintaining informational guardrails—a pattern repeated during sensitive operations.

40/

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More from @osint_east

Jan 3, 2023
It's worth noting this occurred 1) on a holiday, and 2) during a holiday celebration, making the strike perhaps more psychologically devastating.

If the same event occurred in, say, November I'm not clear outrage would be as great (though anger over incompetence would be).

1|4
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.

2|
From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.

3|
Read 5 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
On casualty estimates and their impact:

Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.

#Makiivka

1|4
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.

This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.

2|
That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.

Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.

s: t.me/sovanews63/285…

3| Translation  s: https://t.me/sovanews63/28593  Sourced: Jan.
Read 4 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
Reference on the #Makiivka strike:

The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.

i/s: t.me/grey_zone/16439

1|2 "Destroyed Vocational ...
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.

2|2
+1

Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.

s: t.me/NeoficialniyBe… Translation.  s: https://t....
Read 5 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.

If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.

1|3
In a strange way he seems detached at times, bordering on indifferent if only to allow (objective) reporting while others lean overly-performative.

МИГ and Rozhin are similar in this way–far more "matter of fact" language used by the two.

s: t.me/mig41/22995

2| Tranlation: MIR  Sourced: J...
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️

Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.

3|3
Read 4 tweets
Dec 15, 2022
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?

A new look at #WagnerPMC

#UkraineRussianWar
#Mercenaries

🔞

1 of 48 PART ONE: In the Shadows  W...
Studies on #Wagner, a unofficial quasi-state military apparatus, illustrate #Kremlin shadow efforts aimed at enabling foreign policy objectives.

Simply, Wagner brings to bear the levers of organized violence where (official) #Russian forces cannot.

2|
This violence is an enabling force, but also a restrictive one. It is, in effect, Wagner's primary capability.

All other internal efforts (media, power-projection, political maneuvering) are oriented towards enabling and maintaining this capability.

russianpmcs.csis.org

3|
Read 49 tweets
Dec 14, 2022
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.

Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.

#Bakhmut

1/N
This is not an ideal vector (poor cover, flexible) but is a more efficient route to city center & river crossings.

Breaking secondary AFU defensive lines is a clear goal.

As suspected, Wagner is moving off main approaches to avoid interception.

2/

In terms of rhetoric the Wagner/milblogger narrative is kicking into gear by framing these smaller actions as more indicative of general AFU setbacks.

s: t.me/pmc_wagnera_to…
s: t.me/c/1827743879/1…

3/ Translation: Wagner PMC  Sourced: Dec 14. 2022. Telegram.Translation: Wagner PMC  Sourced: Dec 14. 2022. Telegram.
Read 6 tweets

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