#Putin likely elevated Russian Army General Sergey #Surovikin and let him withdraw from western #Kherson on condition that he take the rest of #Donetsk Oblast using Russian forces recouped from western Kherson as well as newly-arriving mobilized servicemen.🧵
2/ This observation offered by Andriy Zagorodnyuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Center of Defense Strategies, is the likeliest explanation for the resumption in the intensity of Russian offensive operations first around #Bakhmut and then to the southwest around the #Vuhledar area.
3/ Russia's recent offensive efforts in #Donetsk otherwise make little operational sense. They are far from operationally significant locations apart from #Bakhmut...
...and were launched during a difficult muddy time by inadequately prepared mobilized servicemen before Russian commanders in the area had amassed enough combat power for decisive operations.
#Surovikin likely ordered them to start when they did as an earnest sign of his commitment to #Putin.
4/ It was clear that the Russians would be unable to defend their lodgment in western #Kherson Oblast by the time #Surovikin took command of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine on October 8.
5/ #Surovikin signaled his intention to withdraw from western #Kherson almost immediately and likely began setting conditions to retreat within a couple of weeks.
6/ It is not clear whether #Putin authorized #Surovikin to abandon western #Kherson fully at that time or whether Surovikin had to continue working to persuade Putin of the hopelessness of any effort to hold on in western Kherson.
7/ However that may be, Russian Defense Minister Sergey #Shoigu met with #Surovikin on November 9 in a staged, public setting and ordered him to withdraw, which Surovikin promptly did. isw.pub/UkrWar111322
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A cessation or prolonged slowing of combat operations in #Ukraine over the next few months is very unlikely, and any attempt at a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities at this time would overwhelmingly favor #Russia.🧵
2/ The Russians are emphatically not attempting to establish and strengthen defensive positions all along the line but are rather renewing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.
The Ukrainians will almost certainly continue their counter-offensive operations already underway.
3/ Both sides are already fighting in very muddy conditions. They will not likely stop fighting when winter freezes the ground and makes it even more conducive to large-scale mechanized maneuver warfare. Combat is more likely to intensify than to slacken as temperatures drop.
#Ukraine will also likely recoup combat power from western #Kherson and redeploy it to other areas for both defensive and counter-offensive operations.🧵
2/ The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) could conceivably try to chase the Russians across the #Dnipro River at various points but is unlikely to do so because the logistics of supporting a Ukrainian lodgment on the eastern bank are very daunting.
3/ The UAF is therefore more likely to consolidate its control of the western bank, leave enough force to deter any Russian attempt to cross the river again, and reallocate forces to other areas.
Russian offensive operations in #Donetsk Oblast of #Ukraine will intensify in the coming weeks as additional mobilized servicemen arrive along with forces withdrawn from western #Kherson Oblast.🧵
2/ Ukrainian forces in the area will find themselves hard-pressed, and #Kyiv will very likely have to divert troops to defend against these renewed Russian offensives.
3/ The Russians are not likely to make operationally significant gains despite their renewed efforts, although they could conceivably take #Bakhmut over time at enormous cost.
#Ukraine has won an important victory in the campaign that liberated western #Kherson.🧵
#Putin had been determined to hold this key terrain, possession of which would have allowed him to renew his invasion of unoccupied Ukraine from positions on the right bank of the #Dnipro.
2/ The importance of the Russian lodgement on the right bank of the #Dnipro River for renewing future Russian offensive operations was likely more important in #Putin‘s calculations than the symbolic value of retaining the only oblast capital his forces had seized since February.
3/ #Putin had committed substantial Russian forces to the defense of western #Kherson, including many of the remaining elite airborne units available to the Russian military. He also committed reinforcements generated by the partial mobilization of reservists ordered on Sept. 21.
2/ The Russians are not setting conditions for a relaxation of hostilities for the rest of the fall and into the winter but rather are launching a new offensive in #Donetsk Oblast.
3/ The Ukrainians will likely use combat power recouped from the liberation of western #Kherson to reinforce their ongoing counter-offensive in #Luhansk Oblast or to open a new counter-offensive drive elsewhere.
#Putin is having a harder time appeasing parts of #Russia's highly ideological pro-war constituency due to his military’s inability to deliver his maximalist goals of overthrowing the Ukrainian government and seizing all of #Ukraine, as ISW has assessed. isw.pub/UkrWar111222
2/ #Putin needs to retain the support of this community and has likely ordered some of his propagandists to suppress any critiques of the Russian withdrawal from #Kherson City since many state TV news programs have been omitting or downplaying the aftermath of withdrawal.
3/ The ever-increasing doubts among extreme Russian nationalists about #Putin’s commitment to Russian ideology reduce Putin’s appeal to the nationalist community, while mobilization and high casualties will likely continue to upset members of Russian society.