The overall pace of #Russian and #Ukrainian operations along the frontline has slowed in recent days due to deteriorating weather conditions but is likely to increase starting in the next few weeks as temperatures drop and the ground freezes.
2/ Ukrainian and Russian reporting from critical frontline areas throughout eastern and southern Ukraine, including ##Svatove, #Bakhmut, and #Vuhledar, indicates that operations on both sides are currently bogged down by heavy rain and the resulting heavy mud.
3/ Temperatures are forecasted to drop throughout #Ukraine over the next week, which will likely freeze the ground and expedite the pace of fighting as mobility increases for both sides.
4/ The temperature in areas in #Ukraine’s northeast, such as along the Svatove-Kreminna line, will dip to near-or-below-freezing daily highs between November 28 and December 4.
5/ It will likely take the ground some days of consistent freezing temperatures to solidify, which means that ground conditions are likely to be set to allow the pace of operations to increase throughout #Ukraine over the course of the weekend of DEC 3-4 & into the following week
6/ It is unclear if either side is actively planning or preparing to resume major offensive or counter-offensive operations at that time, but the meteorological factors that have been hindering such operations will begin lifting. isw.pub/UkrWar112622
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Russian forces have likely deployed mobilized personnel to the primary lines of defense and pulled experienced, professional units to the secondary and tertiary lines of defense, a deployment pattern that could lead to more rapid Ukrainian advances.
2/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously reported, Russian mobilized personnel are generally poorly trained, equipped, and led, significantly increasing casualties among mobilized personnel and decreasing their willingness to fight.
3/ Such reports are so frequent and pervasive that they have divided the Russian information space and prompted swift punishment and suppression.
Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River. isw.pub/UkrWar112722
2/ Russian forces would presumably delay until they can deploy reinforcements to either stop or slow Ukrainian forces from breaking through secondary and tertiary lines of defense that protect critical GLOCs both to #Crimea and to western #Zaporizhia Oblast (as shown in the map).
3/ It is unclear if the Russian military leadership foresees a delay mission at the operational or the strategic level. An operational-level delay would require holding long enough to allow forces already in theater to move from other areas to eastern #Kherson.
Russian forces are fortifying their positions along critical GLOCs in eastern #Kherson Oblast against a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive.🧵 isw.pub/UkrWar112722
Satellite images below were captured 15 NOV via @Maxar
2/ @Maxar imagery from 15 NOV shows that Russian forces have prioritized digging trenches & erecting dragon’s teeth anti-tank defenses along GLOCs that connect Russian forces on the left bank of the Dnipro River with southeastern rear areas in Kherson Oblast and Crimea...
...as well as with eastern rear areas around Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.
3/ Most of these field fortifications are situated directly on the GLOCs and are primarily oriented perpendicular to the roads themselves.
Tonight's assessment from @TheStudyofWar and @criticalthreats evaluates the defensive positions Russian forces are establishing in eastern #Kherson Oblast and what those positions suggest about Russian expectations for future operations in this area.🧵isw.pub/UkrWar112722
2/ The Russian military clearly assesses that Ukrainian forces could cross the Dnipro River and conduct counter-offensive operations in eastern Kherson Oblast, possibly threatening all of the critical ground lines of communications (GLOCs) from Crimea to the mainland.
3/ Russian forces have been digging trench lines and concentration areas in eastern Kherson since early October 2022 in apparent preparation for the withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River and Kherson City.
Russian officials may be attempting to counterbalance the influence of #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin through the promotion of other parallel military structures. isw.pub/UkrWar112622
2/ The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 26 that Russian officials appointed a Viktor Yanukovych-linked, pro-Kremlin businessman, Armen Sarkisyan, as the new administrator for prisons in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine...
...and that Sarkisyan intends to use the role to create a new “private military company.”
Russian forces are likely using inert Kh-55 cruise missiles in their massive missile strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, further highlighting the depletion of the Russian military’s high-precision weapons arsenal. isw.pub/UkrWar112622
2/ The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 26 that Russia is likely removing nuclear warheads from aging Kh-55 missiles and launching the missiles without warheads at targets in #Ukraine.
3/ The UK MoD suggested that Russian forces are likely launching the inert missiles as decoys to divert Ukrainian air defenses.