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Nov 28 9 tweets 4 min read
🧵Part 2 on Russian defenses in eastern #Kherson:

Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River. isw.pub/UkrWar112722
2/ Russian forces would presumably delay until they can deploy reinforcements to either stop or slow Ukrainian forces from breaking through secondary and tertiary lines of defense that protect critical GLOCs both to #Crimea and to western #Zaporizhia Oblast (as shown in the map).
3/ It is unclear if the Russian military leadership foresees a delay mission at the operational or the strategic level. An operational-level delay would require holding long enough to allow forces already in theater to move from other areas to eastern #Kherson.
4/ A strategic-level delay would mean holding long enough to allow newly-mobilized units time to arrive in the theater. The difference lies primarily in the Russian military’s perception of time-space relationships in this area.
5/ Russian forces would likely take many months to drive through a Ukrainian defensive array if the Ukrainians had built one like the one described in our Sunday report.
6/ If Russian forces expect Ukrainian forces to take months to break through their defenses in this region, they could reasonably expect additional mobilized forces or partially-trained conscripts to arrive in time to stop and possibly reverse the Ukrainian counter-offensive.
7/ But Ukrainian counter-offensives have sometimes moved much more rapidly than that, once launched.
8/ If Ukrainian forces were able to penetrate several of the Russian defensive lines in Kherson Oblast in weeks rather than months, then Russian forces would have to reinforce from other parts of the theater with forces already deployed and operating there.
9/ The defensive array itself offers no insight into the Russians’ expectations in this regard.

Read our full assessment of Russian defensive positions in eastern #Kherson Oblast: isw.pub/UkrWar112722

Support @TheStudyofWar on #GivingTuesday: isw.pub/GivingTuesday2…

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More from @TheStudyofWar

Nov 30
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 29 that Russian forces have likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three months. isw.pub/UkrWar112922 Image
2/ The UK MoD stated that the BTGs‘ relatively low allocation of infantry, decentralized distribution of artillery, and the limited independence of BTG decision-making hindered their success in Ukraine.
3/ @TheStudyofWar assessed starting in April that Russian BTGs were degraded in various failed or culminated Russian offensives, including the attacks on Kyiv, Mariupol, Severodonetsk, & Lysychansk, and later efforts to reconstitute these BTGs to restore their combat power failed
Read 6 tweets
Nov 30
Eastern #Ukraine Update:

#Russian forces made marginal gains around #Bakhmut on November 29, but Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed. /1
isw.pub/UkrWar112922 Image
Eastern #Ukraine Update:

#Russian forces continued to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations around #Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Svatove and #Kreminna. /2
isw.pub/UkrWar112922 Image
Eastern #Ukraine Update:

#Russian forces continued limited ground attacks west of #Kreminna to regain lost positions. /3
isw.pub/UkrWar112922
Read 4 tweets
Nov 30
NEW: #Russian forces made marginal gains around #Bakhmut today, but Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed.

isw.pub/UkrWar112922 ImageImageImageImage
2/ Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances southeast of #Bakhmut but @TheStudyofWar remains unable to confirm most other claimed gains around Bakhmut made since November 27.
3/ Some Russian milbloggers made unsubstantiated claims that Russian forces broke through the Ukrainian defensive line south of #Bakhmut along the T0513 highway to advance towards Chasiv Yar.
Read 5 tweets
Nov 29
.@TheStudyofWar has produced hundreds of daily assessments and thousands of maps to track the war in #Ukraine. Meet a few analysts from our small (but mighty) team working hard 7 days a week to keep you informed.🧵
isw.pub/GivingTuesday2…
“At the end of the day, what we really need is…more people who are passionate about this work.” - Lina, Russia Analyst

Give to help grow our team: isw.pub/GivingTuesday2…
“I think the reason people trust ISW is because we go very far out of our way to make sure that we caveat information and only run things when we are sure that they actually occurred.” - Mason, Senior Analyst, Russia Team Lead

Give to help us keep up: isw.pub/GivingTuesday2…
Read 4 tweets
Nov 29
NEW: Recent claims of Russian gains around #Bakhmut do not portend an imminent Russian encirclement of the city.

Read the latest on #Ukraine in tonight's Russian offensive campaign assessment w/ @criticalthreats: isw.pub/UkrWar112822 ImageImageImageImage
2/ Geolocated imagery shows that Russian forces likely captured Ozarianivka (a village about 15km southwest of #Bakhmut) around November 27 or 28.
3/ Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also captured Kurdiumivka (13km SW of #Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km SW of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km SW of Bakhmut), Zelenopillia (13km south of Bakhmut), Pidhorodne (5km NE of Bakhmut) and Spirne (30km NE of Bakhmut)...
Read 10 tweets
Nov 28
🧵Part 3 on Eastern #Kherson:

Russian forces have likely deployed mobilized personnel to the primary lines of defense and pulled experienced, professional units to the secondary and tertiary lines of defense, a deployment pattern that could lead to more rapid Ukrainian advances.
2/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously reported, Russian mobilized personnel are generally poorly trained, equipped, and led, significantly increasing casualties among mobilized personnel and decreasing their willingness to fight.
3/ Such reports are so frequent and pervasive that they have divided the Russian information space and prompted swift punishment and suppression.
Read 11 tweets

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