2/ Geolocated imagery shows that Russian forces likely captured Ozarianivka (a village about 15km southwest of #Bakhmut) around November 27 or 28.
3/ Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also captured Kurdiumivka (13km SW of #Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km SW of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km SW of Bakhmut), Zelenopillia (13km south of Bakhmut), Pidhorodne (5km NE of Bakhmut) and Spirne (30km NE of Bakhmut)...
4/ ...with the intention of encircling #Bakhmut from the south and east.
There is no open-source evidence supporting these claims at this time.
5/ Russian sources have notably propagated spurious claims regarding gains around #Bakhmut as part of a continued information operation since October, and recent unsubstantiated territorial claims may be part of this continued information operation.
6/ Even if Russian forces have indeed succeeded in taking control of settlements south of #Bakhmut, these gains do not threaten the critical T0513 (Bakhmut-Siversk) & T0504 (Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka) routes that serve as major Ukrainian ground lines of communication into Bakhmut.
7/ There is also a network of smaller village roads that connect to Bakhmut via the city’s northwest. The claimed Russian positions closest to Bakhmut in Klishchiivka & Pidhorodne lead directly into prepared Ukr. defenses in Bakhmut & its western and northern satellite villages.
8/ Russian forces in #Klishchiivka, in order to advance any further, would have to cross three kilometers of fields with little cover and concealment. Russian troops, in their current degraded state, are likely unable to be able to accomplish this task quickly.
9/ #Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy #Prigozhin himself observed in October that Wagner forces operating in the #Bakhmut area advance only 100–200 meters a day.
10/ Russian claimed advances around #Bakhmut over the course of November 27 and 28 are thus unlikely to generate operational-level effects and certainly not quickly. isw.pub/UkrWar112822
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The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 29 that Russian forces have likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three months. isw.pub/UkrWar112922
2/ The UK MoD stated that the BTGs‘ relatively low allocation of infantry, decentralized distribution of artillery, and the limited independence of BTG decision-making hindered their success in Ukraine.
3/ @TheStudyofWar assessed starting in April that Russian BTGs were degraded in various failed or culminated Russian offensives, including the attacks on Kyiv, Mariupol, Severodonetsk, & Lysychansk, and later efforts to reconstitute these BTGs to restore their combat power failed
#Russian forces made marginal gains around #Bakhmut on November 29, but Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar112922
#Russian forces continued to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations around #Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Svatove and #Kreminna. /2 isw.pub/UkrWar112922
NEW: #Russian forces made marginal gains around #Bakhmut today, but Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed.
2/ Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances southeast of #Bakhmut but @TheStudyofWar remains unable to confirm most other claimed gains around Bakhmut made since November 27.
3/ Some Russian milbloggers made unsubstantiated claims that Russian forces broke through the Ukrainian defensive line south of #Bakhmut along the T0513 highway to advance towards Chasiv Yar.
.@TheStudyofWar has produced hundreds of daily assessments and thousands of maps to track the war in #Ukraine. Meet a few analysts from our small (but mighty) team working hard 7 days a week to keep you informed.🧵 isw.pub/GivingTuesday2…
“At the end of the day, what we really need is…more people who are passionate about this work.” - Lina, Russia Analyst
“I think the reason people trust ISW is because we go very far out of our way to make sure that we caveat information and only run things when we are sure that they actually occurred.” - Mason, Senior Analyst, Russia Team Lead
Russian forces have likely deployed mobilized personnel to the primary lines of defense and pulled experienced, professional units to the secondary and tertiary lines of defense, a deployment pattern that could lead to more rapid Ukrainian advances.
2/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously reported, Russian mobilized personnel are generally poorly trained, equipped, and led, significantly increasing casualties among mobilized personnel and decreasing their willingness to fight.
3/ Such reports are so frequent and pervasive that they have divided the Russian information space and prompted swift punishment and suppression.
Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River. isw.pub/UkrWar112722
2/ Russian forces would presumably delay until they can deploy reinforcements to either stop or slow Ukrainian forces from breaking through secondary and tertiary lines of defense that protect critical GLOCs both to #Crimea and to western #Zaporizhia Oblast (as shown in the map).
3/ It is unclear if the Russian military leadership foresees a delay mission at the operational or the strategic level. An operational-level delay would require holding long enough to allow forces already in theater to move from other areas to eastern #Kherson.